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High Court Family Division Judgment | Re Jake (a child) |
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this anonymised version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
NATIONAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY LIST
Royal Court of Justice
Strand, London
WC2A 2LL
Before
Mr Recorder Adrian Jack
(sitting as a High Court Judge)
Case No FD25C40794
IN THE MATTER OF JAKE (A CHILD)
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT AND SECTION 100(3) AND (4) OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
BETWEEN
STAFFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Applicant
and
(1) JAKE’S GRANDMOTHER
(2) JAKE’S GRANDFATHER
(3) JAKE’S MOTHER
(4) JAKE (acting through his GUARDIAN)
Respondents
Staffordshire County Council represented by Danish Ameen of counsel,
instructed by Staffordshire County Council Legal Services
The Guardian represented by Dorian Day of counsel, instructed by Moseleys Solicitors
The other Respondents did not appear
Hearing: 21st August 2025
Judgment date: 27th August 2025
Judgment
This judgment was handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties by email and release in anonymised form to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12 noon on 27th August 2025.
.............................
Mr Recorder Adrian Jack
Jake is now sixteen years old. On 4th July 2024 he was convicted of three serious sexual offences and was subsequently sentenced to two and half years’ custody. He was released on licence on 30th July 2025. He will remain on licence until 29th October 2026.
By an application dated 24th July 2025 the applicant local authority sought an order authorising the deprivation of Jake’s liberty (“a DOLs order”). This Court made a DOLs order on 29th July 2025 with a hearing on 21st August 2025, which came before me, to consider whether the DOLs order should be continued. The local authority’s application raises a point as to the interaction between the Court’s powers under its inherent jurisdiction to exercise its powers of deprivation of liberty and the licensing regime for the release of young offenders. Counsel have been unable to find any guidance on this point in the caselaw.
On hearing the matter on 21st August 2025 I indicated that I would reserve my judgment, but made an order extending the DOLs order to 11.59pm on 27th August 2025 to preserve the parties’ positions. The order I made permitted the local authority pursuant to section 100 of the Children Act 1989 to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The operative part of the order declared:
It is lawful and in the best interest of Jake that the local authority Staffordshire County Council be permitted to deprive Jake of his liberty by placing him at [an address in Wrexham] pursuant to article 5 [of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)] and accordingly such deprivation of liberty is authorised until 23:59 hours on 27 August 2025.
The deprivation of liberty sought by the local authority and permitted by the court is necessary to avoid breaching Jake’s EHCR Article 2 and 3 rights, the least restrictive and most proportionate response to the risk of harm which arises and may include:
Jake will subject to a 1:1 ratio at all times both within and outside his placement;
Jake’s bedroom is monitored by alarms which will alert staff if Jake has left his bedroom at night and to ensure that he does not enter another young person’s room;
There are window restrictors on the windows of the home
These provisions in place for Jake are necessary, the least restrictive and a proportionate response to the risk of harm which arise.
In depriving Jake of his liberty, the local authority is directed to use the minimum degree of force or restraint required only in circumstances that these are necessary. The use of such force/restraint is lawful and in his best interests provided always that the measures are:
The least restrictive of Jake’s rights and freedoms;
Proportionate to the anticipated harm;
The least required to ensure Jake’s safety and that of others; and
Respectful of Jake’s dignity.”