TC09622 - [2025] UKFTT 01232 (TC)

The relevant statutory time limit for lodging an appeal is 30 days from the date of the decision. Mr Ahya’s appeal was received by HMRC on 12 March 2024, and so HMRC contends that the appeal was 26 days late (in respect of the assessments and penalties issued under section 29 and section 7(8) of the Taxes Management Act 1970) and 23 days late (in respect of the penalties issued under Schedule 41 to the Finance Act 2008).

Mr Ahya contends that the delay in making the appeal was less than this as the letter was sent on 8 March 2024; further, it was also contended for Mr Ahya that the attempts to file tax returns, where successful, should be treated as an appeal and so the appeal should be regarded as being made when the returns were filed. As the letter of 8 March 2024 referred to returns being filed online, it was contended that the appeal date must therefore be on or before 8 March 2024 although no specific date of filing was provided in evidence.

We note the submissions made as to treating the filing of returns as being the date of appeal: filing a tax return is not, in our view, equivalent to making an appeal. s31A Taxes Management Act (TMA) 1970 requires that an appeal be made by giving notice in writing to HMRC setting out the grounds of appeal. Filing a return online does not meet this requirement and so we do not consider that Mr Ahya has established that an appeal was made any earlier than 12 March 2024.

With regard to the contention that the delay should be measured by reference to the date of Mr Ahya’s letter, Friday 8 March 2024, we do not agreed that the date on a letter means that the letter must have been sent on that date. The operative date is the date on which notice of an appeal is given to HMRC (s31A TMA 1970). We were provided with no evidence as to when or how this letter was sent to HMRC. It clearly was sent, as it was received, but we were provided with no evidence was to whether it was posted on the date set out in the letter or whether it was posted at some point over the weekend following that date (or, even on Monday 11 March 2024). We consider that the only reliable date available to measure any delay is the date on which the letter was recorded as received by HMRC.

In the context of a deadline which requires that the appeal be given to HMRC within 30 days (s31A TMA 1970), and therefore received by HMRC within 30 days, we consider that it is the date of receipt of a notice of appeal which determines the length of the delay. Accordingly, as it was not disputed that the appeal was received on 12 March 2024, we find that the delays involved are 26 days and 23 days.

For Mr Ahya, it was contended that the decision in Islam v Thanet District Council [2025] UKUT 281 (LC) indicated that a delay of just over three weeks was not considered to be lengthy and that such a delay might be regarded as less than serious.

Having considered that decision, which related to a delay in appealing to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), we note that the decision in the same paragraph makes it clear that the appellant in that case had contacted the Tribunal within a few days of the deadline before making the appeal, asking how to appeal. The Upper Tribunal considered that this also had to be taken into account, and had not been, in assessing the seriousness of the delay. There was no evidence that Mr Ahya had contacted HMRC to enquire as to how to appeal before the appeal was sent. Mr Ahya’s agent speculated that Mr Ahya must have contacted HMRC in order to gain access to his online account by 8 March 2024 (see below) and that this might amount to an earlier appeal but we were provided with no evidence of such contact, let alone that any such contact might have amounted to more than a technical query to the online service helpdesk to reset the account.

At the first stage, we find that the delay, although not extensive, is not trivial. It is sufficiently serious that we cannot simply dispense with the second and third stages of the approach set out in Martland. Submissions made with regard to prejudice arising from the delay have been considered below, in evaluating all of the circumstances of the case.