TC09517 - [2025] UKFTT 00527 (TC)

As I have mentioned above, and notwithstanding the correspondence in which the appellant’s agent persistently denied that neither he nor the appellant had received relevant communication from HMRC, such denial of receipt was not sustained as a ground of appeal before me.

However, when considering the first stage of the Martland analysis, namely to establish the length of the delay, I am content, as is HMRC, to consider the delay started on 9 November 2021, namely the date on which letters to both the appellant and the agent was sent by Officer Hutchings, and which included the view of the matter letter and the settlement letter of 14 June 2019. It is clear from the appellant’s letter to Officer Hutchings of 16 November 2021 that she received the 9 November 2021 letter, as she authorised Mr Salam to communicate with HMRC regarding her case and other tax affairs via email.

The delay therefore is some two years and three months, and that is clearly serious and significant. I therefore need to proceed to the next stage of the analysis, namely, to establish the reasons why this delay occurred.

Like HMRC, I sympathise with the health issues that the appellant has suffered. But there is wholly insufficient evidence to explain why between 9 November 2021 and 26 February 2024, neither the appellant nor her agent was able to notify her appeal to the tribunal. I accept that she may well have been on medication, and I also accept that she was affected by the death of her father. But she had clearly authorised her agent to deal with her tax affairs, including her original appeal and the view of the matter letter and I do not accept that her personal health position and the impact of her father’s death, had any impact on her agent’s ability to notify her appeal to the tribunal. Authority was given to the agent in the appellant’s letter of 16 November 2021. The agent clearly failed to submit the appeal until February 2024. Katib is authority for the proposition that failings by an agent are deemed to be failings by an appellant. And there is no evidence whatsoever as to why the agent failed to submit the appeal in time. If it was reasonable for the appellant to wash her hands of responsibility for submitting the appeal by appointing the agent, then the agent’s failures are deemed to be hers. And I can see no justifiable reason why the appeal was not made on a timely basis.

I now need to carry out an evaluation of all the circumstances, assessing the merits of the reasons given for the delay and the prejudice which would arise to the parties by granting or refusing permission. I take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and that statutory time limits should be respected. In doing this, I can have regard to any obvious strengths or weaknesses of the appellant’s case.

It is Mr Salam’s submission that the strength of the appellant’s case outweighs everything else. However, I gave him ample opportunity at the hearing to take me through the documents in the bundle to demonstrate any obvious strengths of the appellant’s case. In particular, given that the issue is simply that the appellant has been unable to explain unexplained deposits into her bank account from her husband’s Pakistan bank account, I asked Mr Salam to show me a clear debit from the latter being reflected as a credit in the former. He took me through various bank accounts from which it is clear that HMRC have accepted debits from the appellant’s husband’s account into her account as not being additional income. But he was unable to clearly show me that the deposits which are reflected in the closure notices, have a clear provenance in debits from her husband’s account. Indeed, as Miss Ritchie noted, this is the problem that HMRC have faced, namely clear and obvious evidence to tie up the debits and credits for these particular items.

Accordingly, I am afraid for the appellant that I cannot see any obvious strength in her case. Indeed, given the ample opportunities that the appellant and her agent have been given to provide this evidence, it seems to me that her position is very weak.

The appeal is very late. The matters were put in the hands of a professional who could be expected to appreciate that statutory time limits, imposed by Parliament, should be respected. The view of the matter letter made it clear in large letters, that the deadline for asking for a review or making an appeal to the tribunal was 9 May 2019. There was no request for a statutory review. There was no appeal until February 2024. There is no suggestion that the appellant was misled by her agent. The appellant’s case is weak. HMRC would be considerably prejudiced if this matter proceeded to appeal, since the relevant HMRC officer has now retired and many of the relevant documents may have been destroyed.

The balance of prejudice weighs very heavily in favour of rejecting the application.