FA-2025-000024 - [2025] EWHC 1500 (Fam)

Fecha: 17-Jun-2025

The Law Relevant to Appeals Against Findings of Fact

The Law Relevant to Appeals Against Findings of Fact

11.

The relevant law has recently been summarised by Mr Justice Hayden in F v M [2025] EWHC 1279 (Fam) wherein at paragraphs 18 and 19 he stated:

18.

An Appellate Court will not interfere with findings of fact made by the trial judge unless it is constrained to do so; this applies not only to primary facts but extends to the evaluation of those facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from them. The correct approach is set out in the frequently cited Fage UK Limited v Chobani UK Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 5 , per Lewison LJ. Later, in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 , per Lewison LJ who characterised the approach to an appeal on a pure question of fact as a "well-trodden path" signposted by the following principles:

"2.

…

An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii)

The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii)

An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv)

The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi)

Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

19.

Self-evidently, these principles shield the findings of a first instance judge with a robust and durable armour, though not, ultimately, an impregnable one.

12.

I adopt that summary and have applied it to this appeal.