FD25C40349 - [2025] EWHC 1974 (Fam)

On 3 April 2025, the local authority issued an application under the inherent jurisdiction. If permitted to do so, they sought an urgent deprivation of liberty order permitting them to take G from the hospital ward by force and restrict his liberty to prevent him from absconding from the placement they had identified. They wished the order to be in place before G was told of it.

On the same day, the application on the papers came before HHJ Weston KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Royal Courts of Justice. He joined the young person as a party and appointed a CAFCASS guardian for him. He gave directions for the service of the application and supporting papers on the parties.

The local authority sought an urgent hearing without notice to G. Notification of the hearing listed on 3 April at 3.30pm was provided at 2.57pm via e-mail to the local authority and CAFCASS; the father was reported to have been notified by the local authority but not to be in a position to attend at short notice. It had not been possible to notify the mother and it had not been possible for G to be represented at short notice by a Children’s Guardian or solicitor who did not know of the application. The hearing was without notice to G himself. In those circumstances, the Court was concerned to protect the article 6 rights of the parties.

The hearing came before HHJ Weston KC via MS Teams. The Local authority confirmed that it was possible for G to stay a further night in hospital and that in the circumstances they did not oppose the Court listing the matter the next day. Holding directions were made as to non-notification of G and provision for limited information to be given to his parents.

The application came into my list on 4 April 2025. The hearing was again remote via MS Teams. The hearing was attended by the local authority and their representatives; the father appeared in person and G was represented by Counsel and his Guardian. G was not in attendance and had not been told of the local authority’s plans. Also in attendance was a legal representative of the Trust responsible for the hospital in which G was an inpatient.

On 4 April 2025 I permitted the Local authority to invoke the Inherent Jurisdiction. With the Trust’s consent, the court approved a plan for G to remain on the hospital ward whilst he was told of the local authority’s plan and whilst those who represented him sought his wishes and feelings. Given the local authority’s evidence that once G knew of the plan, he was likely to abscond and harm himself, the court acting under the Inherent Jurisdiction permitted the local authority and the Trust to deprive G of his liberty for the purpose of keeping him safely on the ward whilst his solicitor and Guardian consulted him. In that context I gave directions for the filing of an initial analysis by the Child’s Guardian and listed the case for a return hearing before me on 15 April 2025.

On 11 April 2025 the local authority applied to ward G and made an application to restrict disclosure of information about G to his parents. G’s parents have respected his wishes, and they have not sought information about him nor to attend any hearing before me whilst G has been in attendance.

The hearing before me on 15 April 2025 was again listed remotely via MS Teams. The local authority and Guardian attended and G was legally represented. G’s mother attended in person. I permitted the local authority to make a wardship application in relation to G and gave directions to enable full written submissions and legal argument on the next occasion. G had expressed through his Children’s Guardian his clear wish that he did not agree to be placed in the placement identified by the local authority and that he would only wish to be placed in a semi-independent placement in the areas that he has identified. He agreed to remain accommodated on his current hospital ward pending the next hearing. The Trust confirmed that they would be prepared to accommodate G until the outcome of the next hearing and confirmed that they would request a continuation of the current restrictions, the restrictions having been necessary in their care of him to date. The deprivation of liberty permitted by the court on that occasion were:

In depriving of his liberty, the local authority and the Trust were directed by me to use the minimum degree of force or restraint required only in circumstances such that these are necessary. The authorisation of the restriction of G’s liberty was permissive not mandatory. The local authority and Trust were only to restrict his liberty if it was both necessary and proportionate to do so.

The next hearing was listed before me on 1 May 2025. That hearing had to be adjourned to the next day because of a power cut in the area in which I was sitting. It was heard on 2 May 2025 in a busy list.