TC09671 - [2025] UKFTT 01261 (TC)

Fecha: 15-Oct-2025

Law

Law

11.

Section 31A TMA provides that a notice of appeal must be in writing, specify the grounds of appeal and be made to HMRC within 30 days of the relevant date. The “relevant date” is the date on which the closure notice, assessment or penalties were issued. Section 49 TMA provides that a notice of appeal may be given to HMRC after the expiry of the day 30 time limit if HMRC agree or the Tribunal gives permission.

12.

An appeal can be made to the Tribunal if an in-time appeal has been made to HMRC, a review has been requested and HMRC provide their view of the matter (see s 49B TMA). However, such an appeal must be brought within 30 days of the date “of the document in which HMRC gives notice of the conclusion of the review. An appeal after that 30 day period has expired may only be notified to the Tribunal with the Tribunal’s permission (see ss 49G and 49H TMA).

13.

Guidance on the approach to be adopted and legal principles to be applied when exercising a judicial discretion whether to admit a late were given by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Martlandv HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (“Martland”) at [44] – [47]. We summarise these as follows:

(1)

It must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be.

(2)

In considering that question, the Tribunal can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in Denton:

(i)

Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being ‘neither serious nor significant’), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’;

(ii)

Establish the reason (or reasons) why the default occurred; and

(3)

Evaluate ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.

(1)

In carrying out the balancing exercise the Tribunal can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice.

(2)

Shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser) should not, of itself, generally carry any weight in the Tribunal’s consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant’s explanation of the delay:

14.

Although the Upper Tribunal in Martland stated that the balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected, it is clear from the more recent decisions of the Upper Tribunal in Medpro Healthcare Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKUT 255 (TCC) (“Medpro”) and Pawar v HMRC [2025] UKUT 309 (TCC) that no extra weight should be given to this factor. Although we have adopted the approach as in Martland, the recent decision of the FTT (which included the Senior President of Tribunals, Dingemans LJ, as a member of the panel) in Lands Luo Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 1207 (TC) which was released on 9 October 2025 came to a different conclusion, ie that particular importance should be given to time limits etc as in Martland.