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DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
The barring application
The barring application requests that the proceedings should be struck out pursuant to Rules 8(2)(a) and 8(3)(c).
The appellant asks the tribunal to use its power to allow the appeal based on delay which is an abuse of process.
The grounds for the application are that the appellant has been prejudiced by HMRC’s inordinate and inexcusable delay and as a result the appellant cannot obtain third party evidence to corroborate his grounds of appeal, nor will he receive a prompt and fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“Article 6”).
The barring application then goes on to deal with:
Jurisdiction. In the appellant’s view the tribunal has jurisdiction to consider whether an appeal should be allowed on the basis of delay;
Prejudice. The timeline shows that between February 2014 and May 2021, HMRC had no contact with the appellant notwithstanding there was an open appeal. This has caused prejudice.
- Heading
- Introduction
- THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- DISCUSSION
- Submissions
- HMRC are in breach of their obligations under the taxpayer’s charter on which the appellant is entitled to rely
- The best approach to evidence is to rely on documents, but these are no no longer obtainable
- There were significant changes to the tax landscape in this area, given Rangers and Hoey , and the issues around the imposition of the loan charge. These needed to be clarified before these appeals co
- There has been no delay since the submission of the appeal to the tribunal
- There is no evidence that HMRC have failed to cooperate with the tribunal in furtherance of the overriding objective
- Staleness is not relevant in this context. This is not a situation where an assessing officer has sat on discovery before issuing the assessment. Furthermore, given the decision in HMRC v Tooth [2021]
- My view
- Pleading the fair trial issue
- Conclusions