TC09670 - [2025] UKFTT 01260 (TC)

The NOA should have been filed within 30 days of the date of the review decision (s.16(1) Finance Act 1994). The application proceeded on the basis that the NOA was 17 days late.

As to stage 1 of the Martland approach, this is not simply an exercise in mathematics; there is a large element of context. First, the only defect was the failure to attach the decisions appealed against. Secondly, the Respondents were copied to the email lodging the original NOA and were therefore aware that the Appellant intended to appeal the decision. This was not a case in which for instance the Respondents had long ago closed their case file and would have to reopen it. Thirdly, it took the Tribunal from 14.2.25 – 3.3.25 to reject the NOA. That accounts for the majority of the delay. Fourthly, whilst the Respondents criticised the Appellant’s representative for a delay of 3 days in resubmitting the NOA, Mr. Atkins has explained the delay. Far from simply sitting on his hands we are satisfied that Mr. Atkins was taking steps to resolve the issue. We do not find the delay of 17 days in this particular case to be serious or significant.

As to stage 2, the reasons for the delay are clear. Mr. Atkins mistakenly omitted to attach the documents to his email filing the original NOA. When the appeal was rejected, he discussed the issue with his line manager on 4.3.25, and on that day the T240 form malfunctioned when attempting to print. These are not “good” reasons. However, on the scale of reasons that the Tribunal grapples with on applications of this nature, they are not particularly egregious. We accept that the mistakes of Mr. Atkins are to be attributed to the Appellant.

As to stage 3, applying the approach in Medpro, considering all the circumstances of the case with no ex-ante weighting on the CPR 3.9(a) and (b) factors, we consider that the application to make a late appeal should be allowed.

The delay was not serious or significant in the circumstances. The Respondents were aware, within the statutory time period for making an appeal, that the Appellant wished to appeal. We do not accept that the Appellant’s appeal is very weak. The Grounds of Appeal are, in our view, clear. They assert that for a proportion of the imports the preferential origin treatment was in fact available because supplier declarations were held. As to the evidence in support of that argument, this is not a proper application on which to carry out a detailed analysis of the prospects of success. We conclude that the merits of the Appellant’s case are neither very weak, nor are they very strong. We do not accept that there is limited prejudice to the Appellant because it mainly sought to appeal to enter into ADR. The effect of refusing permission to make a late appeal is that it cannot appeal at all. It will not be able to enter ADR, but nor will it be able to challenge the C18 demand by a statutory appeal. There is no real prejudice to the Respondents in permitting the application. They have always been aware that the Appellant wished to appeal against the C18. By contrast, refusing the application will be terminal for the Appellant’s appeal against a C18 of £1,052,965.00. As to the latter point; ever was it thus, but we do take it into account. Bearing in mind the relatively short delay, the otherwise compliant original NOA, and the absence of real prejudice to the Respondents, we allow the application applying the approach in Medpro.

Had we applied the approach in Martland to weighting on the CPR 3.9(a) and (b) factors it would have made no difference to our decision.