Re S
[Parental Alienation] [2020] EWCA Civ 568. I set this out at length in the earlier judgment, but it is worth doing so again:“7.At the outset, it must be acknowledged that, whether a family is united or divided, it is not uncommon for there to be difficulties in a parent-child relationship that cannot fairly be laid at the door of the other parent. Children have their own feelings and needs and where their parents are polarised they are bound to feel the effects. Situations of this kind, where the concerned parent is being no more than properly supportive, must obviously be distinguished from those where an emotionally abusive process is taking place. For that reason, the value of early fact-finding has repeatedly been emphasised.8.As to alienation, we do not intend to add to the debate about labels. We agree with Sir Andrew McFarlane (see [2018] Fam Law 988) that where behaviour is abusive, protective action must be considered whether or not the behaviour arises from a syndrome or diagnosed condition. It is nevertheless necessary to identify in broad terms what we are speaking about. For working purposes, the CAFCASS definition of alienation is sufficient:"When a child's resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent."To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive.9.Where a child's relationship with one parent is not working for no apparent good reason, signs of alienation may be found on the part of the other parent. These may include portraying the other parent in an unduly negative light to the child, suggesting that the other parent does not love the child, providing unnecessary reassurance to the child about time with the other parent, contacting the child excessively when with the other parent, and making unfounded allegations or insinuations, particularly of sexual abuse.10.Where a process of alienation is found to exist, there is a spectrum of severity and the remedy will depend upon an assessment of all aspects of the child's welfare, and not merely those that concern the relationship that may be under threat. The court's first inclination will be to reason with parents and seek to persuade them to take the right course for their child's sake, and it will only make orders when it is better than not to do so. Once orders are required, the court's powers include those provided by sections 11A to 11O of the Children Act 1989 , and extend to consideration of a more fundamental revision of the arrangements for the child. We agree that whilst a change in the child's main home is a highly significant alteration in that child's circumstances, such a change is not regarded as "a last resort": Re L (A Child) [2019] EWHC 867 (Fam) at [53] to [59] per Sir Andrew McFarlane P. The judge must consider all the circumstances and choose the best welfare solution.11.Cases at the upper end of the spectrum of alienation place exceptional demands on the court. It will recognise that the more distant the relationship with the unfavoured parent becomes, the more limited its powers become. It must take a medium to long term view and not accord excessive weight to short-term problems: Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at 129. It must, in short, take action when and where it can do so to the child's advantage. As McFarlane LJ said in Re A (Intractable Contact Dispute: Human Rights Violations) [2013] EWCA Civ 1104; [2014] 1 FLR 1185 at 53:"53. The conduct of human relationships, particularly following the breakdown in the relationship between the parents of a child, are not readily conducive to organisation and dictat by court order; nor are they the responsibility of the courts or the judges. But, courts and judges do have a responsibility to utilise such substantive and procedural resources as are available to them to determine issues relating to children in a manner which affords paramount consideration to the welfare of those children and to do so in a manner, within the limits of the court's powers, which is likely to be effective as opposed to ineffective."”23.There are a number of cases concerning alleged “parental alienation”. This is a highly fact specific scenario in which labels and generalisations are not in my view helpful. In a very large number of cases that appear before the Family Courts, particularly concerning private law, the parents have some degree of animosity towards each other and whether consciously or unconsciously may influence the views of the children about the other parent. It must however be remembered that children are autonomous human beings who have their own feelings and their own perceptions. That becomes particularly true as they become older and begin to wish to assert their own personalities separately from parental control. 24.It needs to be accepted, and carefully considered, that the “muscularity” of Court intervention suggested at [13] of Re S may be in considerable tension with the wishes and feelings of the children. As the children get older, and more weight would be accorded to their wishes and feelings, the Court has to consider very carefully the degree to which a very significant interference in their Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (“EHCR”) rights against their wishes, is justified and proportionate. 25.In my view the Court should also bear closely in mind in these difficult cases, that there may be no “good” solution. The Court cannot rewrite the past and only has a limited influence on the future. It is often not possible to cure the wrongs that have happened, and it is particularly hard to change a mindset or narrative that has been firmly adopted. It may be, although I am only considering the facts of this particular case, that these comments are particularly apt in respect of slightly older children, who are less open to being told what to do by adults, whether for good or ill.