TC09633 - [2025] UKFTT 01096 (TC)

HMRC submitted that in their calculations for the purposes of the Assessments, for fixed rate employees they applied the reference salary in accordance with paragraph 7.7 of the Coronavirus Direction. For employees who were not fixed rate, HMRC used the lookback method where that was more beneficial to the Appellant. For all employees, HMRC submitted they had applied the rules as set out in the applicable Directions.

The revised calculations by HMRC were set out in the Review Letter. In summary HMRC had used as the reference salary for fixed rate employees the amount payable to the employees shown on the latest RTI return made before the relevant CJRS day (19 March 2020). For employees who were not fixed rate, HMRC had used the lookback method where this was most beneficial to the Appellant. In respect of one employee not shown on an RTI return until 5 March 2021, HMRC had denied the claim for a CJRS Payment in accordance with the Seventh Coronavirus Direction. In respect of one employee first employed on 1 October 2020, HMRC had used the applicable calculation basis for an employee not on a fixed salary.

The Appellant did not dispute the calculations made by HMRC in the Review Letter. Accordingly, we determined that HMRC’s calculations in the Assessments were correctly made and that the Appellant’s original claims were not.

Accordingly we determined that:

We then proceeded to consider the Appellant’s arguments set out in [15]. In relation to those, we were sympathetic to the Appellant. Unfortunately, however, we did not consider these were grounds on which we could allow the appeal. Specifically:

In relation to [42](3) and (4) there is considerable case law (e.g. the Upper Tribunal decision in HMRC v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC)) that this Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only the powers given to it by statute. The remedy for matters of the kind referred to in those paragraphs is a claim for Judicial Review or under HMRC’s complaint system. We do not have powers to rule on such matters, much as the Appellant might have liked this Tribunal to have such powers.

Accordingly, we determined that we should dismiss the appeal.

We noted in reaching this determination that the Appellant was in a nearly identical position to Laxzo Limited which is a company that Mr Saleem is involved with and which had appealed an assessment in respect of CV Support Payments. It was unsurprising to us that the outcome of this appeal was the same as Laxzo Limited’s appeal (Laxzo Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 372 (TC)). HMRC had applied on 17 June 2025 (some two weeks before the hearing) to amend their statement of case mainly to introduce points made in Laxzo and other cases relating the absence of jurisdiction for this Tribunal to consider certain of the Appellant’s arguments.At the hearing, the Appellant objected to that application but in the circumstances we did not find it necessary to determine the application since the absence of jurisdiction for us to hear certain of the Appellant’s arguments was plain to us in any event. Had we determined the application by HMRC to amend their statement of case we would have determined it in HMRC’s favour since it was consistent with the overriding objective of enabling this Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.