FD25P00554 - [2025] EWHC 2878 (Fam)

In 2020 a consent order was made in the then Queen’s Bench Division in settlement of a claim by the child of Ms Rayner and Mr Rayner for damages for clinical negligence. That order directed the establishment of a bare trust to hold the damages for the child in question. The trust was duly settled in May 2020. In addition, an anonymity order was made in relation to that claim pursuant to CPR r.39.2(3)(d). In January 2025 the current Professional Trustee was appointed.

On 23 June 2023 DJ Richmond, sitting at the Family Court in Manchester, approved a consent order that concluded the process by which financial arrangements following divorce had been agreed between Ms Rayner and Mr Rayner. During the course of the hearing listed to determine the application made by TML, it became clear that no financial remedy proceedings were issued, that the parties reached agreement without the need for such proceedings and that a financial remedy case number had been assigned to the matter only when the consent order was submitted to the Family Court sitting in Manchester for judicial approval. In that context, and subject to confirmation by Ms Hillas and those instructing her who did not represent Ms Rayner at the time, it appeared that the only document that resulted from the financial remedy process was the final consent order of 23 June 2023.

The order of 23 June 2023 dealt with the distribution of the former matrimonial home, including provision for Ms Rayner to retain a 25% beneficial share in that property, with the Trust receiving the remaining 75% beneficial share. In January 2025 Ms Rayner sold her remaining 25% beneficial share to the Trust and used the proceeds to purchase another property. That latter transaction came, in due course, to generate significant media interest in August and September 2025.

The consent order of 23 June 2023 contained undertakings given by Ms Rayner and Mr Rayner not to speak publicly about the financial arrangements incorporated into that order. In the context of the significant media interest to which I have referred, on 2 September 2025 HHJ Hess granted an application made by Ms Rayner, and supported by Mr Rayner and the Trustee, to release the Rayners from their undertakings under the order of 23 June 2023. Again, at this hearing it would appear that the only document produced as a result of the application to be released from undertakings granted by HHJ Hess was the order he made on 2 September 2025 to that effect.

As I have noted, her release from the undertakings in the order of 23 June 2023 allowed Ms Rayner to provide information to Sir Laurie Magnus, the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, and to make a statement to the media on 3 September 2025 concerning the ownership of the former matrimonial home. During the course of a public statement Ms Rayner stated that she wished to set out the facts as openly and transparently as she could and made reference to undertakings contained in the order of 23 June 2023.

Thereafter, Ms Rayner went on in her public statement to describe the arrangement in respect of the former matrimonial home and the settlement of the trust which I have set out in summary above, including the reason for the establishment of that trust. That reason being, as Ms Rayner described it in her public statement, a deeply personal and distressing incident involving the parties’ son as a premature baby, who was left with life-long disabilities. Thereafter, Ms Rayner described the trust as having been established to manage on the child’s behalf the award of damages made in the proceedings in the Queen’s Bench Division, the child being the sole beneficiary of the Trust. Ms Rayner went on to relate that, in order to ensure stability for the child in a home adapted for their needs, the parties’ interest in the family home was transferred to the Trust, with Ms Rayner later selling her remaining beneficial interest in the property to the Trust as I have described.

Ms Rayner resigned from her ministerial position, as the Deputy Prime Minister and as the leader of the Labour Party on Friday 6 September, following the Prime Minister's ethics adviser finding that Ms Rayner had breached the Ministerial Code in relation to her omitting to pay the correct amount of tax on the property transaction to which I have referred.

On 5 September 2025, TML wrote to the President of the Family Division seeking copies of the two orders mentioned by Ms Rayner in her public statement, namely the order of 23 June 2023 containing the undertakings and the order of 2 September 2025 releasing Ms Rayner and Mr Rayner from those undertakings. The President required TML to make a formal application to the Family Court. That application was issued on 5 September 2025 and sought the following relief:

“An order for: disclosure of an order (or orders) made in proceedings involving Angela Rayner (nee Bowen) in 2023 and on 2 September 2025; or for disclosure of information about the proceedings (such as, but not limited to, the relevant court, case number and/or case title) to enable the applicant to make an appropriately confined application for documents or information.”

On 5 September 2025, I made a directions order on the papers allocating the matter to myself, and directing service of the application on Ms Rayner, Mr Rayner and the Trust. I listed the matter before me for hearing on 9 September 2025. The order was provided to those representing TML by the Clerk of the Rules on the same day at 1555hrs. Accordingly, there were three days, one of which was a business day, between the order requiring service of the application on the Trust (which was identified in the order) and the hearing on 9 September 2025.

During the course of submissions at the hearing before me on 9 September 2025, it became clear to the court that there was a substantial measure of agreement between the parties in the context of it being likely that the only document to emerge from the financial remedy proceedings was the order of 23 June 2023 and the only document to emerge from the application heard on 2 September 2023 was the order of that date.

Ms Rayner did not oppose the release to TML of the documents to which I have referred, subject to redactions proposed by the Trustee. Subject to those redactions, the Trust likewise had no objection in principle to certain information relating to the financial remedies proceedings being disclosed to TML. That position was made clear in Mr Learmonth’s Skeleton Argument on behalf of the Trust, which was served on TML on the afternoon of Monday 8 September 2025. On behalf of TML, Mr Wolanski did not seek to oppose at the hearing either the nature or extent of the redactions proposed on behalf of the Trust with respect to the documents to be disclosed and, during the hearing, expressed TML to be neutral in respect of the same.

In the foregoing circumstances, I granted permission for disclosure to TML of orders dated 23 June 2023 and 2 September 2025 made in the proceedings and the position statement put before the court on 2 September 2025. In addition, and in circumstances where TML took no position on the issue, on the application of the Trust I granted an order under CPR rr.5.4C(1) and 5.4D(1) prohibiting the provision of documents from the personal injury claim to any non-party without an application and that any application under r.5.4C(2) should be on notice.

Finally, and as I have noted, Ms Hillas and her instructing solicitor did not represent Ms Rayner in June 2023. In the circumstances, and quite properly, Ms Hillas was not in a position to confirm, definitively, that no bundle and an index thereto was prepared when the agreed financial remedies order was submitted to the Family Court sitting in Manchester in June 2023. In the circumstances, I further directed that if any index were discovered in the review of documentation that Ms Hillas’ instructing solicitor intended to undertake should be disclosed to TML to inform any further application for disclosure and permission to disclose information, subject to the same provisions as to redaction that I have outlined already, but that if no index is found to exist the proceedings would stand concluded.