1700-0689-0107-3484 - [2025] EWHC 1696 (Fam)

On 23 November 2023, M issued these Schedule 1 proceedings on C’s behalf. On 15 March 2024, F issued an application in D11 seeking an order dispensing with the requirement that he file a Form E1 and that instead he should serve a schedule of his assets, income and liabilities. This application was sought pursuant to the so-called ‘millionaire’s defence’. On 30 March 2024, M issued an application in D11 for interim provision by way of maintenance and legal service orders. On 3 April 2024, the matter came before His Honour Judge Hess on a first appointment. He made a consent order which inter alia (a) recorded F’s reliance on the millionaire’s defence and directed him to make disclosure by schedule, (b) directed M to answer two questions relating to the value of her chattels and her ability to access two policies, (c) made directions for an FDR and (d) listed a hearing for interim provision.

The application for interim provision came before a deputy district judge on 31 May 2024. The DDJ reserved judgment to 20 June 2024. The order itself bears the date 9 July 2024. By the date of that hearing, F had made disclosure by schedule. This put F’s total resources at £67,608,000 and his income at £3,275,000 per annum. In contrast, M had provided disclosure which showed that she had c.£70,000 in bank accounts, a life insurance policy with Company D worth c.£320,000 (‘Policy D’), another life insurance policy with Bank E worth £116,000 (‘Policy E’) and a collection of jewellery and handbags with a purchase price of c.£1,350,000. So on the face of it, M had £1,756,000 worth of resources and no income. M had suggested that (a) the policies were for C and (b) there would be tax of 15% on withdrawal. The DDJ rejected these points.

At the hearing, the parties agreed that F should continue to pay for rent on the family home and C’s school fees. In addition, M sought c.£51,500 per month (or c.£618,000 per annum), comprising household bills, general maintenance, a holiday fund and C’s birthday fund. She also sought a lump sum to repay loans of £160,000. F offered £10,000 per month and additional costs paid directly of c.£11,500 per month. The latter are difficult to equate with M’s position as the figure of £11,500 per month included school fees and may have included some items sought by M. The DDJ ordered F to pay £13,115 per month/£157,380 per annum with an additional £36,000 holiday fund, giving total provision of £193,380 per annum. As to provision for legal services, the DDJ decided that M should use her own resources to pay for legal services. The DDJ gave a considered and lengthy judgment. The decisions made by the DDJ were plainly a proper exercise of judicial discretion. I make no comment at all about the interim maintenance provision. I note that, perhaps, another judge might have reached a different conclusion about how to exercise his or her discretion in respect of the interim funding of legal fees in a claim brought on behalf of a child who has one very rich parent and one impecunious by the metric of the other’s wealth, albeit rich by a more standard metric. M was unhappy with the outcome and issued a notice of appeal on 12 July 2024. By that notice she sought to challenge both the decision on quantum of general income provision and legal services provision.

The parties attended mediation in September 2024. I was told that there were three mediation sessions in total. I do not know the dates of all the sessions but I do know that mediation was not successful. The case then came before Judge Hess for an FDR hearing on 2 October 2024. The FDR was effective but, like mediation, unsuccessful. It is a great shame that the parties were unable to reach a resolution of this claim. They could not have been in better hands than their selected mediator’s and Judge Hess’s. At the conclusion of the FDR, Judge Hess directed that the matter be allocated to a High Court Judge, listed for a post FDR directions hearing and a three day final hearing. M’s application for permission to appeal was to be heard by the allocated judge. After the FDR, the parties served open offers. M’s was served on 11 October 2024 and F’s on 24 October 2024.

On 19 February 2025, M issued an application to adduce further evidence in the appeal relating to her two policies with D and E. In short, that evidence identified possible criminal sanctions against M in France were she to draw down on the policies and also gave evidence that F had paid her an extra £90,000 on top of the £36,000 ordered by the DDJ so that she could go on additional holidays. On 28 February 2025, M issued a further application for a legal services provision order. She sought payment of £113,700 to cover the anticipated costs of these proceedings and of section 8 proceedings. In her statement in support, M explained that her then solicitors would not continue to act without this payment.

The case was allocated to Lieven J and listed for directions on 7 March 2025 and final hearing on 4 June 2025. At the directions hearing, Lieven J made orders for updating disclosure and for the production by M of a bank account she had failed to disclose. She also directed the parties to exchange property particulars and statements. Lieven J decided that she would determine M’s permission to appeal application on paper and listed the case for a one day hearing on 4 April 2025 before McKendrick J to deal with M’s appeal, if she granted permission, and M’s application for a legal services provision order. On 14 March 2025, Lieven J delivered a written judgment refusing M’s application for permission. This was hardly surprising. As I have already stated, the DDJ’s judgment was clearly an unimpeachable exercise of discretion. I have not been able to ascertain whether the application to adduce further evidence in the appeal was decided. To my mind this makes no material difference. The appeal was always bound to fail. For reasons that are not entirely clear to me the hearing listed on 4 April 2025 did not take place. It may or may not be connected with M’s decision to dis-instruct her previous solicitors on 26 March 2025 and instruct her current solicitors. That change was hardly surprising – in her statement in support of further legal funding M had explained that her then solicitors would cease to act were she unsuccessful on her application. They may well have taken the view that her chances of success on 4 April 2025 were limited given the outcome of the appeal and the DDJ’s earlier order.

Thus, the scene was set for this hearing.