FA-2025-000111 - [2025] EWHC 2756 (Fam)

Change of name

The original Cafcass Officer did not find any welfare based justification for changing D’s surname.

The second Cafcass Officer told the judge (paragraph 90 of the judgment) that she recommended a change of surname because she had accepted M’s account of why she wanted to change the name, without asking any probing questions or considering the possibility that this might be part of a pattern of minimising F’s role in D’s life. This, said the judge, was particularly problematic as the order for a s7 report expressly directed Cafcass to consider whether each party was motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of D.

The judge expressed herself (paragraph 91) as surprised that the second Cafcass Officer seemed unconcerned about oral evidence given by M that D now viewed her maternal grandfather as her father, and that the second Cafcass Officer had not considered the possible confusion which D might feel, particularly as, on the findings made by Recorder Daley, the maternal grandfather has a “dominating and authoritarian personality”.

The judge expressed the view that the second Cafcass Officer should have seen D, and was concerned (paragraph 92) that she did not do so because M had asked her not to, a fact to which she did not refer to in report, nor had she informed F; it only emerged during her oral evidence.

At paragraphs 108-114 of her judgment, the judge set out her decision and reasoning in respect of the change of surname. It is important, in my judgment, to view this in the context of her judgment as a whole, including her conclusion that M is seeking to erase D’s relationship with F. I reject the submission either that the judge minimised the serious findings made against F, or placed insufficient weight on the impact upon M of F’s conduct. Read in its entirety, the judgment clearly records these matters.

The judge concluded that to change D’s surname would not be in her welfare interests, and would constitute a further rupture in her relationship with F that is not justified. She noted M’s distress at seeing F’s surname written down, and the traumatising effect on her, but as the first Cafcass Reporter had said, D is very aware of her surname which is part of her identity and provides an important connection to F and her paternal heritage. She is able to write her own name. The judge said that to change D’s name would be confusing, and that it would be harmful in the context of M’s motivation to erase all reference to F in D’s life. The judge considered whether there would be practical difficulties arising out of D having F’s surname rather than that of M. She was unpersuaded, and in any event concluded that any such difficulties would be outweighed by the potential harm to D of a change of name.

I acknowledge that in reaching her conclusion not to change the surname, the judge departed from the Cafcass Officer’s recommendation. In my judgment, she clearly explained why she did so (as set out above) and was entitled, in the light of all the evidence before me, to come to a different conclusion to that of the Cafcass Officer.

I note that although the skeleton argument prepared on behalf of M for this appeal criticises the judge for not ordering, as an alternative, a double barrelled surname, in my judgment that is not a fair criticism given that the judge considered it at paragraphs 112 and 113 of her judgment, observed that M did not agree to it in any event, and concluded that changing to a double barrelled surname would be as confusing as changing to M’s surname. Moreover, the judge found that there would be a risk of M gradually dropping F’s name.

Although the judge did not expressly refer to Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] 1 FLR 167 or any jurisprudence since then, (i) the relevant authorities were cited to her, and I have no reason to suppose that during a lengthy hearing she disregarded them, and (ii) the ultimate test is the welfare of the child, a test which, on any fair reading of her judgment, the judge applied. In my view, read as a whole, the judgment sets out the relevant factors at play when considering whether to order a change of surname or not. This was a balanced evaluation by a judge who weighed up a range of circumstances, informed by the welfare checklist. It seems to me that this was quintessentially an evaluation by a judge who had the benefit of hearing the case over a number of days. The appellate court should be slow to interfere with the first instance judge’s overall conclusions in such circumstances. The judgment as a whole is a clear, coherent and comprehensive analysis.

This was, no doubt, a challenging case for the judge. Alighting upon a fair decision for D, consistent with her welfare, in the context of (i) shockingly abusive behaviour by F towards M and (ii) highly conflicted parental attitudes which must on M’s side at have been at least in part the product of such behaviour, was not easy. But that is the lot of family court judges who deal with challenging cases every day and, depressingly, routinely deal with cases involving high level domestic abuse. Family court judges are tasked with making decisions with far reaching consequences for everyone involved. This judge approached the task conscientiously, with care and analytical clarity. It is not, in my judgment, tenable to argue that the judge exceeded all reasonable bounds when reaching her conclusion.

In my judgment, there is no real prospect of success on appeal, and the application for permission to appeal should be refused.