FT/EA/2024/0478 - [2025] UKFTT 01244 (GRC)
First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)

FT/EA/2024/0478 - [2025] UKFTT 01244 (GRC)

Fecha: 23-Oct-2025

Conclusions

Consideration

21.

The analytical framework for considering whether an information request is manifestly unreasonable draws on the Dransfield analysis of the related concept of vexatious in s14 FOIA. burden (on the public authority and its staff); the motive (of the requester); the value or serious purpose (of the request); and any harassment or distress (of and to staff). It is also essential to consider the balance of public interest between disclosure and withholding and to apply the presumption in favour of transparency.

22.

It may be noted that there is ample material within the bundle of comprehensive attempts by EA to provide assistance and information to the Appellant (eg letter page 83-85). On one occasion when the Appellant pursued the appropriate response to an adverse decision, an appeal to the Planning Inspectorate. In the information supplied to the Planning Inspectorate by the EA a detailed explanation was provided why the Appellant’s solution was inadequate (page 384). That appeal was not pursued to its conclusion. However, the Appellant is intransigent in arguing for his solution, even though it does not meet the requirements of the relevant regulations – the legal requirement.

23.

Addressing first the burden on the EA it is clear from the witness statements it has provided that the request pattern from the Appellant consumes a substantial amount of the resources of the EA. Furthermore the witnesses address the stress and anxiety which this Appellant causes, - an example of the approach is set out in paragraph 4 above – the accusations included are very likely to cause anxiety and distress in the staff who receive them.

24.

In addressing the value of the request, although the Appellant clearly values it highly the issue is the value to the public. Here a paradox emerges – the information, through the user guide and the examination of the programme is already available to the public and there is no public clamour for it, only the pressure from the Appellant. The claim that an “auditable” copy should be released is misleading. The information has been provided which would enable a competent user of the system to recreate and check the performance of the system – however disclosure as requested would create a significant risk of a manipulated but apparently authentic version of the material being circulated (since disclosure is to the whole world) creating risk and a significant further burden of checking each application to a far greater extent than is necessary now.

25.

The Appellant has clearly indicated that this is a challenge to the policy underlying the arrangements, rather than an attempt to inform public discourse, a policy which is in any event that of the Secretary of State, not the EA.

26.

The balance of public interest falls decisively in favour of non-disclosure and the presumption in favour of disclosure does not assist the Appellant. In considering a case such as this all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is manifestly unreasonable in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a statutory right. This is a clear case of an improper use of EIR.

27.

The appeal is dismissed.

28.

The rules of this tribunal give the tribunal power to award costs where the bringing or the conduct of a case is vexatious. The tribunal invites the Respondents to consider whether to make a costs application.

Signed Date:

Hughes 18 October 2025