FA-2024-000131 - [2025] EWHC 2361 (Fam)

The original child maintenance order was made by District Judge Hudd on 18 February 2019. It was in the sum of £350 per month. The quantum payable under that order is not the subject of this appeal; the duration is. On 26 April 2024, HHJ Oliver extended the term of the order beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday until 31 August 2028.

The formal application before HHJ Oliver in January 2024 and April 2024 was the respondents D50K for the enforcement of existing spousal and child maintenance orders. The application to extend the duration of the child maintenance order was made by the respondent in her skeleton argument dated 23 January 2024. At paragraphs 13-15 of that argument (see appeal bundle page 114) the respondent set out her application to extend the current order until August 2028. In the papers before me the skeleton argument dated 23 January 2024 appears in the bundle for the hearing the next day, namely 24 January 2024. The appellant argues that he did not receive that skeleton argument. However, it seems to me that whether he specifically had received that skeleton argument for the January 2024 hearing, during the hearing itself the application to extend the duration of the order was referred to with the respondent referring to that application, her reasons for making it and the relevant financial need. The appellant was present when those submissions were made. From that moment, he knew of the application, its nature and the respondent’s relevant arguments. Thereafter it was raised again by the respondent with the appellant in her email to him of 10 February 2024 at paragraphs 6-7 inclusive (appeal bundle 202). Thus, it is plain that as of 24 January 2024 the appellant knew that an application to extend the duration of the Child Maintenance Order had been made and the basis upon which it has been made. The first ground of appeal before me, namely that the appellant was not given notice of any application to extend the duration of the existing child maintenance order, is simply not made out.

The application to extend the duration of the child maintenance order was made informally in the manner I have already described within enforcement proceedings. In my judgment that informal application was sufficient to engage the court’s powers under s.29 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to extend the duration of the child maintenance order beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday whilst she remained in tertiary education. That was the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Mutch v Mutch [2016] EWCA Civ 370 when an application to vary under S31 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 raised in a solicitor’s statement in support was deemed to be sufficient to engage the variation powers of the court. Similarly, an informal application during existing proceedings under s.32 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was considered sufficient in relation to Tattersall (above). I see no reason why the position should be any different under s.29 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, particularly where, as here, the appellant had had notice of the application, the basis upon which it was made and the relevant needs of the child.

The informal notice of an application to extend the duration of the child maintenance order was made in a skeleton argument dated 23 January 2024. The appellant had notice of the application at the latest during the hearing on 24 January 2024. Both the date of the informal application and the date the appellant were notified are before the child’s eighteenth birthday. Accordingly, HHJ Oliver had the power to increase the duration of the order under s.29 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 – UD V DN (above).

Given the evidence before the court and the submissions made on 24 January 2024 and 26 April 2024 by the respondent, the learned judge had the evidential basis to extend the child maintenance order under s.29(3)(a) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, namely that the child is and will be attending an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation. The date of 31 August 2028 is calculated as the date upon which the relevant child’s tertiary education is likely to cease.

The second ground upon which I granted permission to appeal was that the duration of order made by HHJ Oliver arguably extended beyond the child’s tertiary education. The appellant did not pursue that ground before me. The respondent in her written arguments (see for instance paragraphs 17-19 at page 121-122 of the appeal bundle) set out a cogent case that the relevant child’s tertiary education will continue to 31 August 2028. That argument was before HHJ Oliver. Consequently, HHJ Oliver was entitled to make the order he did in the terms he did.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The order of 26 April 2024 as drafted by HHJ Oliver remains in force and any stay to paragraphs 1 and 5 of that order granted by this court is duly lifted.

The preamble to this judgment sets out the mechanism by which any typographical errors etc are to be notified to the court.

Any applications for costs of the appeal are to be made to me in writing no later than 2pm on 15 September 2025. The applications must be supported by written submissions which must not exceed 4 sides of A4 paper. They must be in Word format using Times New Roman pt 12 line spacing 1.5.

That is my judgment.