TC09641 - [2025] UKFTT 01115 (TC)

The hearing was listed to take place on Wednesday 27 August 2025, beginning at 10.30am. Mr Lambert did not attend at this time, nor did a representative attend on his behalf. The Tribunal clerk emailed him at the email address provided in his notice of appeal, but by the conclusion of the hearing had received no reply. The notice of appeal did not include a telephone number for Mr Lambert. The correspondence within the hearing bundle included a letter from Mr Lambert’s GP containing two telephone numbers which purported to be for Mr Lambert; the Tribunal clerk called both of these numbers but the calls were not answered.

Under Rule 33 of the FTT Rules, if a party fails to attend a hearing, the Tribunal may proceed in their absence if the Tribunal is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify them, and considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.

After the hearing had ended, I confirmed that the Tribunal had sent Mr Lambert a “Notice of Hearing”. This was sent on 10 March 2025, to the email address provided in Mr Lambert’s notice of appeal. This gave the date of the hearing of the strike-out application as 27 August 2025, and included the information that “if you do not attend, the Tribunal may decide the matter in your absence”.

Mr Lambert had emailed the Tribunal on 28 February 2025, using the same email address that was subsequently used by the Tribunal to send the Notice of Hearing, stating that he was available to attend a hearing on 26-27 August 2025 or 24-26 September 2025. He should therefore have been aware that the hearing was likely to be arranged for one of these dates.

He was also copied in to various emails sent to the Tribunal by HMRC in the days running up to the hearing. This included an email dated 20 August 2025 attaching the authorities bundle, in which HMRC noted that Mr Lambert had failed to provide a skeleton argument and expressly referred to “the upcoming hearing on 27 August 2025”.

I am therefore satisfied that Mr Lambert was notified of the appeal or that reasonable steps were taken to notify him.

I considered whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed. Rule 2(2) of the FTT Rules says:

“Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes--

(a)

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;

(b)

avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;

(c)

ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;

(d)

using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and

(e)

avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.”

The relevant factors here are (a), (c) and (e).

In relation to (a), HMRC had sent Mr Puzey to the hearing, and if the appeal was not heard, his time and the related costs would be wasted.

In relation to (c), the lack of a representative means that Mr Lambert could not put forward oral submissions. But I had his grounds of appeal and his objection to the application for the appeal to be struck out. Mr Lambert failed to comply with a Tribunal direction that he should provide a skeleton argument not later than 21 days before the hearing, so I did not have the benefit of that skeleton argument. However, in the absence of an explanation from Mr Lambert as to why he had failed to comply with this direction, I did not consider that this was a factor that should weigh in his favour.

In relation to (e), postponing the appeal would inevitably cause delay for the parties in this case, and would be likely to cause delay to other court users.

I had a hearing bundle containing (in addition to, as already mentioned, Mr Lambert’s grounds of appeal and his objection to the strike-out application): Tribunal directions; HMRC’s application to strike out; correspondence between the parties including HMRC’s penalty explanation letter and the personal liability notice; a note of a telephone conversation between Mr Lambert and an HMRC officer; a letter from Mr Lambert’s GP; and other relevant documentation. I also had a bundle of authorities, HMRC’s skeleton argument and two additional case law authorities provided by HMRC. In my judgment I had sufficient information properly to consider the application.

I was mindful that the appeal concerns a large sum of money, and that the Tribunal had categorised the case as “complex”, but these factors are not sufficient to require me to direct an adjournment, particularly in a situation where Mr Lambert had neither requested an adjournment nor explained to the Tribunal why he had failed to attend the hearing.

I therefore decided that it was in the interests of justice to continue with the hearing in Mr Lambert’s absence. Mr Lambert is entitled under Rule 38 of the FTT Rules to apply for this decision to be set aside and for his appeal to be reinstated. Such an application would be granted only if it were just in all the circumstances so to do. I would also refer Mr Lambert, in this context, to my comments at paragraphs [71] to [75] below concerning the possibility of applying to amend his grounds of appeal.

If Mr Lambert wishes to apply for this decision to be set aside, he must make this application to the Tribunal in writing so that it is received within 28 days after the date this decision is sent to him.

Alternatively Mr Lambert may apply for permission to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal: see paragraph [77] below.