[2025] EWHC 1525 (Fam)

The question for the Court is whether there should be a further lifting of restrictions beyond those already given effect by the Transparency Order made in this case. In particular, although the Transparency Order is aimed at allowing reporting on proceedings by accredited journalists and authorised legal bloggers, I understand the Applicants to wish to be able to publish information themselves as well as, or instead of, through a reporter or legal blogger. As noted, this Court has the power to (i) vary the Transparency Order insofar as it restricts or allows information relating to the proceedings to be published by reporters and (ii) exercise its inherent jurisdiction to allow the Applicants themselves to disclose information relating to the proceedings. I heard no submissions on the burden of proof. The resolution of the issues on this application does not depend on the burden of proof but I shall assume that any party that seeks to vary a Transparency Order and/or to disapply the provisions of AJA 1960 s12 shoulders the burden of proof. I shall now consider the exercise of both those powers. The principles set out above concerning an intense scrutiny of Article 8 and Article 10 rights, and the importance of the welfare of the children apply to both issues but I also have regard to the statutory provisions and the rules of court. The starting point is that the children proceedings in the Family Court were held in private and so AJA 1960, s12 applies unless disclosure or publication of information is permitted. The first consideration is the interests of the children.

I have received no application by any reporter or legal blogger to vary the Transparency Order either to allow the naming of individual social workers or for any other reason. I was repeatedly pressed by Y during the hearing to answer hypothetical questions about what would or would not constitute a breach of the Order. The Transparency Order is in the standard terms of the template used during the Pilot period, which are now largely reflected in the template Order used nationally. It has been designed to be clear. The Transparency Order made by DDJ Elliott states plainly to whom it applies (including the Applicants), how long it remains in force (until the children are 18) what a person aware of the order cannot publish (for example the name or date of birth of the children, the name of any parent, or images of the children and family members). It states that the Local Authority and any relevant NHS Trust may be identified but not individual social workers, not the Guardian, and not treating clinicians). Communication of information relating to the proceedings may be made with certain third parties such as the police provided it is in accordance with permission under the Family Procedure Rules rr12.73, 12.75 or Practice Directions 12G (para. 2.1) and 12E. I conceded that those rules are complex. AJA 1960, s12 continues to operate except insofar as the Transparency Order varies it. As the Transparency Order provides, “any publication of information relating to the proceedings which is not permitted by this Order is a Contempt of Court.” That warning applies both to reporters and to the Applicants.

In the present case, notwithstanding the Applicants’ passionate beliefs about the injustices caused to them and their children, and their dismissal of the authority of the Court, there have been no apparent breaches of the Transparency Order. I credit the Applicants for that. However, they wish to be permitted to publish their account of the proceedings to include naming judges, barristers, and individual social workers and healthcare professionals whom they believe are part of a corrupt system and a criminal conspiracy. Under the terms of the existing Transparency Order it is expressly permitted to report the names of judges and barristers and no application has been made to impose restrictions against naming them. I pause to comment that during the hearing Y indicated that she knew where one of the barristers lived. I intervened to warn her not to seek to intimidate. I was later shown an email sent by the Applicants to the solicitor for the Local Authority in which they purport to give details about and to criticise a barrister’s personal life. The barristers in this case have broad shoulders and do not ask the Court to prevent them being named. The question of anonymisation of judges has recently been considered by the Court of Appeal - Tickle and Summers v BBC and Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42. There has been, and shall be, no bar on naming the Judges in this case.

The question whether to allow publication of the names of individual social workers and healthcare professionals is a different matter. In April 2024, the Supreme Court heard the appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision in Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2023] EWCA Civ 331. At precisely the same time that I initially handed down judgment in the present case the Supreme Court handed down its judgment. I therefore recalled my judgment and allowed the parties to make further submissions related to that judgment. This judgment takes into account the Supreme Court’s judgment, Abbasi and another (Respondents) v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Appellant); Haastrup (Respondent) v King’s College HospitalNHS Foundation Trust (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 25. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision but for different reasons. A number of principles are set out at the end of the main judgment of Lord Reed and Lord Briggs. At paragraph [182] they held:

“(1)

The High Court has jurisdiction, in proceedings concerned with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment of children, to grant injunctions protecting the identities of clinicians and other hospital staff involved in that treatment, where and for so long as that is necessary to protect the interests of those children. That jurisdiction arises under the court’s inherent parens patriae powers, and under its inherent jurisdiction to protect the administration of justice. Such injunctions can be granted against parties who will not themselves act wrongfully, where that is necessary in order to protect the children’s interests or the administration of justice, and they can be granted contra mundum.

(2)

The High Court also has jurisdiction to issue such injunctions where that is necessary in order to prevent interference with hospital trusts’ performance of their statutory functions, as explained in Broadmoor.

(3)

The High Court also has jurisdiction to issue such injunctions where that is necessary in order to protect the rights of clinicians and other hospital staff, in proceedings brought or continued by those individuals in reliance on their rights. In principle, such proceedings can (in an appropriate case) be brought in a representative capacity.

(4)

These grounds of jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive. In particular, the need to protect the interests of the children, to secure the administration of justice, and to prevent interference with the trusts’ performance of their functions are likely to co-exist and to be mutually reinforcing.

(5)

Such injunctions are not incompatible with the open justice principle where, as in the Haastrup proceedings, the application is made under the parens patriae jurisdiction and the substantive hearing is held in private. It is also possible to avoid any incompatibility with the open justice principle.

(6)

Applications for such injunctions should be based on the relevant cause of action under domestic law (such as the parens patriae jurisdiction, or the Broadmoor principle, or the rights of the clinicians under the law of tort), rather than simply on section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act and section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act.

(7)

In principle, the powers of the High Court under the latter provisions are wide enough to enable it to issue injunctions to protect the Convention rights of clinicians and other hospital staff in proceedings brought by hospital trusts, if that is the only way in which those rights can receive practical and effective protection. However, those circumstances do not exist where such protection can be afforded under parens patriae powers or under the court’s power to protect the administration of justice, or on the basis explained in Broadmoor, or where it is practical for the clinicians (or a representative) to be joined to the proceedings and to assert their own claim.

(8)

Notice of an application for such an injunction should be given to media organisations. Notice of the grant of such an injunction, and of any application to vary or discharge such an injunction, should be given to the clinicians affected.

(9)

In deciding whether to grant such injunctions at the outset of such proceedings, where the court is being asked to exercise its parens patriae powers, the interests of the child in question, and the need to secure the administration of justice in the proceedings, are likely to justify making an order in circumstances where there is a significant risk that publicity will result in interferences with the child’s right to confidentiality and privacy, and in damage to the continued care being provided by the hospital. An order is also likely to be justified under the Broadmoor principle, and, where the clinicians (or a representative clinician) are joined, in order to protect the rights of the clinicians.

(10)

Such injunctions should be of limited duration. A reasonable duration would be until the end of the proceedings and, in the event that they terminate with the child’s death or the grant of the declaration sought, for a subsequent cooling off period. The length of that period will reflect the court’s assessment of the continued risk of interference with the trust’s performance of its statutory functions, and in particular with its continuing treatment of other patients, and the time reasonably needed for clinicians to take advice about their personal rights, but is likely to be measured in weeks rather than months or years.

(11)

The individuals whose identities are protected by such injunctions should be identifiable by reference to the court’s order.

(12)

Such injunctions, being contra mundum, should include liberty to any person affected by their terms to apply on notice to vary or discharge any part of the order.

(13)

In the event that a fresh injunction (or the continuation of the existing injunction) is sought after the cooling-off period in order to protect the rights of clinicians or other hospital staff, the application should be made by those individuals (or one or more representatives of them), relying on the relevant cause or causes of action. It should be supported by specific evidence.

(14)

The court should begin its assessment of any application for such an injunction, or for the continuation of such an injunction, by considering the relevant domestic law.

(15)

When the court considers whether the grant or continuation of such an injunction is compatible with the Convention rights protected by article 10, or whether its refusal or discharge would be compatible with article 8, it needs to consider (a) whether there is an interference with the relevant right which is prescribed by the law, (b) whether it pursues a legitimate aim, ie an aim which can be justified with reference to one or more of the matters mentioned in article 10(2) (or article 8(2), as the case may be), and (c) whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society.

(16)

In answering the last of those questions in relation to article 10, the need for any restriction of freedom of expression must be established convincingly. It must be justified by a pressing social need, and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. This consideration applies with particular force to preventive restraints on publication, and is reflected in section 12(3) and (4) of the Human Rights Act.

(17)

In assessing proportionality in a situation where there are competing rights under articles 8 and 10, the court should consider the criteria established in the case law of the European court, so far as relevant.

(18)

The court should also consider how long the duration of any restriction on freedom of expression needs to be, and whether the reasons for the restriction may be affected by changes in circumstances. A permanent restriction would require compelling circumstances.

(19)

Weight can be given to the importance of protecting the medical and other staff of public hospitals against unfounded accusations and consequent abuse. However, the court should also bear in mind that the treatment of patients in public hospitals is a matter of legitimate public interest, and that the medical and other staff of public hospitals are public figures for the purposes of the Convention, with the consequence that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider than in the case of private individuals.”

The use of Transparency Orders and the operation of FPR PD 12R were not expressly considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was considering applications regarding life sustaining treatment for children made in the High Court not CA 1989 proceedings in the Family Court, nevertheless FPR PD 12R would now apply to serious medical treatment applications concerning children in the High Court when a reporter attends. The Court did consider AJA 1960 s12 and restrictions which the Court might impose on naming witnesses in private proceedings as follows at [119] and [120]:

“119.

There is no constitutional principle that is infringed by a prohibition on the publication of the names of witnesses in proceedings held in private under the parens patriae jurisdiction.

120.

We also note that section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 provides that the publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in certain specified circumstances, including “(a) where the proceedings – (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors”. As Munby J said in Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn [2001] Fam 59, 72, summarising a number of earlier authorities, “in essence, what section 12 protects is the privacy and confidentiality: (i) of the documents on the court file and (ii) of what has gone on in front of the judge in his courtroom”. Accordingly, it covers the names of the witnesses who gave evidence or provided statements, the identities of the experts who provided reports, and the contents of their evidence, statements and reports. It follows that, by virtue of section 12, the publication of the witnesses’ and experts’ names, either by the media or by the parents, would have rendered them liable to proceedings for contempt of court. That reflects the common law: In re Martindale [1894] 3 Ch 193; In re De Beaujeu’s Application for Writ of Attachment against Cudlipp [1949] Ch 230. For that reason also, the injunction could not be regarded as impinging upon open justice.”

The judgment in Abbasi did not directly concern proceedings of the kind with which I am concerned, nor did it directly address the position of individual social workers, although at paragraphs [58] to [61] the Supreme Court remarked on some overlapping considerations affecting social workers and treating medical professionals as carers for a child. The principles set out in Abbasi are I am satisfied are applicable to orders preventing the naming of individual professionals such as social workers in cases concerning children’s welfare heard in private. That is what the template Transparency Order addresses. AJA 1960, s12 does not prevent the naming of a witness as a witness, but it does prevent anything being published about the witness relating to the proceedings, such as what they said in court. The Supreme Court in Abbasi was content that an injunction could be made preventing the naming of witnesses in private family proceedings. The Supreme Court also proceeded on the basis that AJA 1960, s12 does not prevent the naming of non-witnesses, otherwise injunctive orders in private proceedings such as Haastrup would not be necessary. The template Transparency Order refers expressly to individual social workers and treating clinicians or medical professionals and does not distinguish between those who are witnesses and those who are not. In that regard, the template Transparency Order may impose restrictions on publication that go further than the reach of AJA 1960,s12 as set out by the Supreme Court at paras [119] and [120] in Abbasi.

Since the Supreme Court did not address the use of Transparency Orders nor the jurisdiction of the Family Court, there may be questions to be addressed. Does the template Transparency Order indeed go further than AJA 1960, s12 as I have suggested might be the case? Should the Court insist on receiving specific evidence in relation to each individual social worker or clinician before making an order to restrict their identification in relation to the proceedings or does the requirement for specific evidence apply only to a restriction on naming such individuals as dealing with the child, as opposed to naming them “in relation to the proceedings”? Does the Family Court as well as the High Court have jurisdiction to make such orders? Is the template Transparency Order preventing the naming of individual social workers and treating clinicians until the relevant child is aged 18 compatible with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abbasi? Should notice be given to the media, not just to the reporter in court, every time a Transparency Order is made? I do not have to address those questions in the present case. I am sitting in the High Court, I have ample evidence on which to make a judgement as to the consequences for individual social workers and healthcare professionals of allowing them to be named in information relating to the proceedings. I do not have any application before me for a wider injunction beyond that contained within the Transparency Order (other than extending it to the High court proceedings.

In the present case, the children are still alive and they are at a vulnerable stage in that they are the subject of placement orders but not adoption orders. It would be harmful to them to jeopardise any prospective adoption. I have to be mindful of the effect on any potential adopters and therefore on the children of allowing the naming of individual social workers and healthcare professionals in information published relating to the proceedings.

The Applicants wish permission to be given for the publication of information relating to the proceeding so that their own views can be published and so that they can pursue a public campaign against those they consider responsible for a criminal conspiracy to steal, sell, and abuse their children, including individual social workers and healthcare professionals. I would not prevent them from doing so only on the basis that their views do not accord with the Court’s findings. Open justice exists to allow criticism as well as approval of judges’ decisions and court processes, even unwarranted criticism. It is not for the Court to decide what criticism of the justice system merits publication and what does not. Where, however, the evidence demonstrates that allowing publication of information in relation to proceedings to include named individual social workers and healthcare professionals will be likely to lead to defamatory attacks, abuse, and even bullying likely to cause significant distress to anyone of what is in a different context sometimes called “customary phlegm”, then protection of their Article 8 rights is engaged and requires careful consideration.

I do not want to air the precise allegations that the Applicants make against Judges, barristers, social workers, and healthcare professionals, because I have not seen any evidence to support them. However, to give a sense, the Applicants have variously maintained that the removal of their children by the Local Authority and the Court was part of a corrupt systemin which children are stolen, sold for profit, held as “hostages”, abused, given lethal injections, and sometimes experimented upon. The Applicants believe that Judges, Local Authorities and others financially benefit from this abuse. They do not respect boundaries of personal privacy – they have purported to provide evidence of the private family life of a barrister, the financial affairs of a Judge, and the personal conduct of a social worker.

The Applicants’ written communications, including to the Court, are expressed in aggressive language and reports of very serious crimes have been made against individuals to the police. References have been made by the Applicants to their connections in the military and to various “Commandos” who will be able , it is said, to access email accounts and find out where the children and other individuals live.

The purpose of publicity will be to bring the parents’ views of a criminal conspiracy to an audience and to recruit more supporters to their cause. The purpose of naming individual social workers or healthcare professionals would be to associate them with the sort of allegations to which I have briefly referred.

The children with whom the Family Court was concerned await adoption. They are vulnerable and they are at a crucially important time of their lives. I have no doubt that publication of information relating to the proceedings would, unless suitably restricted, be liable to lead to the identification of the children and could jeopardise a potential adoption. The children need a permanent family and they need stability in a nurturing home. Unrestricted publication of information about them, even if they were not named or their images were not published, would risk causing them harm over their lifetimes. Potential adopters would be likely to be discouraged to put themselves forward if there was publicity around the children and abuse and attacks on those who have sought to protect their interests. The ability of social workers to act in the children’s best interests would be compromised if they are occupied with dealing with public attacks on their actions and personal abuse.

I have considered the extent to which the parents’ Article 10 rights are already safeguarded. The Applicants, as parents of children taken into care, have an account of the process which they want to tell the public. The Transparency Order, as it stands, allows a reporter to publish information about the proceedings. A reporter’s published account of proceedings could feature the parents, albeit anonymously. Publication of DJ Hussain’s judgment, suitably anonymised, would also allow for comment on the Court’s decisions. The Transparency Order modifies the statutory restriction on publishing information relating to the proceedings to allow for greater freedom of expression. Whilst some restrictions remain, the right to freedom of expression is curtailed but not extinguished. A reporter could tell the parents’ story without any further lifting of reporting restrictions.

The Applicants hinted to the Court that there has already been publicity relating to the proceedings in India but I have not seen evidence of that and I have no evidence of any postings, articles, or broadcasts in which information relating to the proceedings has been published in this jurisdiction.

The Local Authority and the Guardian strongly oppose any significant changes to the Transparency Order and they oppose any of the statutory restrictions on the Applicants or other non-reporters disclosing information being removed. They both submit that the existing Transparency Order should be expressly extended to the hearing on 30 July 2024 and they support the publication of the judgments on 2 May and 30 July 2024 as well as this judgment with suitable anonymisation.

I accept that the right to freedom of expression potentially allows for the publication of unevidenced assertions about court cases and the family justice system more generally, but it is surely relevant to the intense scrutiny of competing considerations that the Applicants seek to exercise their right to freedom of expression to make what are likely to be defamatory assertions about all manner of individuals. They appear to hold their beliefs sincerely but with fervour and without any perspective. Anyone whom they see as opposing them is fair game for attack and abuse. They will try to bring them down. This involves complaints to the police and professional regulators but also intimidation such as I witnessed in court when Y made it clear that she knew where Counsel for one of the other parties lived. I have no doubt that, given the freedom to identify individual social workers or healthcare professionals in any published information relating to the proceedings, the Applicants would use that freedom to abuse and bully those they regard as complicit in a criminal conspiracy to steal their children. I cannot discern any public interest in allowing public pillory and abuse. Individual social workers and healthcare professionals also have Article 8 rights and the Court has to be mindful of protecting those rights. In this case the Applicants would, unless restrained, be likely to publish information in relation to the proceedings in such a way as to garner further support for their views and to pillory individuals. Furthermore, public identification of a social workers, the Guardian, and healthcare professionals is, to a small extent, liable to heighten the risk of identification of the children.

Y told the Court that she and X wanted to draw links with other cases involving “stolen” children. A reporter may justifiably seek the lifting of restrictions in order to report on evidence of concerning patterns of practice by a certain Local Authority, or Trust. Of course, power should be held to account but, here, I am concerned with far-fetched assertions of conspiracy that are based on misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and ill-will.

In children cases held in private, Parliament has decided that information relating to the proceedings must not be published. In children cases, the template Transparency Order is designed to strike a balance between Article 10 and Article 8 rights whilst protecting the welfare of the children involved. The Court is not bound to make the template Transparency Order: it can choose not to make a Transparency Order at all, or it can make one with different terms from the template Order. The need to safeguard children and protect their rights means that Courts will allow children to be named only in extremely rare instances, for example where a child has been abducted and the authorities need the public’s assistance to find them. Very occasionally, permission will be given for the publication of the names of parents involved in private family hearings involving children, for example in Griffiths v Tickle (above). Generally, however, allowing the names of parents to be published risks identification of the children which will infringe the children’s Article 8 rights and put them at risk of harm. In this case the children currently have the same surnames as one parent. I am sure that if the parent’s names were published in relation to the proceedings, then that would create a high chance of identification of the children.

Here, a reporter could report on what happened in the proceedings without naming the parents. The story might lack the human element that comes with naming individuals and publishing their images, but the parents’ experience could nevertheless be reported. There is no particular public interest in knowing the identity of these parents. They do not hold positions of responsibility such as an MP, for example.

I am bound by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abbasi insofar as it applies to the present case. The Supreme Court did not refer to Transparency Orders or the template Order. The template Order is expressly provided for in the Family Procedure Rules PD 12R which applies when a reporter attends a private hearing in family proceedings as set out in the Practice Direction. Reporters attended two of the hearings with which I am concerned. Once made, a Transparency Order applies to the whole proceedings not just the hearing attended by the reporter. Under the template Order, in reporting on the proceedings no-one may publish the name of a medical professional who is or has been treating the relevant child or a member of their family. This goes beyond a prohibition on naming a medical professional who has been a witness. The template Order maintains that prohibition until the child is aged 18. Thus the template Order which the Court does not sit easily with the principles set out in Abbasi but the Court is required to consider making a Transparency Order and to give reasons if it does not follow the terms of the template Order referred to in the Practice Direction.

The effect of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abbasi on the Transparency Order regime and the operation of FPR PD 12R, in particular in the Family Court, may well require careful consideration in another case. I do not need to wrestle with those issues because I sit in the High Court to hear this application to lift reporting restrictions. I have no application before me to extend the injunction to prevent the naming of individuals otherwise than in information relating to the proceedings. For the reasons I have given I am satisfied that unless the court continues the Transparency Order and ensures that it covers the applications in the High Court, individual social workers and healthcare professionals will be named in information published about the proceedings. I also satisfied that that would be a serious interference with their Article 8 rights and that they would suffer abuse and verbal attacks some of which would be likely to be defamatory. There would be a risk of harm caused to the children as a consequence not least because they await adoption and any adoption would be jeopardised. That is, in many regards, the Applicants’ goal.

The template Transparency Order and the Transparency Order made by DDJ Elliott, who adopted the pilot template Order, prevent any person (including non-reporters such as the parties, from identifying any individual social workers or treating clinicians or medical professionals in any information published about the proceedings (para 15 of the template Order). That injunction is effective until the relevant child is aged 18. The Transparency Order scheme does not require specific application by any social worker or medical practitioner nor any evidence of the risk of harm or interference with their rights to be produced. The compatibility of these provisions with Abbasi may require consideration on another occasion. In this case I have ample evidence of the Applicants’ intentions to publish information relating to the proceedings in order to publicise their views about a criminal conspiracy. I do not need further evidence to establish that the identification of individuals who have or are caring for the children in information relating to the proceedings would jeopardise any prospective adoption. Although final care orders have been made and a placement order, the process is far from over for the children. Adoption order have not been applied for and so the children need protecting from the sort of publicity that the Applicants wish to generate. The protection that is necessary and proportionate is to maintain the Transparency Order and to extend it to these High Court proceedings.

I am satisfied that subject to some minor amendments, the Transparency Order made by DDJ Elliott in this appropriately accommodates Article 8 and 10 rights whilst protecting the welfare of the children. Subject to the issue of duration, the only variations that are required, in my judgement, are (i) to extend the Order to cover the later proceedings in the High Court, and (ii) to allow the parents to share information with reporters (accredited journalists or legal bloggers) who were not present at hearings. Accordingly, I shall so extend the Order and include a provision that,

“A party, legal representative, or reporter may also share documents with another accredited journalist or legal blogger providing:

(i)

That the accredited journalist or legal blogger is provided with a copy of this order.

(ii)

That the accredited journalist or legal blogger writes to the court by email to confirm that they have made a request for documents and that they have been sent a copy of this order and they understand that they are to be bound.”

Although the standard Transparency Order is designed to be prospective in its effect, the inclusion of a provision that information may be shared with other reporters means that even after proceedings have been concluded, a reporter who was not present at any hearings may publish information relating to the proceedings provided they abide by the restrictions within the Transparency Order.

Counsel for the Local Authority and the Guardian considered that it was right in this particular case to extend the Transparency Order to the hearing before HHJ Downey on 30 July 2024. Under the Transparency Reporting Guidance in place at the time, the pilot did not apply to Part 14 proceedings and the applications to revoke the placement orders were Part 14 proceedings as HHJ Downey identified. However, there would be no risks or detriment to the children caused by allowing the reporting of that hearing subject to the Transparency Order. In the particular circumstances of this case, I agree and I shall include express provision in the revised Transparency Order that it applies to that hearing.

It was agreed by Counsel that CA 1989, s 97 is no longer effective because the Children Act proceedings have concluded. There are no ongoing proceedings. If applications for adoption orders are made in the future, those will be Part 14 applications and the Transparency Order will not apply meaning that AJA 1960, s12 would apply without variation (unless the Court hearing the Part 14 proceedings expressly ordered otherwise).

I shall not lift restrictions on publishing the names of any Cafcass officers, the Guardian, clinicians or social worker. I shall make it clear in the revised order that by “clinicians” the Transparency Order refers to all healthcare professionals including nurses. On the facts of this case, allowing such individuals to be named publicly as being involved in these proceedings would put them at risk of public abuse and bullying. I would go so far as to say that their physical safety would be put at risk because of the nature of the allegations the parents make, which include child abuse, the manner in which the Applicants have sought to generate support for their “cause” (they came to court in January 2025 with a large group of supporters) and the Applicants’ comments about their supporters and their resources. The Local Authority and any relevant NHS Trust may be named. Court appointed experts may be named, as may legal representatives and judges.

Having regard to the past conduct of the Applicants to which I have referred in this judgment, it is virtually certain that they would use any opportunity given to them to disclose information about the case directly to the public or sections of the public, so as to verbally attack and abuse individuals involved in their children’s case. They would do so fuelled by their unevidenced beliefs in conspiracy and corruption. Such public attacks would not only amount to a substantial interference with the individuals’ Article 8 rights but would also jeopardise any adoption. Y told the Court quite frankly that the Applicants’ unwavering goal is to get back their children and they would consider the disruption of the adoption process to be a worthwhile achievement. In consideration of the Article 10 right of freedom of expression and theirs and others’ Article 8 rights, as well as the importance of the welfare of the children, I have concluded that I should not further lift reporting restrictions to allow the Applicants themselves, or any other individuals who are not reporters within the meaning of the Transparency Order, to be able to disclose information relating to the proceedings.

In the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abbasi, I have reconsidered the issue of the duration of the Transparency Order which, unamended, would continue in effect until the children reach the age of 18. AJA 1960, s12 continues indefinitely but it would not prohibit the naming of individual social workers or healthcare professionals who have dealt with or are dealing with the children. Following Abbasi, I am satisfied that those parts of the Transparency Order which prohibit the publication by reporters or anyone else, of information relating to the proceedings that identifies individual social workers and treating clinicians or medical professionals, should be time limited to a point well before the children’s 18^th birthdays. Once the children are adopted and settled into their adoptive family, alternatively placed in long term fostering and settled there, then those parts of the order are no longer justified on the evidence before me. I do not wish to imply that the evidence does not exist, but it is not before this Court. The individuals protected may apply for extensions of the injunction both as to its scope and its duration but will need further evidence to support any such application. Since it cannot be known when an adoption will take place, or a long-term fostering placement found, I shall extend those specific parts of the Transparency Order that prevent the publishing of information relating to the proceedings that identifies individual social workers and healthcare professionals to a period of two years from the date of this judgment There shall be liberty to apply to extend that period. The Applicants are subject to ECROs and I remind them that they require prior permission to make any application.

DJ Hussain handed down a detailed written judgment which gives a full account of the history of the removal of the children and reasons why care and placement orders were made. I invited the Applicants to agree that it should be published, along with the judgment of HHJ Downey of 30 July 2024 for which I have an approved transcript. They were resistant to the notion of the judgments being published because they do not agree with them. Y did not see any inconsistency in her seeking the removal of all reporting restrictions, bar the naming of the children, whilst opposing publication of the judgments. However, in my judgement, open justice requires the judgments to be published once suitably anonymised. Once published, the judgments can be commented upon and that will support Article 10 rights to freedom of expression. The Transparency Order will ensure that proportionate protections of the children and of individual social workers and healthcare professionals are maintained. An issue arose as to redaction of parts of DJ Hussain’s judgments that refer to the parents’ medical histories. The Applicants want all references personal to them to be removed from the judgments, but it is in the nature of judgments in family proceedings that they will include personal information about parents. I shall allow the parties further time to address the Court in writing on any redactions (removing parts of the judgments from any published version) before publication, and I shall seek the agreement of the judges concerned to publish. However, provided that the restrictions within the Transparency Order are respected in the published judgments, it appears to me clear that in a case where the Applicants have now come to the High Court, and I am giving a judgment on reporting restrictions and transparency, the public should have access to the judgments themselves.

I shall publish this judgment, authorise the publication of the judgments of DJ Hussain dated 2 May 2024, and HHJ Downey, dated 30 July 2024, subject to anonymisation and any redactions, vary the Transparency Order as set out above, but refuse any other or further lifting of reporting restrictions.

I am most grateful to the Guardian for participating and to Ms Cservenka for acting for the Guardian pro bono. There are no ongoing proceedings in which the Guardian is active but the assistance to this Court is much appreciated. The Applicants invited the Court to hand this judgment down by reading it their presence before a jury. Juries are not part of proceedings such as these and it is unnecessary to have a further hearing simply to read the judgment out. I shall hand this judgment down by circulating it to the parties by email. It shall be published on the National Archive together with the judgments in the Family Court.