LV22C50093 - [2025] EWHC 1474 (Fam)

As noted, this matter has a lengthy litigation history. Ms A has three children: M (aged 14), N (aged 7) and O (aged 3). Ms A came to the UK with M and N in 2020. O was born here in August 2021. Final orders were made by HHJ Coppel in February 2024 for M (a care order and placement in long-term foster care) and O (a supervision order with O remaining in his father’s care). A final child arrangements order was made for N to live with his father to facilitate his return to Mr O’s care in Italy. That order was successfully appealed (see Re N (A Child) (Care Order: Welfare Evaluation) [2024] EWCA Civ 938). This is the re-hearing of welfare decision-making for N.

Ms A’s relationship with Mr O began in 2013. They lived together between October 2013 and June 2019, although the arrangements were complicated with Ms A being in an overlapping relationship with Mr U. N was born in November 2017. The exact care arrangements for N in the first couple of years of his life are unclear, but the relationship between the parents finally broke down in June 2019 and Mr O moved out of the rented home that Ms A was providing. Regular contact did however continue between N and his father. Mother moved to England with M and N in 2020. There were court proceedings in Italy in 2021 that resulted in court ordered arrangements for ongoing contact between N and Mr O in Italy. Mother’s new partner, Mr U, travelled regularly to Italy with N to facilitate the contact. The last contact in Italy between N and his father was over the Christmas period 2021/22.

In January 2022, Mr U made allegations to the children’s school that Ms A was physically and emotionally abusing the children. Wider concerns emerged regarding the complex dynamics between Ms A and the children’s respective fathers (Mr O, Mr U and Mr Z). Serious allegations were made involving sexual exploitation, criminality and violence. The Local Authority issued proceedings on 22nd February 2022. O remained in the care of his father. M and N were removed into foster care when Mr U notified the local authority he was unable to care for all three children. On 18th March 2022, after a short period with a temporary foster carer, M and N moved into the care of their current foster carer, ER.

The final composite hearing was heard by HHJ Coppel between April 2023 and January 2024. Judgment was handed down on 12th February 2024. Findings were made against the mother, Mr O, Mr U and Mr Z. HHJ Coppel determined that none of the children could return to Ms A’s care. No party sought to appeal the factual findings, threshold determination or welfare assessment with respect to Ms A. The Court therefore records for completeness the threshold findings relevant to Mr O:

Following the Court of Appeal decision, Dr Parsi di Landrone, a registered clinical psychologist, was instructed to carry out a psychological assessment of Mr O. She was appointed as she is dual qualified in Italy and the United Kingdom and has worked in both jurisdictions. Upon receipt of her report, it was unanimously agreed between the parties that her report was fundamentally flawed, could not be relied upon, and a new psychologist would need to be instructed.

Dr Parsi di Landrone met with Mr O by MS teams to carry out the psychological assessment on 23rd and 24th August 2024. Her report is dated 17th September 2024. One of the key issues impacting on welfare decision-making for N is whether there remains a risk of harm from domestic abuse given the finding that Mr O physically assaulted Ms A on 24th April 2018. Dr Parsi di Landrone was instructed to opine on whether there were any aspects of Mr O’s personality that inhibit his ability to care for N. She concluded there were not, but in doing so appeared to challenge and go behind the finding of domestic abuse made by HHJ Coppel. The key passage from the abstract of her report reads:

“I disagree with the finding about his violent nature in reference to the hospital record brought as evidence by [Mrs. A] as the record do not specify the name of the partner involved in that incident and [Mrs. A] was in a relationship with Mr. U as well as Mr. O at the time of the incident. Since Mr. O has not been charge[d] by the Italian local authority for this incident, this evidence is not an acceptable for me; especially considering that there is no further evidence that Mr. O has been violent before or after this incident or in any other romantic relationship. In my professional opinion, this evidence is also not acceptable as the court demonstrated that [Mrs. A] has res[orted] to lying and manipulate facts according to her benefit and the partner she chose in such circumstances. Indeed, it has also been found by the court that [Mrs. A] is a vulnerable woman in a co-dependent relationship with Mr. U who has often remarked his dislike towards Mr. O. Ultimately, it is clear that the competitions and animosity between the fathers fueled by the ambiguous and enmeshed behaviors of [Mrs. A] towards the fathers, has often led to conflictual relationship between these parties.

Considering the unacceptability of such evidence and lack of further evidence of domestic abuse, as well as the consistent and copious evidences that Mr. O has always cared for Master N at the best of his capacity; it appears that Mr. O has no risk of domestic abuse and therefore, it appears that he is not a threat for his son.”

Within that passage Dr Parsi di Landrone directly challenges the findings of HHJ Coppel and the soundness of the evidence on which those findings are based. She points to the ‘unacceptability of that evidence’ to justify her conclusion that Mr O does not pose a risk of domestic abuse.

The united position of all parties is that Dr Parsi di Landrone wholly misunderstood and failed to comply with her instructions as an expert. Most crucially, her conclusions and recommendations were fundamentally flawed by reason of her failure to proceed on the basis of the factual findings made by HHJ Coppel.

Dr Parsi di Landrone was notified in writing by the parties of their concerns and that they would be seeking for adverse comments to be made regarding her report within this judgment. Dr Parsi di Landrone has attended two hearings before me to deal with this issue and has submitted a lengthy response to the parties’ concerns. Within the response, Dr Parsi di Landrone denies that she refused to accept the findings of HHJ Coppel. She argues that in carrying out a psychological risk assessment she must consider not just historical findings but a wide range of factors including current risk indicators. She opposed being named within any published judgment.

The Court does not take issue with the methodology for carrying out a psychological risk assessment as set out by Dr Parsi di Landrone in her response. The fundamental difficulty is that contrary to the duties of an expert, Dr Parsi di Landrone did not consider the Court’s findings within that broader framework of assessment, but challenged the validity of the findings themselves. It is not a case of different professionals utilising different assessment tools, but a court appointed expert failing to proceed on the basis of the facts as determined by the Court in carrying out the risk assessment as instructed. The Court notes the objection raised by Dr Parsi di Landrone that she was not given an opportunity to respond to concerns before a new psychologist was appointed. However, given the fundamental and pervasive nature of this failing, the Court is satisfied it was not susceptible to remedy through the raising of questions or points of clarification. The Court also has to note that Dr Parsi di Landrone’s detailed response, continues to conflate the factual findings of the Court (which are not subject to question or challenge), with the process of assessing current risk.

In terms of the impact these failings have had on proceedings, it ultimately led to further cost and delay whilst a new psychologist was instructed. The assessment of Mr O had to be undertaken de novo. For those reasons, I am satisfied the fees of Dr Parsi di Landrone should not in principle be met from the public purse. The Court understands that Dr Parsi di Landrone has in fact already been paid in full by the local authority and the legal aid agency for her work. In light of the Court’s comments, I would invite her to consider whether she should out of good will return her fee to those public bodies.

Dr Parsi di Landrone requested that she is not named within this judgment. She naturally fears the impact on her reputation and capacity to secure future instructions as an expert within this jurisdiction. Practice Guidance on the publication of judgments was issued by the President of the Family Division on 19th June 2024. The Guidance at 5.5.4. provides that anonymisation of professional witnesses is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. That does not apply in this case. Anonymisation may also be justified on other grounds depending on the specific facts, but a speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient.

In the Court’s judgment, Dr Parsi di Landrone has not raised any matters which would be capable of justifying departure from the usual position that experts should be named. There is a clear public interest rooted in ensuring the fair, just and efficient administration of family justice that experts should not be anonymised, the more so when their assessments and recommendations have been found to be flawed. The Court observes that experts have clear and important duties to the Court as set out within Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. It is vital instructed experts understand those rules and comply with them. If they fail in those duties, it not only causes harmful delay and significant cost to the public purse, but undermines fair, sound and just decision-making by the courts.

There may be some cases where an expert is able to demonstrate that publication will result in a significant interference with their own Article 8 right to respect for private and family life which, when balanced against the competing public interest in publication, is sufficiently weighty to prevail. A credible threat to the expert’s physical safety is one such possibility. However, whilst no doubt publication may be uncomfortable for Dr Parsi di Landrone and may impact on her professional standing, she has not been able to point to any matters that would engage her Article 8 rights in any significant way.

Weighing these considerations, the Court is satisfied Dr Parsi di Landrone should be named.