[2025] EWHC 1335 (Fam)

I have read the clear and comprehensive skeletons filed and served on behalf of the father and of the mother.

The father’s junior counsel, Mr Sherwin, made oral submissions to supplement the skeleton argument filed in support of the strike out application. It was accepted that the application had to be determined on the facts as set out in support of the claim and not on the basis of any disputed material. Broadly, the father submitted that the mother’s claim had no reasonable prospect of success at trial.

It was submitted that the letter of intent signed by the mother and father on 11 December 2018 was never intended to create legal relations. Emphasis was placed on two particular passages in the letter of intent, namely;

The father submitted that the letter of intent was never implemented, not least because the mother refused to accept or to sign the draft tenancy agreement which had been referred to in the letter of intent. Accordingly, the father proceeded with the purchase of a property for the benefit of T but without the provision of a life tenancy for the mother in the property. It is to be noted that the mother has lived in this property since it was purchased.

It is of note that when the mother considered that the father was not abiding by the terms of the letter of intent, she did not seek to enforce it but rather she applied to enforce and/or vary the financial arrangements order made on 23 October 2013.

The mother’s reliance on seeking to enforce and/or vary the financial arrangements order made by the court formed a key plank of the father’s application to strike out the mother’s claim.

On 17 September 2020 the court stayed the mother’s claim in these proceedings until the determination of the father’s application in the Family Court for permission to use documents produced in those proceedings in this claim. On 10 May 2021 the stay was lifted and the mother’s claim was transferred from the Chancery Division to the Family Division. The mother had applied to file and serve an amended particulars of claim to which the father had consented but in fact the amended particulars of claim was never formally filed or served. No further steps were taken in the prosecution of the claim by the mother and on 22 April 2024 the father filed an application for a strike out of the claim and/or summary judgment on the counterclaim.

The dispute about the provision of a property in which the mother and T could live and, most particularly, whether the mother should have a personal interest or benefit in that property, arose and was maintained in the context of highly emotive and protracted litigation concerning the living arrangements for T.

The father further relied on two further grounds in support of his application to strike out the claim and/or for summary judgment, namely:

I deal with the first ground, in respect of seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the court, which is advanced in support of the submission that the letter of intent is unenforceable at paragraph 49 below.

At the court’s invitation the submission in respect of want of prosecution was not pursued by counsel for the father.

The mother’s formal response to the father’s strike out application and the application for summary judgment on the counterclaim was set out in a skeleton argument prepared by counsel. I permitted Ms Hazeldine, who was assisting the mother as a litigant in person, to make supplemental oral submissions on behalf of the mother.

In broad terms the pertinent submissions made on behalf of the mother in opposition to the father’s applications were that:

Further, in the Amended Particulars of Claim, the mother included a claim seeking equitable compensation for proprietary estoppel. I note the Amended Particulars of Claim was never formally filed or served insofar as it was not signed or dated.

It was submitted on behalf of the mother that the claim for proprietary estoppel “must survive any attack that [the father] makes in relation to any construction of the [letter of intent].” This may be so, but, in my judgment, the claim has no reasonable prospect of success. First, it is doubtful that the terms of the letter of intent constituted a representation or assurance to the mother that she would receive a life interest in the property. Second, there is no evidence that the mother relied on this representation or assurance when she moved to live at the property with T. Indeed, she would have known when she moved to the property that she had not been given a life interest in it. Third and finally, there is no evidence of any detriment having been suffered by the mother.