FD24P00214 - [2025] EWHC 2165 (Fam)

In the case of each alleged breach, I have to consider the order made, whether a penal notice was attached, whether it was interpreted and translated, whether there was knowledge of rights and service. I have already dealt with interpretation. Every order was interpreted into Farsi in writing, and the father has been served with each one.

The first order on which the mother alleges breach is that of Ms Davey sitting as Deputy High Court Judge on 11 October 2024. At paragraph 12, she required the defendant to cause B to return by 23.59 on 8 November 2024 and that obligation to return was continuing. There was a penal notice attached to that order. It was served by post, a form of service that was specifically allowed by the order. Also, at paragraph 14, the order required the father to do all that was required of him to renew B’s Iranian passport. I will not make a finding on that alleged breach as the later orders were much more specific about what precisely he was required to do, and I do not see any benefit in making a finding in respect of paragraph 14.

In relation to paragraph 12, there is no doubt that B has not returned to England and Wales. The only possible defence to such non-compliance would be as to the father’s ability to achieve B’s return. In many such cases, a parent will say they used their best endeavours but failed to be able to achieve return. This case, and this is critical, is different. Andrew Allen KC was instructed as an expert on Iranian law. He set out his professional opinion that the father could delegate parental rights, for example to the paternal uncle H, to get B a passport and facilitate her return. The father has not done that. Most importantly, as I already alluded to, the father, on 2 April 2025, before Mr Justice Trowell expressly said he could return B. I will read out the relevant recitals (5) and (6).

“(5)

During the hearing, the father told the judge that he would be able to return B to this jurisdiction under certain conditions. If the conditions were fulfilled, he would then decide whose care the child would be returned to. The conditions were:

a.

the mother and her family would apologise to the father and his family for what they have done;

b.

the mother would return the gold jewellery given to B;

c.

the mother would reimburse the father for all expenses he has incurred in Iran and in this country; and

d.

the person who appears in a video filed by the father with the court who the father alleged today molested B must be brought to justice / investigated.

(6)

The father’s position in relation to contact between the mother and B was that he would not allow any contact until the above demands were met. After the court confirmed its order in relation to contact, the father said that it would be impossible to comply with the order without an order of an Iranian court.”

The evidence before the court is therefore both from Andrew Allen KC that the father could obtain or allow the uncle to obtain passport for B and the father positively asserted to Mr Justice Trowell that he could return B if he wished. Furthermore, at the hearing on 12 June 2025 (again before Mr Justice Trowell), the following is recorded as recital 6 to that order:

“The father told the court in terms that, with his agreement, the child B could be returned to the jurisdiction of England & Wales”.

I have no hesitation in finding that, on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the father breached the order of Ms Davey in respect of failing to return or facilitating the return of B to England and Wales. As I have said, the order was served by post and that was allowed by the order, and order was interpreted. The father has not filed evidence as is entirely his right. I merely record that to suggest there is no evidence that the order could not have been complied with. On the standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, I find paragraph 12 to have been breached.

In the order of Mr Justice Trowell on 15 Nov 2024, there are 3 paragraphs allegedly breached.

Paragraph 11 directed the father to return or to facilitate B’s return by 23:59pm on 27 November 2024. It had a penal notice attached.

Paragraph 13 required the father to arrange an appointment with the Iranian Embassy to provide his formal consent in writing for the renewal of the child’s passport. A penal notice was attached. At paragraph 14, the father was required to serve on Dawson Cornwell LLP evidence that he has contacted the Iranian Embassy in London to arrange an appointment for the purposes of renewing the child’s passport, evidence that he has provided his formal written consent for the renewal of the child’s passport, and evidence of the outcome of the appointment. The evidence of the mother’s solicitor is that paragraphs 13 and 14 have not been complied with. I find beyond reasonable doubt that those paragraphs have been breached

The father has put forward no explanation as to why he has not complied with the order, nor evidence to suggest that he has done so. The burden is not on him but he has provided no counter evidence. That order was served by post as allowed by the order and was translated into Farsi. In respect of all orders and indeed all of the evidence, the mother’s solicitor has in her witness statement explained that, having sent all of the evidence to the father, she checked on Mimecast that the father downloaded those documents in English and Farsi. He did. I find breach beyond all reasonable doubt.

The next order is Mr Justice Trowell dated 10 December 2024 with another return order. A penal notice is attached. Service by post and email was permitted and completed. I again find breach beyond reasonable doubt.

In the 12 June order of Mr Justice Trowell, there is no breach in respect of the paragraph of the return order and none is alleged as that date has not happened yet but, critically, there were also requirements in paragraph 12 to ensure B’s return could happen by 16 August 2025. The father had to take a series of steps to delegate his power to the paternal uncle H. The mother’s solicitors sent father a draft letter to sign and to send to the uncle to delegate his parental rights to his brother but there is no evidence that the father complied with that. It is recorded in the order that:

“The father shall within 48 hours of being given notice of successful renewal of the child B’s Iranian passport by H:

a.

Send to the solicitors for the mother (Dawson Cornwell, using the email address [.......] @dawsoncornwell.com) and the court notice of successful renewal of the child B’s Iranian passport and a copy of the renewed passport;

b.

Purchase flight tickets from Iran to the United Kingdom in the names of the child B and H (“the flight tickets”); and

c.

Send to the solicitors for the mother (Dawson Cornwell, using the email address […..]@dawsoncornwell.com) and the court details of the flight and copies of the flight tickets.”

The father has not done the above. It is not correct to find breach of paragraph 13 as the father cannot do this as he has not complied with paragraph 12. However, I find beyond reasonable doubt a breach of paragraph 12 alone.

Turning to contact, the order of 2^nd April 2025 in respect of indirect contact records:

“The father must ensure that B is available for video contact with the mother by WhatsApp on the following dates and at the following times:

A.

On 7 April 2025 at 4pm Iranian time;

B.

On 14 and 18 April 2025 at 4pm Iranian time;

C.

From the week commencing 21 April 2025, every Monday, Thursday and Friday at 4pm Iranian time and continuing until further order.”

Paragraph 12 had a penal notice attached. The evidence of the mother and the mother’s solicitor is that there was no contact whatsoever despite the mother making numerous attempts to contact B via WhatsApp. There have been efforts made by the mother’s family in Iran to obtain contact through the Iranian court. To some degree this is not relevant to the committal, but I will set it out as part of background and because it has some relevance to sentence in terms of the efforts the mother’s family have gone to. The application went through West Azerbaijan Judicial Office to their Social Welfare Office but in a letter dated 11 June 2025 (in the western calendar), the welfare office says “we hereby inform you based on phone call with the paternal uncle on 31 may that the child is living with the uncle because the father is residing abroad. The uncle explicitly stated that under no circumstances will he allow any office or person to meet with B”. Therefore, it appears that there is simply no prospect of the mother gaining contact with B through the Iranian courts.

The final interim contact order and final alleged breach is of the order of 12 June 2025 at paragraph 17, which records as follows:

“The father shall make sure that the child B is available for video contact with the mother via WhatsApp on the following dates and at the following times:

a.

On 16 June 2025 at 16:00 Iranian time;

b.

On 23 June and 27 June 2025 at 16:00 Iranian time; and

c.

From the week beginning 30 June 2025 every Monday, Thursday and Friday at 16:00 Iranian time and continuing until further order.”

There has been absolutely no contact despite strenuous efforts by the mother. Again, I find beyond a reasonable that the order was breached. A penal notice was attached and, as I already said, the order had been served.

There are therefore breaches of 9 separate paragraphs in orders.

To be absolutely clear, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the breaches alleged have been proved. I am satisfied that every order had a penal notice attached to the relevant paragraphs. I am satisfied that every order was translated into Farsi. I am satisfied that they were sent to the father in English and Farsi and have seen evidence that the father has opened and downloaded emails where they have been sent. I am satisfied that the father’s rights were fully explained to him in at least two orders which again have been translated. Every order was served by post and electronically and I am satisfied that the father received and opened them.

In respect of the committal application, that was not served in person because the process server refused to serve in person given the father’s previous conduct. I have an email dated 17 July 2025 to the solicitor at Dawson Cornwell LLP which says:

“hi [I] further to our previous correspondence and phone call, we confirm that in the matter of service of documents upon [the father], our previous colleague is NOT prepared to attempt personal service again upon this subject. As you are aware, on the last occasion [the father] became very physically aggressive to our Server, and even police officers, and additionally made same unpleasant false accusations to the police about our Server's actions. Professional process servers are not plentiful in that area, but I have contacted a number of them but cannot secure anybody willing to accept the assignment under knowledge of the previous altercations which, of course, I am duty bound to inform them. The original Server, who obviously knows the property and location, has stated that he would be willing to attend the property and effect service through the letter box and then quickly leave the location. Of course I am aware that this is not ideal, but I cannot attempt to encourage anybody into a potentially dangerous situation.”

In the light of that material and those issues having been brought to the attention of Mr Nicholas Allen KC in the order of 4 July, he allowed service by post of the draft order, and in paragraph 21, service of the committal application by post. I have no doubt that there has been good service. Firstly, I have seen proof of service by post; secondly, proof that the father has seen them electronically and has downloaded them; and thirdly, that the father is here today and plainly knows what this application is about. Indeed, I can see him sitting outside the court.

I am satisfied that all procedural steps and safeguards have been met. I am satisfied in those circumstances that all necessary procedural safeguards were met.

I turn to the issue of sentence. The leading judgments as I said are Lady Justice Hale in Hale v Tanner and the very recent judgment of Lady Justice King in the Court of Appeal. I have considered carefully the principles set out by Lady Justice Hale as she then was, and I have no doubt that a custodial sentence is required.

I have come to this conclusion for two reasons, the first being the history of this matter, which indicates that such sentence is the only hope of compliance and of securing B’s return. The father has been given numerous opportunities to return B but has ignored them, and ignored any of the preparatory steps required. His attitude throughout is that he will only comply with orders on his own terms. Secondly, that a custodial sentence is required to show the court’s displeasure about what have been complete and deliberate breaches of court orders both in securing B’s return and taking the required steps to secure return and provide for indirect contact.

An aggravating feature of the father’s conduct is that he removed a 9-year-old child by force. I can only assume on the facts that the father was involved in the decision to remove B at the airport in Tehran and to retain her in Iran. B has been kept away from her mother for 19 months. Without being overly emotive, this is an act of extreme cruelty to B and to the mother.

There are two further issues: whether I should suspend the sentence for a short period; and how long the sentence should be. I have closely considered whether or not the suspension would secure the return of B.

The father has been given copious opportunities to comply and has shown contempt for the court and the court’s processes. There is clear conduct at previous hearings that the father believes he can set the terms, and he labours under the belief that he can dictate to the court how to manage processes. I have reached the conclusion that the only way to get the father to appreciate the seriousness of the matter, and to comply, is to make an immediate order of imprisonment.

The sentence is determined at 6 months. These have been deliberate and persistent breaches that have created a cruel situation of no contact between the mother and child. The father has failed to provide for any interim contact. I note that this, as equivalent to criminal proceedings, is a first offence and I am hopeful that a period of 6 months imprisonment – which is likely to in practice involve a significantly shorter time - will give the father enough time to realise that he has no choice but to comply and take steps to secure B’s return.

If the father complies and secures the return of B to the jurisdiction of England and Wales, he can apply back to court to purge his contempt.