Case No. IP-2018-000182

79.The parties were in agreement that any statute bar applies only to the claim for damages, because the Limitation Act 1980 should not be applied to claims for specific performance: P&O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co and Ors (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 1717. I have found that such a claim does not arise, but if it had, it would have arisen when “mutual acknowledgement of the completion of [Sub-]Stage 4” occurred, on Volumatic’s own case, in 2007/2008. The limitation period for claims for breach of contract is six years (section 5, Limitation Act 1980). Therefore, in my judgment, that claim is clearly statute barred. 80.I do not accept the position, set out in Volumatic’s Reply, that a fresh cause of action arose on the expiry of the 10 year exclusive supply period – that no longer sits with how Volumatic now pleads its case. Nor does it assist Volumatic to argue that the obligation to assign the intellectual property is a continuing one – were that the case, Volumatic could wait decades before bringing its claim, and the purpose of the statute of limitations would be frustrated. I accept IFL’s submission that continuing obligations such as the duty to repair may avoid limitation periods (see Bell v Peter Browne and Co [1990] 2 QB 495 at 500E to 501F), but the obligation here is not the same: had IFL assigned the intellectual property, there would have been no continuing obligation to do so again. I am bound to follow Capita (Banstead 2011) (formerly known as FPS Group Ltd) and another v RFIB Group Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1310, which held at paragraph 20 (per Longmore LJ with whom Henderson LJ agreed, Gloster LJ dissenting) that Bell is to be preferred over the Midland Bank case cited by Mr Tilley. I accept Mr Popplewell’s submission that there was no continuing obligation in this case. 81.Any claim for damages is therefore time barred.