FD24P00235 - [2025] EWHC 952 (Fam)

Having considered carefully the extensive evidence and submissions in this matter, I am satisfied that the mother has failed to satisfy the court to the requisite standard of proof in respect of any of the findings she seeks. I am further satisfied, and I so find, that the mother has repeatedly lied to the court by fabricating or exaggerating her evidence in the manner particularised below. In addition, I am satisfied that, by her actions, the mother has deliberately obstructed the relationship between the father and the children. Finally, I am satisfied, pursuant to s.37(1) of the Children Act 1989, that it may be appropriate for a care or supervision order to be made in respect of P and Q. My reasons for so deciding are as follows.

In stating my conclusions, I have carefully borne in mind that a victim of domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour may not have a perfect recall of such behaviour, especially where such behaviour has been extreme in nature, given the limits on the reliability of human memory. In that context, I have also given full weight to the fact that, as observed by Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Lancashire County Council v C, M and F [2014] EWFC 41 at [7], that the court should be wary of attaching forensic significance to “story creep” as memory fades and accounts are repeated over time. I have likewise been careful to bear in mind that the court must be cautious with respect to placing weight on the manner in which an alleged victim of domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour gives their evidence in court.

I have also considered the contents of PD12J and have, in addition to examining the individual allegations made by the mother set out in tabular form, been careful to consider whether there exists in this case a pattern of controlling and coercive behaviour, bearing in mind the insidious scope and manner of this particular type of domestic abuse and the need to look for repetition and patterns of behaviour. In this case, I further bear in mind that if the mother’s accounts of childhood abuse are true (which this court is not in a position to determine), then as a victim of previous sexual and physical abuse she would have been poorly equipped to assert herself by, for example, seeking to leave the father or by reporting every incident to the police.

However, even with each of these allowances, I am satisfied that the evidence of the mother as a whole cannot support the findings she now seeks.

I consider the evidence of the mother to be entirely lacking in credibility. Her evidence was characterised by repeated and extensive inconsistencies, embellishments and significant and multiple changes of account. In the witness box, even when confronted with irrefutable proof of her having lied about a particular matter, the mother either sought to change her story once again to meet the inconvenient facts put to her or to simply refute the assertion she was being dishonest. On occasion, her accounts in the witness box became ever more florid and introduced new allegations, for example that Q was conceived through rape, a serious allegation with long term implications for Q that had been made nowhere before. Of further concern, the mother gave the impression in both her written and oral evidence of having deliberately sought to create, and to continue to create, a false narrative around the father to suit her case, albeit at points she appeared to lose track of the different versions of events she had given, resulting in further changes and contradictions in her evidence. As I will come to, that false narrative has been provided by the mother not only to this court but also to agencies and authorities in the United States, to the UK Border Force, to the Home Office and, most harmfully, to the children.

I have, of course, borne in mind the principle articulated in R v Lucas. People do sometimes lie, out of shame, fear or embarrassment. I am, however, satisfied that the lies told to the court by the mother have been deliberate. As will become apparent, those lies plainly relate to material issues before the court. It is equally apparent that the mother’s motivation for lying is that she feared the truth of the nature, extent and quality of the relationship between the father and the children would undermine her case. Finally, I am satisfied that the lies told by the mother are demonstrated by other evidence before the court clearly demonstrating them to be lies. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the lies told by the mother are capable of amounting to corroboration where relevant. Further, save where corroborated by other evidence, given her propensity to lie I have treated the mother’s evidence with very considerable circumspection.

By contrast, the evidence of the father was straightforward. He made concessions where necessary, even in circumstances where they did not assist his position. For example, he readily accepted that if the mother’s allegations were true they would represent “absolutely outrageous and unacceptable” examples of behaviour towards the children. By way of further example, he did not seek to disguise the fact that he had owned firearms despite there being no independent evidence to prove his ownership of them in the context of the mother alleging he had threatened both her and the children with guns. In contradistinction to the evidence of the mother, the father’s evidence was generally consistent with the other sources of evidence available to the court in the form of documents, and with the evidence of the paternal grandmother. In the foregoing context, I am satisfied that I can place considerable weight on the evidence of the father, particularly where it is corroborated by other evidence.

Given the stark disparity of narrative between the parties and where, in contradistinction to the task facing the court with respect to the father’s application for a return order under Art 12, this court is engaged in a fact finding exercise, in order to explain the findings made by the court it is necessary to state my conclusions in some detail. However, as made clear by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] 4 WLR 42, it is not necessary for the court to recite each and every piece of evidence it has heard and I do not do so.

It is symptomatic of the scope of the factual disputes in this case that there is no agreement between the parties even as to the mother’s date of birth, ethnicity, nationality and childhood background, nor as to whether and, if so, when and in what circumstances the parents were married.