[2025] EWHC 2067 (Fam)

The Defendant, Daniel Hesketh appeared as a party at a hearing at the Family Court in St. Helens before District Judge Gray on 7 January 2025. This was a hearing in private family law proceedings concerning the welfare of the Defendant’s two children. The mother of the children appeared by video link. In court, together with the Judge and the Defendant, were a Court Associate, Counsel for the mother, and a security guard, Mr Lowe.

The Defendant’s conduct at the hearing is alleged to have been in contempt of court. Mr Justice Cobb, as acting Family Presiding Judge for the Northern Circuit, drafted allegations against the Defendant of contempt in the face of the court within a Committal Notice dated 21 February 2025. The allegations are:

“PARTICULARS OF ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE

1.

You attended a Court hearing before DJ Gray (“the Judge”) at St Helens Family Court on 7 January 2025.

2.

At the hearing, you used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the Judge while he was conducting the hearing and showed disrespect to the Judge and to all court users within the hearing; in that:

(a)

You referred to the Judge as a “twat” (p.21F transcript),

(b)

You referred to the Judge as a “cunt” (p.21G transcript),

(c)You referred to the Judge as a “fucking gobshite” (p.19G transcript),

(d)

You referred to the Judge and those in court “all of ‘youse’ as rapists, dirty, horrible bastards” (p.28B transcript);

(e)You referred to the Judge and those in court as “youse are nothing but child offenders” p.20E transcript);

(f)

You referred to the Judge and those in court as “all mentally unwell, every one of youse” (p.28G transcript).

3.

You repeatedly interrupted the Judge, shouted at the Judge and generally shouted within the court room, while the Judge was conducting court proceedings, and when delivering his judgment, in such a manner as to show disrespect to the Judge and to the court and its users; in that:

(a)

From page 5-24 (transcript), you spoke over the Judge, and shouted at him and generally in the court room (see specifically in relation to the shouting referred to at pp.8, 10, 15 of the transcript);

(b)

See page 26-30 of the transcript for the interruptions to the judgment (“rambling on a load of shit” p.30F).

4.

You threatened the Judge while he was conducting court proceedings in that:

(a)

You said to the Judge “I swear to God now if I see you outside this courtroom, Judge, I am gonna punch the fucking lights right out of ya” (p.21F transcript);

(b)

You said to the Judge: “‘I’ll see you off outside this courtroom, you stupid twat… and any soft cunt like you and your family it’s fucking on” (p.21F transcript);

(c)You told the Judge to “fuck off” (p.28H transcript);

(d)

You said to the Judge “Who the fuck are you to tell me I can’t see my kids?” (p.29B transcript).

5.

For the reasons set out above, and with specific regard to the transcript and audio recording of the court hearing taken as a whole, it is clear that by your conduct you disrupted the court proceedings and impeded the due administration of justice.”

Hence, the allegations at paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Particulars are (i) abuse of the Judge and others in Court, (ii) interruptions of the Judge, (iii) threats, including of physical violence, against the Judge, and (iv) disruption of the proceedings. Each is alleged to have constituted a contempt of court.

The evidence in support of the allegations was referred to in the Contempt Notice and comprises (i) a transcript of the hearing, (ii) an audio recording of the hearing, (iii) a witness statement from District Judge Gray dated 7 February 2025, and (iv) a witness statement from Paul Lowe, Security Officer, dated 7 February 2025.

Cobb J gave directions for a first hearing to take place before Bright J on 21 March 2025. In accordance with FPR Part 37 the Notice included advice to the Defendant about his right to remain silent and to receive publicly funded legal advice and representation. Personal service of the Contempt Notice and evidence was required. On 19 March 2025, on consideration of the papers, Bright J vacated the hearing listed for 21 March 2025 because personal service had not been effected. He listed the adjourned first hearing before me on 16 April 2025. Again, personal service could not be effected and so, after consideration of the papers, I vacated the hearing on 16 April re-listing it for 9 May 2025. On 15 April 2025, after further consideration of the papers, I gave directions permitting service by an email address beginning with “d” which was held on the court file in the family proceedings in the Family Court at St. Helens.

On 9 May 2025 I attended at the Liverpool Combined Court in Derby Square, Liverpool to conduct the hearing of the committal. DJ Gray and Mr Lowe attended court to give evidence. Mr Hesketh did not appear but I was assisted by helpful evidence from PC Roberts, a Police Liaison Officer, who had made contact at my request with the Investigating Officer who, it transpired, had interviewed Mr Hesketh, in the company of a solicitor, about the events at the hearing on 7 January 2025. The Defendant had given the police a telephone number and an email address beginning with an “h”. The Defendant had given a “no comment” interview. I recorded on the face of my order of 9 May 2025 that PC Roberts 4431 had given evidence on oath on 9 May 2025 that:

“Mr Hesketh had voluntarily attended with a solicitor for a police interview in relation to the events at St Helens Family Court on 7 January 2025 on 28 April 2025.

During the attendance at the police station Mr Hesketh had been played the recording of the hearing on 7 January 2025.

Mr Hesketh’s attendance had followed telephone contact with him and he gave a telephone number to the police –[redacted]– and an address at [redacted].

PC Roberts having used the said telephone number, spoke to Mr Hesketh at between 1100 hrs and 1200 hrs on 9 May 2025. Mr Hesketh informed him that he was unaware of the committal hearing and had not received any documents. Mr Hesketh said that post to the address above is often stolen and that contact with him should be at email address (redacted, beginning with H) or by telephone at the said number.

The investigating officer would be able to provide details of the solicitor who attended the interview with Mr Hesketh.”

At the hearing on 9 May 2025 I also received written witness evidence from Tipstaff officers that they had attended the last known address for the Defendant. It appeared that the address was possibly still occupied by him and there was post addressed to him at the location, but he was not present and a neighbour said he had not been seen for some time. I considered whether to proceed in the absence of Mr Hesketh but on balance, for reasons I gave at the hearing, I decided that I should again adjourn the proceedings and relisted them for the afternoon of 13 June 2025. I could not be sure that Mr Hesketh had notice of the hearing on 9 May 2025. Furthermore, it appeared to me that since it was now known that a solicitor was acting for Mr Hesketh in the criminal investigations, and given that contact details had been given to the police which had not previously been known to this Court or the Tipstaff, a further attempt at service should be made. I directed that personal service should be attempted but that if it could not be effected then service would be permitted by leaving papers by post at the last known address and by service at both email addresses known to be used by the Defendant.

I conducted a further hearing at Liverpool Combined Court on 13 June 2025. Again, the witnesses DJ Gray and Mr Lowe attended. Again, PC Roberts was available to assist the court. In advance of the hearing I had received a statement from a member of the Tipstaff’s team which informed the Court that contact with Mr Hesketh had been made by text. Messages had been exchanged making arrangements for officers to meet Mr Hesketh at an agreed location in Liverpool on 31 May 2025. I have seen copies of those texts. In fact, Mr Hesketh did not appear at the agreed venue as arranged and did not respond to calls made to his mobile on the day. I was also provided with a copy of an email sent to Mr Hesketh by the Tipstaff on 3 June 2025 which contains information that Mr Hesketh had not provided a postal or home address to the Tipstaff. The Tipstaff accordingly sent the written evidence (transcript and two statements) to both email addresses on 3 June 2025.

PC Roberts had made further enquiries, contacting the solicitor known to have represented Mr Hesketh at his police interview. That contact was by voicemail message on 12 June 2025. On the day of the hearing, 13 June 2025, PC Roberts managed to speak to Mr Hesketh by telephone. Under oath, PC Roberts informed the Court that the Defendant had been angry in his exchange by telephone with him, informed PC Roberts that his solicitor had been in touch with him as requested by PC Roberts, and denied that he had known about the hearing on 13 June 2025. He was told of the time of the hearing but said he was refusing to attend because his employer would not permit him to do so.

In Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) Cobb J considered whether to proceed with a committal hearing in the absence of the defendant. He held at paragraphs [4] and [5]:

“4.

It will be an unusual, but by no means exceptional, course to proceed to determine a committal application in the absence of a respondent. This is so because:

i)

Committal proceedings are essentially criminal in nature, even if not classified in our national law as such (see Benham v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 293 at [56], Ravnsborg v. Sweden (1994), Series A no. 283-B); in a criminal context, proceeding with a trial in the absence of the accused is a course which will be followed only with great caution, and with close regard to the fairness of the proceedings (see R v Jones (Anthony) [2003] 1 AC 1, approving the checklist provided in R v Jones; R v Purvis [2001] QB 862);

ii)

Findings of fact are required before any penalty can be considered in committal proceedings; the presumption of innocence applies (Article 6(2) ECHR). The tribunal of fact is generally likely to be at a disadvantage in determining the relevant facts in the absence of a party;

iii)

The penalty of imprisonment for a proven breach of an order is one of the most significant powers of a judge exercising the civil/family jurisdiction; the respondent faces the real prospect of a deprivation of liberty;

iv)

By virtue of the quasi-criminal nature of committal process, Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) ECHR are actively engaged (see Re K (Contact: Committal Order) [2002] EWCA Civ 1559, [2003] 1 FLR 277 and Begum v Anam [2004] EWCA Civ 578); Article 6(1) entitles the respondent to a "a fair and public hearing"; that hearing is to be "within a reasonable time";

v)

Article 6(3) specifically provides for someone in the position of an alleged contemnor "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing", though this is not an absolute right in the sense of "entitling someone necessarily to indefinite offers of legal assistance if they behave so unreasonably as to make it impossible for the funders to continue sensibly to provide legal assistance" (per Mance LJ (as he then was) in Re K (Contact: Committal Order) (reference above)). The respondent is also entitled to "have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence" (Article 6(3)(b)).

5.

As neither respondent has attended this hearing, and in view of Mr. Gration's application to proceed in their absence, I have paid careful attention to the factors identified in [4] above, and, adapting the guidance from R v Jones; R v Purvis, have considered with care the following specific issues:

i)

Whether the respondents have been served with the relevant documents, including the notice of this hearing;

ii)

Whether the respondents have had sufficient notice to enable them to prepare for the hearing;

iii)

Whether any reason has been advanced for their non-appearance;

iv)

Whether by reference to the nature and circumstances of the respondents' behaviour, they have waived their right to be present (i.e. is it reasonable to conclude that the respondents knew of, or were indifferent to, the consequences of the case proceeding in their absence);

v)

Whether an adjournment for would be likely to secure the attendance of the respondents, or at least facilitate their representation;

vi)

The extent of the disadvantage to the respondents in not being able to present their account of events;

vii)

Whether undue prejudice would be caused to the applicant by any delay;

viii)

Whether undue prejudice would be caused to the forensic process if the application was to proceed in the absence of the respondents;

ix)

The terms of the 'overriding objective' (rule 1.1 FPR 2010), including the obligation on the court to deal with the case 'justly', including doing so "expeditiously and fairly" (r.1.1(2)), and taking "any … step or make any… order for the purposes of … furthering the overriding objective" (r.4.1(3)(o)).”

Mr Hesketh had provided email addresses to the Family Court and to the police. They had been used on 3 June 2025 to serve him with the Committal Notice, my order of 9 May 2025, the witness statements for DJ Gray and Mr Lowe, and a transcript of the hearing on 7 January 2025. I viewed the email sent to him attaching the papers and was satisfied that he had been served by that means. Furthermore, he had been notified of the hearing on 13 June 2025 not only by that means but also by PC Roberts and, I was satisfied, the solicitor who had represented him during the criminal investigations (but who is not on the record in these proceedings). I had given permission for alternative service because of the fact that Mr Hesketh could not be located and his current address was unknown. He had frustrated the Tipstaff’s efforts to effect personal service.

I was satisfied that Mr Hesketh had had sufficient notice, from 3 June 2025, to prepare for his attendance at the hearing on 13 June 2025, and to prepare to address the allegations against him. The evidence in support of the allegations is straightforward. I acknowledge that he had not been sent the audio recording but he had heard it at his police interview. I have listened to it. The transcript is accurate and although the audio recording gives much more colour to the events in court on 7 January 2025, the allegations of contempt rely on the words used which are set out in the transcript. Mr Hesketh had had the transcript for nine to ten days prior to the hearing on 13 June 2025. I note that PC Roberts told me under oath that Mr Hesketh had told him in their conversation on 13 June 2025 that he is “digitally illiterate”. However, Mr Hesketh had given two email addresses to authorities and would have expected them to be used by the police and the court to communicate with him. He had had the assistance of a solicitor and he had had ample time to look at the attachments to the email sent by the Tipstaff. In any event, the Tipstaff included the order regarding the hearing on 13 June 2025 in the body of the email and so Mr Hesketh will have known about the hearing without having to open any attachments.

Relying on all the evidence including that of PC Roberts given under oath at the hearing, I was satisfied that Mr Hesketh had chosen not to attend the hearing on 13 June 2025. He could have attended if only to ask for an adjournment. He could have asked his solicitor, from whom he told PC Roberts he had had contact on either 12 or 13 June 2025, to attend and speak for him, or at least to communicate with the court. He did not do so. The seriousness of the hearing on 13 June 2025 and the committal proceedings cannot have been lost on the Defendant. No good reason for his non-attendance was provided. Mr Hesketh had told PC Roberts that he would not attend because he was going to work instead. That was a choice made by him not to attend in the face of clear information about the importance of this hearing.

The hearing of the committal had been adjourned twice on paper and once in court prior to 13 June 2025. Witnesses had now twice attended court to give evidence. The Tipstaff had been in contact with Mr Hesketh and arranged a meeting for personal service which he chose not to attend. Mr Hesketh had been spoken to about these proceedings by PC Roberts on 9 May and again on 13 June 2025. He had been served with the Committal Notice, evidence, and notice of the hearing by email at two email addresses. His solicitor (representing him in respect of the parallel criminal investigation into the conduct alleged to be in contempt of court) was aware of the hearing on 13 June 2025. The order of 9 May 2025 with which he was served by email on 3 June warned him that if he failed to attend on 13 June 2025 the Court could proceed in his absence. That order and the Notice of 21 February 2025 warn him of the possibility of a sentence of imprisonment following a finding of contempt of court. I was satisfied that Mr Hesketh had chosen not to engage in the committal proceedings and was indifferent to the consequences of the case proceeding in his absence.

Given the history of the committal proceedings I had no confidence that a further adjournment would secure Mr Hesketh’s attendance or facilitate his representation in the proceedings. Indeed, I was satisfied that he had sought to frustrate the proceedings, at least since contact had been made with him by the Tipstaff, by evading personal service, making alternative service difficult, and by choosing not to attend at the current hearing. His non-compliance with arrangements with the Tipstaff for a meeting to effect personal service caused officers to make a fruitless journey from London to Liverpool and back. Mr Hesketh made no contact to explain let alone apologise for his non-appearance at the arranged site for service of the documents, even though he had exchanged texts with the Tipstaff to make the arrangements. He showed no care for the consequences of ignoring the proceedings. I was satisfied that there would be a significant chance that he would not attend at a fifth arranged hearing.

The evidence in support of the allegations against Mr Hesketh is simple. The words used speak for themselves. The evidence that he spoke those words is straightforward. There is no particular disadvantage to the Defendant from proceeding in his absence. Nor is there any prejudice to the forensic process from doing so. In contrast, there would be prejudice to the witnesses from a further adjournment. The witnesses have now twice attended court to give evidence. With respect to Mr Lowe, I am particularly conscious of the impact on other cases of DJ Gray having to repeatedly come to court ready to give evidence and therefore not being available for other court business which requires his judicial attention.

I announced at the hearing, albeit to an empty court room (save for court staff), that I would proceed in the absence of the Defendant. Having regard to the very helpful checklist of factors set out by Cobb J (above), I was satisfied that the overriding objective would be served and that it was in the interests of justice by proceeding in the absence of Mr Hesketh.

Accordingly, DJ Gray and Mr Lowe, who had been waiting outside court, were called into court individually, took the oath, confirmed their name and role, and verified their witness statement. Neither had anything to add or change to their statements. I had no questions for them. I then released them.

Having regard to their evidence but most particularly the transcript of the hearing on 7 January 2025 which, having listened to the audio recording of the hearing is accurate, I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the allegations were proved. I was further satisfied that each set of allegations at paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Committal Notice of 21 February 2025 constituted contempt in the face of the court: abuse, interruption, threats, and disruption. There can be no doubt that Mr Hesketh spoke the words transcribed as being his as set out in the Committal Notice. He did so at the hearing on 7 January 2025. His conduct was a contempt of court in each of the four respects alleged. I was satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that Mr Hesketh was guilty of contempt of court as alleged in the Committal Notice.

I decided not to proceed to sentence in the absence of Mr Hesketh. Instead, I listed the proceedings for a sentence hearing on 1 August 2025 at Liverpool Combined Court, Derby Square, Liverpool. I gave directions about service and directed that my order be sent to the investigating police officer whose details were provided to the court by PC Roberts.