[2025] EWHC 1064 (Fam)

Fecha: 08-May-2025

Application to Restrict Parental Responsibility

Application to Restrict Parental Responsibility

24.

With respect to the application to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility in respect of Adam, the approach to be applied was summarised with pellucid clarity by the President of the Family Division in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689:

“[10] Irrespective of whether or not there is a statutory power to bring parental responsibility to an end, in every case the court may control and limit a parent's ability to exercise parental responsibility through the making of prohibited steps orders, and may enhance the ability of the other parent to exercise parental responsibility with respect to specific issues. CA 1989, s 8(1) provides that:
'"a prohibited steps order" means an order that no step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his parental responsibility for a child, and which is of a kind specified in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of the court;
"a specific issue order" means an order giving directions for the purpose of determining a specific question which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any aspect of parental responsibility for a child.'
Whilst a prohibited steps order and/or a specific issue order may normally be made to regulate one or more aspects of the exercise of parental responsibility, it is accepted that, where the facts of the case justify it, the court may make a combination of orders which have the effect of prohibiting a parent from taking any step in the exercise of his or her parental responsibility and clothing the other parent with the exclusive right to exercise parental responsibility without reference to any other person who holds parental responsibility.”

25.

The statutory framework that grounds the foregoing approach, and the principles of application were examined by Peter Jackson LJ in Re T-D [2024] EWCA Civ 793 at [41] to [48], who highlighted the following matters:

The Children Act 1989 provides the court with the broadest and most flexible powers to make welfare decisions.

ii)

The powers, which are themselves a welfare checklist factor, can be used individually or in combination.

iii)

No two cases are the same and, where orders are needed, judges should use the powers that Parliament has given them in the way that they think best meets the needs of the case.

iv)

Court orders represent an interference with the freedom of parents to make their own decisions and must be used in a way that is proportionate to the presenting problem. The interference must be no more than is necessary to achieve the desired outcome for the child.

The court has a broad discretion as to whether orders should be made or not. There will be some disagreements that are too insignificant to warrant an order, and some questions may fall too far into the future to allow a welfare decision to be made. But where an important issue has crystallised, the court will need a sound reason for declining to decide it.

vi)

The power to use s.8 orders to deprive one parent of the right to exercise parental responsibility in one or more broad domains, or altogether undoubtedly exists.

vii)

Such orders have only been made in extreme cases. It is one thing to interfere with a parent’s ability to make an individual decision, and another to deprive them of decision-making power more generally. Where a conventional order can be made, it may be disproportionate to go further. In other cases, nothing less will be adequate to protect the welfare of the child.

viii)

Where such orders are used, the court has generally deployed a prohibited steps order as one means of achieving its objective. Where parental responsibility is being removed in specific domains, a properly drafted prohibited steps order will have the advantage of clarifying what the affected parent can and cannot do.