ZE23P01539 - [2025] EWHC 1403 (Fam)

Ms Callaghan tells me (paragraph 24 of her report) that, given the involvement by the second applicant in AB’s care prior to and since his birth, it is appropriate, necessary and in AB’s welfare interests that he should have parental responsibility. Ms Hurley reached the same conclusion.

The applicants agree and point out that it was the parties’ position that they should each be parents, and point, among other things to the email to the London Borough O Registry Office. Further they say this is very different from a stepparent relationship.

The respondent says that I should not grant the second applicant parental responsibility because (and this is my summary):

I consider that the fourth argument does not have force and is an attempt to diminish the importance which had previously been attached to the second applicant. He is important to AB as more than his father’s husband. He had been considered by the parties as one of the ‘parents’ from at least the time when the respondent was pregnant. I accept he was not a biological parent nor even a primary carer, in the words of the parenting document, but he was considered as one of the trio of adults with special responsibility for the child. He is not merely a stepparent as the respondent would now label him: he attended NCT classes; he was present at the birth.

I was taken to the words of Baroness Hale in Re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43 at paragraphs 33 and 35, where she sets out that there at least three ways in which a person my become a natural parent of a child and lists the third as a psychological parent. Notwithstanding what I consider, and he has acknowledged, was a less than adequate response to the request for help of the respondent when she returned from Country R, I have no doubt (using Baroness Hale’s words) that he has been meeting AB’s needs of feeding, nurturing, comforting and loving, and, as he gets older, will meet needs of guiding, socialising, educating and protecting.

I do consider there is force in the first and second argument. And I note in this regard the words of Peter Jackson J to which I have been referred in Re R (Parental Responsibility) [2011] EWHC 1535 (Fam) as to the risk of conflict. In relation to the first argument, as I said during the hearing, exercise of parental responsibility does not take place on a majority vote basis. I urge the parents to approach the decisions they need to make not as one side versus the other but as an enquiry into the child’s best interest to which they can all contribute. As things stand, given the poor relationship between the parties, I acknowledge that these arguments must weigh in the balance against giving the second applicant parental responsibility.

I have recorded above that I consider that the respondent was made afraid during the incident in the park. It is not an incident of such gravity that this decision should be dictated by it, albeit I do consider I should hold it in mind. It shows mutual disagreement, an open loss of temper – on both sides though almost certainly more frighteningly on his, and an insensitivity on his part to the effect the incident had on the respondent.

It is further necessary for me to consider at this stage a criticism that is made of the second applicant by the respondent, namely that he puts her down by way of his email correspondence. I have been taken to a large number of emails and other written messages between each of the adults. For the most part they can be read in two ways, an enquiry and an implied criticism – depending on whether they are being considered by a defensive recipient or a questioning sender. Some are more overtly hostile but can readily be seen as being the next step in a simmering mutual row. I consider all the adults as equally guilty both of taking offence unnecessarily and causing offence (whether intentionally or otherwise). I do consider that the current poor relationship, as I have already said, is something that I need to consider, however my overwhelming thought as to this correspondence is that all three adults should do better, and I hope that the court experience will make them reflect on how they express themselves hereafter.

As to the third argument, I accept that during these contentious proceedings the positions of the applicants has aligned. That agreement may not continue, and it is appropriate I recognise the potential for the second applicant to have a different view to the first. Considering, as I do, that the second applicant has AB’s best interest at heart, then it is an advantage to AB having the involvement of the second applicant.

Various improbable scenarios were considered by the advocates as to the death of different ‘parents’ or indeed the separation of the applicants. None need to be repeated here, and of course alternate remedies will be available in most of those scenarios, but what they do all underline is that it is in AB’s best interest to have the second applicant as someone who can contribute to his future as a parent.

Ms Cooper says to me for the applicants that an order for parental responsibility will have a material advantage for AB in enabling third parties, such as schools and hospitals, to recognise the second applicant’s importance in his life. I agree with this.

I accept entirely that this is an issue of real importance, as urged on me by Ms James. I note, and have mentioned above and will return to below, the importance that she says it has for the respondent. I do bear in mind all the considerations set out in the Children Act checklist. In the final balancing I agree with Ms Callaghan, for the reasons that she expresses, that the second applicant should have Parental Responsibility. To her reasons I add three things: