FD25P00187 - [2025] EWHC 2629 (Fam)

In the foregoing context, by virtue of the actions of the adults responsible for the abduction of the children, namely the making of protection claims for the children and the pursuance of appeals following those protection claims being refused by the Secretary of Statement, and the operation of the principle in G v G, there will be a delay before the authorities in Brazil with general jurisdiction can take the necessary measures of protection. Having regard to the matters set out in this judgment I am satisfied that the children remain vulnerable to abduction whilst they are in their mother’s care in this jurisdiction and that the welfare of the children demands that their urgent need for stability, security and consistent maternal care is secured pending the implementation of the return order.

In these circumstances, and whilst mindful of the need to interpret Art 11 rather strictly, I am satisfied in this case that, if the court makes a return order, it can be said the children are likely to suffer irreparable harm or to have their protection or interests compromised if measures are not taken to secure the children in their mother’s care in this jurisdiction in the period that has to elapse whilst the asylum appeals are determined and before the authorities in Brazil with general jurisdiction can take the necessary measures of protection. I am further satisfied that, paradoxically, the delay consequent upon the pending asylum appeals, and the frustration of the implementation of any return order in consequence, creates the urgency for the purposes of Art 11 of the 1996 Hague Convention in this case. Accordingly, having determined to make a return order, I am also satisfied that Art 11 provides the court with jurisdiction during that interregnum also to make urgent orders to ensure the children remain in their mother’s care. Those orders will be as follows:

I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to make orders in relation to contact with the father or with the paternal grandmother and paternal aunt. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the court’s jurisdiction to take interim measures under s.5 of the 1985 Act lapses once the court has made a return order in this case. I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to invoke the jurisdiction under Art 11 of the 1996 Hague Convention for the purposes of making contact orders. I am not satisfied that Y and Z are likely to suffer irreparable harm or to have their protection or interests compromised if measures in relation to contact with the paternal family are not taken in the period that is likely to elapse before the authorities in Brazil with general jurisdiction can take the necessary measures of protection. In any event, given the conclusions of the court regarding the conduct of the paternal family in negatively influencing the children, I am satisfied that the father, the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt would use any contact as a means of seeking to undermine the mother’s care of the children. Contact will fall to be considered by the courts in Brazil upon the children being returned to that jurisdiction pursuant to the return order this court has made.