[2025] EWHC 2997 (Fam)

I heard oral evidence from the wife. She had the benefit of a translator but she rarely needed to use the translator.

She was obviously distressed for much of her evidence.

Instead of answering questions straightforwardly she was almost always keen to explain, as she saw it, why she and her case were right. I will analyse each of the important issues below (housing need, income needs and earning capacity), but I do note here that her evidence was more convincing when she argued that the children deserved better, rather than she could not manage on what the husband was proposing.

I hold in mind that a finding has been made that she has been subject to coercive and controlling behaviour when considering her distress and her desire to make sure that her side of an issue was put fully.

It was her case that the parties had a high standard of living at the end of the marriage. On their return to this country they moved into a flat on a well known street, albeit a small flat owned by a sister of the husband. The children, she said, expected things such as swimming pools and big gardens. They had encountered them on visits to Property A, where the husband’s brother, AE, had been living for a while. (It is now empty as the final steps of the renovation are undertaken).

Mr Boydell did demonstrate in cross examination that at a time when the wife said she had no money to enable her to litigate she spent £3,500 on jewellery for herself and gifted money to a sister of hers. He did demonstrate that even after a recital recorded to a court order that she would not spend further on the husband’s credit (which she could do by her PayPal account), she had continued to spend on it. And, further that she had racked up significant parking fines, which she had expected the husband to meet (which he had done).

The husband was called on to explain the sale of Company C and why he had not told the court and the wife about it. It was his case that the sale was for shares in the buying company, Company H. These were valued at £6 million by that company but there had been no independent assessment of the value of the shares by him or his brothers because they were just pleased to get rid of a loss-making business. He considered the new shares a speculative holding. He was less clear how debt of Company C owing either to one of the other companies or his brother, AF (whether from his investment company or personally) would be dealt with on the sale, save that he did not think that debt had been forgiven. It struck me as odd that he did not know how the debt was treated in the deal. (The experts subsequently confirmed to me that Company C’s debt to the other companies and AF was forgiven on the sale.)

He said that he had intended to tell the wife and the court about the sale. That was a very odd answer in that his section 25 statement was silent on it and he had put in a further statement in October 2025, after the sale, in which he remained silent about the sale. Indeed he remained silent about it until it was raised by Mr Lewis in the run up to the hearing.

It is inevitable that I must conclude that he is not telling the truth about this. I do bear in mind that might be because he considered it insignificant, and that revealing it would generate more cost. It might be because he considered that it would be harmful to his case and he was hoping it would not come out. Given that it must have been obvious to him that a sale for £6 million, even if it were for shares and the value of the shares was untested, was likely to indicate a value above zero, I conclude that he concealed the sale because he considered it likely to be harmful to his case.

The husband was pressed by both me and Mr Lewis as to his plans to repay the Directors Loan Account, now standing at some £5.6 million. He had said that he intended to do this from dividends at the conclusion of the hearing but at the same time he said he expected his gross dividends to be about £250,000. I was incredulous as to how he could repay a debt of £5.6 million from £250,000 a year. I pressed the husband as to the tax which the business would need to pay as a consequence of the DLA if it were not repaid.

The husband answered that he hoped there would be some rise in the dividend payment but said that there had been no more than general aspirational conversations about the repayment of the loan.

Again, I struggle to understand why the repayment of such a debt, generating, as the accountancy experts confirmed it would, a tax charge to Company A at 33.75% of its size was something in relation to which there was no plan. I conclude that the husband is not being open on this issue. I do note that I am told that on the repayment of the DLA the tax paid by the company can be reclaimed.

Save for these points, the husband gave his evidence in an apparently open and co-operative way.

The husband was pressed about his access to luxury cars. He drives a valuable 4x4 Cadillac provided for him by Company E (he suggested it would cost about $100,000) and there were a range of top end cars that were held by a subsidiary company for a ‘taxi’ business. These he related have been mainly sold off, that business having failed, but a Rolls Royce, a Ferrari and a Lamborghini are retained for marketing purposes. He accepted if he were going to a work event he may get the use of one of these.

The husband was pressed about why he had stopped renting a valuable flat (where he had lived after separation) and returned to live with his mother. It was suggested that was just optics for these proceedings. He denied that. He said he had not renewed the lease because he had hoped proceedings would be sorted out and he could look for somewhere near the children, but that hope failed and he just moved back to live with his mother pending resolution of the proceedings.

The balance of his evidence I will consider below when I consider housing and income needs.

I heard from Mr Dodge and Mr Strickland concurrently. (They were ‘hot tubbed’.)

I was impressed by the professional and helpful evidence of both of them.

In relation to the sale of Company C, after the production of a contemporary share sale document, both concluded that the best value of Company C, at the date of the sale was £6 million. They both agreed that there was nothing left of value in Company B. There was some disagreement as to the value that should be put on Company B in their reports. Mr Strickland took the view that because the valuation date for the report was December 2023 an October 2025 value was inappropriate. Two things would have changed: (a) more money would have come out of Company A to fund Company B – so we ran the risk because of the different dates in missing that deduction in value to Company A, and (b) investment into Company C could have increased its value. Mr Dodge pointed out that Company A was making profit, so the value for that would not be standing still either.

Both confirmed that the sale did not otherwise affect their respective positions. They had already taken out the debts owing from Company B to Company A.

As to the relevant multiple for the valuation of Company E, Mr Dodge was subject to cross examination by Mr Boydell in particular as to the fact that the comparables that were relied on were not proper comparables, and that he had increased the multiple from an arithmetical average even of those he relied upon. That did not cause him to change his position. Ultimately he said the multiple was a matter of experience, feel and expertise rather than strict arithmetic.

He was also cross examined as to why he had broken down his valuation into the major component business, and how this would have the effect of plumping up the EBITDA for Company E. He answered, convincingly, that the businesses would be sold separately. Mr Strickland had followed the same approach.

As to Company I, Mr Strickland was subject to cross examination by Mr Lewis. Mr Lewis put to him that it was not sensible to value the business at less than its net assets, stock in effect. Mr Strickland first answered that given that it was loss making and the plan appeared to keep it going then it did not have the value of the stock. The losses would consume that value over time. On reflection he changed his position to say that a rational owner would sell off the stock, unless they considered that the business was really worth more than the stock, so it should be valued at the stock, less winding up costs. These could be substantial, including redundancies, getting out of leases, and a reduction in value of the stock through discounted sale.

As to income, Mr Dodge was cross examined by Mr Boydell. He agreed with him that there could be a third scenario to the two outlined above whereby the available income was divided equally between the two brother, AE and the husband, rather than skewed in the husband’s favour by reference to what had been withdrawn (including by loan) over the last few years.