TC09592 - [2025] UKFTT 00891 (TC)

The hearing was listed to take place on Monday 7 July 2025. On Thursday 3 July 2025, the Appellant’s representative (Callistes Solicitors) emailed the Tribunal, stating that they would not be representing the Appellant at the hearing on 7 July 2025 because they had not been put in funds.

On the morning of the hearing, no one attended the Tribunal on behalf of the Appellant. HMRC’s representative twice called a publicly-available number for the Appellant (which is a business) but there was no reply.

Under Rule 33 of the FTT Rules, if a party fails to attend a hearing, the Tribunal may proceed in their absence if the Tribunal is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify them, and considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.

The Tribunal’s “Notice of Hearing” was sent on 12 March 2025. This gave the date of the hearing of the strike-out application as 7 July 2025, and included the information that “if you do not attend, the Tribunal may decide the matter in your absence”. The hearing bundle contained only the version of this notice that was sent to HMRC, so I had no direct evidence of where the Appellant’s version of the notice was sent.

However, as described in this decision below, Callistes had previously objected, on the Appellant’s behalf, both to the application to strike out the appeal and to HMRC’s application to amend their earlier application. HMRC’s application to amend refers to the hearing date of 7 July 2025. This demonstrates that Callistes were well aware that HMRC had applied to strike out the appeal, and their email of 3 July 2025 shows that they also knew of the date of the hearing.

I am therefore satisfied that Callistes had been notified of the hearing. As Callistes are named as the Appellant’s representative in the notice of appeal, it follows that I am also satisfied that the Appellant itself was either notified or that reasonable steps were taken to notify it (because its representative was notified). The reference to not having been put in funds also indicates that Callistes had, or had attempted to, discuss the impending hearing with their client.

I considered whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed. Rule 2(2) of the FTT Rules says:

“Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes--

(a)

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;

(b)

avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;

(c)

ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;

(d)

using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and

(e)

avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.”

The relevant factors here are (a), (c) and (e).

In relation to (a), the appeal concerns a short point of law. HMRC had sent Mr Holt to the hearing, and if the appeal was not heard, his time and the related costs would be wasted. Mr Holt confirmed that HMRC wanted the appeal to be heard.

In relation to (c), the lack of a representative means that the Appellant could not put forward oral submissions. But I had the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and its objection to the application for the appeal to be struck out stating why, in the Appellant’s view, the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. While I did not have a skeleton argument from the Appellant, the Tribunal had previously directed (on 3 March 2025) that the Appellant’s response to HMRC’s strike out application would stand as its skeleton argument. The Appellant was given permission, under the same Tribunal directions, to provide a more detailed skeleton argument, but (so far as I am aware) it chose not to do so.

In relation to (e), postponing the appeal would inevitably cause delay for the parties in this case, and would be likely to cause delay to other court users.

I had a hearing bundle containing (in addition to, as already mentioned, the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and its objection to the application for the appeal to be struck out): HMRC’s skeleton argument; Tribunal directions; HMRC’s application to strike out, and their application to amend this previous application; a schedule of rates of excise duty for the relevant period; HMRC correspondence in relation to the demand for duty; extracts from relevant legislation, case law and HMRC guidance; and other relevant documentation. In my judgment I had sufficient information properly to consider the application.

I was mindful that the appeal concerns a large sum of money, but this factor on its own is not sufficient to require me to direct an adjournment, particularly in a situation where the Appellant had neither requested an adjournment nor explained to the Tribunal why it had failed to send a representative to the hearing.

I therefore decided that it was in the interests of justice to continue with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence. The Appellant is entitled under Rule 38 of the FTT Rules to apply for this decision to be set aside. Such an application would be granted only if it were just in all the circumstances so to do. If the Appellant wishes to make such an application it must be made in writing so that it is received within 28 days after the date this decision is sent to the Appellant.