FD25P00113 - [2025] EWHC 2670 (Fam)

The allegation is that the father stranded the mother and child in Morocco in January 2025. He removed their travel documents through deception and returned to England after he had initiated divorce proceedings in Morocco.

The father accepts that the mother’s visa was due to expire in January 2025, that he left the mother and A behind in Morocco and that he initiated divorce proceedings in Morocco on 26 December 2024.

The father’s case is that the mother asked him to delay issuing proceedings until December 2024 when she would return to live in Morocco.

The mother was absolutely clear that she had no intention of remaining in Morocco and was shocked by the divorce petition.

The evidence on this allegation points very strongly, indeed overwhelmingly, in favour of the mother’s case.

I bear in mind that the father has lied both in the Moroccan proceedings and to the mother about the visa. The father’s explanation for the lie to the Moroccan court is that the mother was inaccurate about his income. The father did not lie out of shame, or to bolster a just cause, or to conceal disgraceful behaviour. He lied because he did not want to have to pay the mother very much money. I do not, in fact, need to rely upon those lies as the evidence is so clear cut in favour of the mother’s case, in my view.

I do not find that the mother’s messages in December and January were part of a plan to ask for more money in these proceedings: their tone and content is self-evidently one of confusion and emotional turmoil.

I find that the father deliberately applied for a divorce petition in secret. He took the mother and A to Morocco knowing that her visa would expire, having made a decision not to renew that visa and knowing full well that he was lying to her about the application. He applied for the divorce on 26 December, took her out for dinner and said how much he loved her, and said nothing about the petition. She did not find out until she was served. He left on 30 December 2024 to return to England when the mother still did not know he had issued proceedings. By the time she found out her visa had expired, and she was unable to come to England.

I find that the father exploited the mother’s vulnerability. He knew that her visa would expire. He stranded her deliberately in Morocco.

The mother says that the father had deliberately taken her residence permit. I note that the residence permit was not found by the Tipstaff. I do not need to make a finding on this point. But I have found that he deliberately withheld A’s passport by leaving it with his grandmother.

The mother has proved the first allegation.

I set out the allegation in full. The allegation is that father subjected the mother to coercive and controlling behaviour including financial abuse. The father refused to let the mother have access to her bank account via internet banking. The father destroyed the mother’s debit card. The father refused to allow the mother have access to her own salary during the time she was working. The father pressured the mother to work in jobs she did not wish to and would frequently shout at her if she did not agree. The father abandoned the mother and A in Morocco without funds for their living expenses. The father did not pay for A’s urgent medical treatment at the hospital when A was struggling to breathe as he had bronchitis.

Stranding the mother and A is an example of domestic abuse.

According to Re H-N I need to consider whether a pattern of coercive behaviour has been established. The complaints are primarily financial. It is clear that coercive control can include financial control. The evidence of coercive behaviour is not as clear cut as that of abandonment.

In cross-examination the father was asked about the contents of the submissions at the reconciliation hearing at which the father had said that the mother did not respect him; committed inappropriate acts for a Muslim woman including wearing revealing clothes; threatened him with deportation; neglected his religious duties and behaved like a foreigner spending weekends out with foreigners.

The father did not deny making these complaints to the Moroccan court, nor did he say they were untrue. The allegations could be described as misogynistic, but I note that the complaints did not feature in the schedule of allegation nor feature to a large extent in her written or oral evidence; there the complaints were primarily financial. I get the impression that the father was lying in his divorce petition in order to strengthen the petition in Morocco. But I do have to bear the father’s evidence on the divorce petition in mind in when considering context of the other allegations.

I note that the mother said she was shocked by the divorce petition, and that she has said in her written evidence that “on the whole” the relationship was fine. She said, and I find, that they continued to have intimate relations until separation at the end of December 2024. The photographs and messages that she prays in aid to show that the parties had a normal relationship until January 2025, and thus why she was shocked by the petition, do not support a case as to a coercive and controlling relationship. I accept that coercion and control come in many forms and can result in a loss of personal autonomy. And also coercive control does not mean that every day is awful, as Ms Baker reminds me. But there are quite a large number of positive messages and photos over a prolonged period of time.

The mother says that the father pressurised her to work in jobs that she did not like. she lists three in her statement, all of which appear to be quite brief in duration, and she particularly disliked the massage parlour cleaning job. I pause her to say that the complaints in the divorce petition in Morocco ring particularly hollow in light of the work that the mother undertook.

The mother’s evidence is also that she gave up work when she got ill in December 2022 and she does not appear to have worked since then. She went to Morocco on her own in 2023 and the father provided her with financial support when she went. He does not appear to have forced her to work since December 2022. He says that he bought her a computer to allow her to do online courses. I accept that the mother would have preferred to work as a physiotherapist, but I do not consider that he has demonstrated coercive control here in relation to employment

The mother says that the father denied her access to her own earnings, refused to give her internet access and cut up her card. I deal with these together.

The mother was not working for the majority of the marriage. She accepted in evidence that she and the father had discussed whether they have a joint account or sole accounts and she had eventually agreed. She has a card on that account. The mother says that she was given a budget of £300 to £350 a month which was insufficient. I find that the father was very cautious about money and did impose a budget. The mother says that the father told her to be patient as he wanted to save money to buy a property, which he did, in which the family live. But it does appear that she had access to the joint account until it was closed. There are a large number of transactions on card no. 8512, for example there are 31 in the period from 18 October 2024 to 13 November 2024, albeit they are for very small sums. I don’t have statements going back to 2022 when the mother was working.

I do not have sufficient evidence to find that the father denied access to the banking app internet. That would seem rather pointless if the mother had a card. I also do not find that he was guilty of coercive control in relation to denying access to the joint account when she had her own card.

I do find, however, that he was controlling about finances as part of his plan to strand the mother in Morocco. To that end

I do not find that the father cut up the card in December 2024. He denies that allegation and it would be pointless if he closed the account.

The mother also alleges that the father abandoned her and A without any funds. The father says that he gave then £500 before he left Morocco and £2,000 in February 2025 after he attended court in Morocco. She says that he did not pay when she asked him for help with

On these points I prefer the evidence of the mother. There is no evidence that the father paid these cash sums. He could easily have produced evidence from his accounts. He has evidence from the Moroccan court that he has paid in the 80,000 dirhams that have been awarded to the mother. But he has nothing in relation to £2,000 that he alleges he gave to the mother in February. He accepted that he did not send any money when he was sent pictures of their son having medical treatment and the mother made a request.

So, for the second allegation, I find that the father’s behaviour was controlling in the following manner

The father lied about his income and salary.

This allegation is admitted and proven. The father lied about his income and assets to the Moroccan court on 21 January 2025. He repeated that lie on 27 March 2025.

The allegation is that the father abandoned A and then cut off all communication with the mother about him and left them financially destitute.

The father has accepted that he ceased communication with the mother. I have already found that the father left the mother, and thus A, destitute.

The father has asserted that the mother has rental income. He has relied upon a rental contract in her name that is five years old. The mother has explained in her statement that she does not have access to this income: the flat was taken over by her sister who gives the rental income to their brother. The father also relies upon ownership of the family home in Morocco that is occupied by her brother. I prefer the mother’s evidence which was consistent in both oral and written form.

The father does not wish to say that he has not communicated with A. But given A’s age, that is what stranding the mother and ceasing communication with her has achieved.

The fourth allegation is proved.

The allegation is that the father hacked into the mother’s email account and deleted her emails on 15 January and 20 January 2025. The father denies the allegation.

There is very little evidence on this point. In her statement the mother says that she received a notification that someone in the UK had accessed her laptop on those dates. The document she relies upon says there was activity on 15 January 2025 in the UK and on 20 January 2025 in Morocco from a Galaxy S9. That would coincide with the father’s whereabouts. But there is no other evidence linking the father and this behaviour. In particular, he says that he does not have a Galaxy S9. He has an S21. The mother has an S9.

I do not find this allegation proven.

The mother seeks financial relief against the father, pursuant to Schedule 1, para 7 of the Children Act 1989 for

The sums of money sought are modest.

I have found that the mother has no rental income and has received no financial assistance from the father although he has paid in £6,500 to the Moroccan court. It is not clear if that is available to her now.

The mother’s sister and brother-in-law are supporting her but they have written a statement to say that this cannot continue.

The father agreed to pay £200 per month towards A at the hearing on 6 May 2025 before MacDonald J, but has paid only once. He makes no other contribution and there are no maintenance orders in place in Morocco

There are ongoing financial proceedings in Morocco. The mother has attempted to claim only spousal maintenance there. It is not clear to me if the court has rejected the severance of child and spousal maintenance orders; that is the father’s position but the mother points out that the documents in the bundle are submissions from his lawyers rather than a judgment.

At the hearing on 15 July 2025 a decision will be made but I am not clear what this will encompass.

The father earns a little more than £3,300 pcm. He is paying privately in these proceedings. He has previously instructed Leading counsel. He says that money has been borrowed to fund proceedings. His mortgage appears to be about £1,504 according to the bank statements which would suggest that he has c £1,800 to live on and pay bills.

The father’s primary position is that the Moroccan court is best placed to deal with this application. His secondary position is that there should be a stay on the basis that it would be more convenient for the Moroccan court to deal with this matter.

Ms Andrews has relied on the case of Timokhin v Timokhina [2023] EWHC 58. That case is very different on the facts. It was a Schedule 1 application where the father who sought provision accepted that the scale of the wealth was such that he did not need financial assistance from the mother to provide the children with the privileged life they led. Here, I have found that the mother is without income or resources. The position could not be more starkly different.

The father has said that the mother and A are not habitually resident in England and Wales absent a finding of stranding. A is a ward of court. The court has earlier determined that A is habitually resident in England. I have found that the mother was stranded in Morocco. On that basis all three parties are habitually resident in this jurisdiction.

Under Schedule 1 of the Children Act, para 1 (7) where a child is a ward of court, the court may exercise any of its power under this Schedule even though no application has been made.

Under s 44 (1) Child Support Act if a person with care (the mother), the non-resident parent (the father) and the children are habitually resident in England and Wales then the CMS has exclusive jurisdiction. That is the case here. The court does not have jurisdiction to make a maintenance award.

Ms Baker has urged me to be practical. The mother’s application under the CMS will take several weeks and she is in need of assistance now. I disagree. The power of the court in wardship jurisdiction is wide but it cannot override the legal jurisdiction of other public bodies. As Munby J said in the case, In the Matter of a Ward of Court [2017] EWHC 1022 at para 9.

“the wardship court cannot exercise its powers, however wide they may be, so as to intervene on the merits in an area of concern entrusted by law to another public authority”.

The CMS clearly has jurisdiction in this case. Whilst I have a great deal of sympathy for the mother’s predicament, I do not consider that it is appropriate for the court to exercise its Wardship jurisdiction to deal with the delays in the procedure of the CMS when the CMS clearly has exclusive jurisdiction.

Given the habitual residence of A, the court does have power to order disclosure, and to make an order for a lump sum. I have found that the father has an income of c £3,300 pcm and a mortgage of £1,500 pcm. I have found that the father has stranded the mother and A in Morocco. The mother and child need provision to assist with legal fees and the application for a visa. The mother has no funds of her own. On the basis of the findings of fact I have made, I consider that the father should pay for the costs of the application and legal fees. After public funding assistance, these fees amount to £3,250. These sums are modest in comparison with the father’s own legal fees. If the mother is successful in her application for legal aid and a fee waive, these figures will reduce. The father has a reasonable income of c £3,300 pcm with a mortgage of £1,500 pcm. I do not consider that the Moroccan court would be better placed to make a determination on this issue of expenditure not least because the father lied to the Moroccan court about his income and capital position.

The mother has also sought financial disclosure. The father says I should not make a substantive order before I order disclosure – what is the point of disclosure if I have already made a determination? I have found that the father as part of his controlling behaviour closed the joint account and opened another account or accounts. I have found that he has not provided for his wife and child financially. He has lied to the Moroccan courts about his finances and does not appear to have rectified the position formally. I have, since the draft of the judgment, been informed that there is a final hearing in Morocco on 29 July 2025. Although I have made a determination on the lump sum and maintenance parts of the Schedule 1 application, I consider that it is necessary to have some understanding of the father’s financial position not least to deal with the practicalities of the mother’s return at the next hearing.

That is my judgment.