TC09587 - [2025] UKFTT 00875 (TC)

Fecha: 09-Jun-2025

THE LAW

THE LAW

35.

The approach to applications for permission to make late appeals is well established. In Martland. At [44]-[46], the Upper Tribunal stated that:

(1)

In considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be;

(2)

The FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process in Denton;

(3)

At the third stage, the balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. The FTT’s role is to exercise judicial discretion taking account of all relevant factors, not to follow a checklist; and (4) In doing so, the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.

36.

In Denton v TH White Ltd (and related appeals) [2014] EWCA Civ 906 the Court of Appeal had set out the three-stage test for relief from sanction applications referred to in Martland at [25] – [31]:

(1)

The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or order. If the breach is not serious or significant then relief from sanctions will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages. If, however, the Tribunal decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance;

(2)

At the second stage the Tribunal should consider why the failure or default occurred;

(3)

At the third stage the Tribunal should consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application.

37.

I have also considered the provisions of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA”) and Section 7 of The Interpretation Act 1978.

38.

Section 83F (6) provides that HMRC must give notice of the conclusions of a review within a period of 45 days beginning with the relevant date or any such period as HMRC and the taxpayer may agree.

39.

Section 83F (8) VATA provides that:

“Where HMRC are required to undertake a review but do not give notice of the conclusions within the time period specified in subsection (6), the review is to be treated as having concluded that the decision is upheld.”

40.

Section 83F (9) VATA provides that:

“If subsection (8) applies, HMRC must notify P or the other person of the conclusion which the review is treated as having reached.”

41.

Section 98 VATA states:

“Service of notices.
Any notice, notification, requirement or demand to be served on, given to or made of any person for the purposes of this Act may be served, given or made by sending it by post in a letter addressed to that person or his VAT representative at the last or usual residence or place of business of that person or representative.”

42.

Section 7 of The Interpretation Act 1978 states:

“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.”