TC09655 - [2025] UKFTT 01206 (TC)

We agree with the submissions made by Mr Paulin and Ms Brown that the reinstatement application should not be considered as a relief from sanctions application, and accordingly, when considering the discretion given to us by Rule 2, we are not fettered by any principles set out in the relief from sanctions cases.

We also agree with their submissions that helpful guidance has been given regarding the application of that discretion to the facts of the appellant’s case by Mrs Justice Proudman in the Upper Tribunal decision in Pierhead Purchasing v HMRC [2014] UKUT 321 (“Pierhead”) in which she said:

“23.

Although, as I have said, there is no guidance in the rules, the FTT applied the additional principles set out (in the context of delay in lodging an appeal) in Former North Wiltshire DC v. HMRC [2010] UKFTT 449 (TC). Those were the criteria formerly set out in CPR 3.9 (1) for relief from sanctions: see the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sayers v. Clarke Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [21]. In North Wiltshire (see [56]-[57]) the FTT concluded that it was not obliged to consider these criteria but it accepted that it might well in practice do so. The same reasoning applies to the present case. The criteria were,

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The reasons for the delay, that is to say, whether there is a good reason for it.

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Whether HMRC would be prejudiced by reinstatement

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Loss to the appellant if reinstatement were refused.

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The issue of legal certainty and whether extending time would be prejudicial to the interests of good administration

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Consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal so far as they can conveniently and proportionately be ascertained.

24.

I was asked by Mr Jones to provide guidance as to the principles to be weighed in the balance in the exercise of discretion to reinstate. Because of the view I have formed I do not think it is appropriate to set any views in stone. I agree with the FTT in the Former North Wiltshire case that the matters they took into account are relevant to the overriding objective of fairness. I also believe that the guidance given in Mitchell v. News GroupNewspapers Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 in relation to relief from sanctions is helpful. It is perhaps instructive that CPR 3.9 (which does not of course apply to Tribunals in any event) does not now exist in its original form. Fairness depends on the facts of each case, all the circumstances need to be considered and there should be no gloss on the overriding objective”.