QB-2022-002447 - [2025] EWHC 2803 (KB)
Fecha: 29-Oct-2025
The Common Law Claim
The Common Law Claim
The Claimants’ pleadings say with reference to the assessment of 14 August 2018:
Neither D3 nor D4 were employed or affiliated to either the D1 and/or D2 and had no background knowledge of C3’s mental health difficulties or knowledge of the mental health examination and informal risk assessment carried by [ an AMHP]on 11 August 2018.
The conclusion of the assessment was that C3’s mental state did not satisfy the statutory criteria for compulsory detention pursuant to section 2 MHA as they found he was not suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warranted in patient treatment in hospital, nor did he constitute a risk to himself or others.
This conclusion failed to take any account of the ongoing background as pleaded above and was in complete contrast to C1's experience of C3 at home; i.e., that for months he had been sleeping all day and not eating. It also failed to take into account Dr Hart's assessment on 9 August 2018 namely that he was showing signs of depression and psychosis as well as the [registered mental health nurse] assessment on 11 August 2018 that he lacked insight into his condition and posed a high risk of harming his mother, including a risk to her life, and further, C1's report to [another AMHP]that C3 had pushed her, spat at her and had smashed glasses in the kitchen.”
The outcome of the MHAA was that D3, D4 and [the AMHP] agreed they did not find evidence of mental disorder that would warrant detention and that C3's conduct should be handled by the criminal justice system. It appears that there were no cross checks carried out as required by the Code of Practice 2015.
The Claimants plead the relevant paragraphs of statutory guidance to be found in the MHA Code of Practice which indicate the factors to be taken into account when considering whether a patient should be detained. These include, unsurprisingly, matters such as family and social circumstances, the impact of a deterioration upon those with whom the patient lives, risk of suicidal self-harm, evidence that the patient mental health will deteriorate without treatment, the history of the patient’s mental disorder and the protection of others. The nature of the risk presented and the likelihood of harm resulting and the severity of any potential harm are set out as factors to be considered. The willingness and ability of those involved in the patient’s life to provide care and support is another relevant consideration as are alternative methods of managing risk and harm to others both physical and psychological. Consultation with relatives carers and friends and family is encouraged.
In respect of the duty alleged against D1, it is said
D1 owed both direct and vicarious duties of care to C3, C1 and C2 as follows:
a direct duty to ensure that, at all material times, that:
the Approved Mental Health Professionals employed to undertake that MHAA assessments were sufficient in number and competent to conduct their in assessing patients for possible admission to hospital pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health (Approved Mental Health Professionals)(Approval)(England) Regulations 2008 No. 1206, the MHA, and the associated Code of Practice; duties
that D1’s part played in the provision of MHA assessments by Harrow CRT and MHAAs organised by the police via the Diversion and Liaison Service were of a standard that could be reasonably expected of a competent and properly run local authority.
(2)A vicarious duty to ensure that the AMHPPH service provided by [the AMHP] on 14 August 2018 was of the standard that could be expected of a reasonably competent and properly run local authority
.
A duty of care (directly and vicariously) owed to Cs 1-3 to ensure that all reasonable steps were taken by D1 and by [the AMHP] to ensure that she was enabled (and carried out) her role in the MHAA on 14 August 2018 with reasonable care; and thereby
along with D3 and D4 took all reasonable steps to avert the risk of the infliction of physical and psychological / psychiatric injury that C3 posed to himself (by self-harm and/or suicide) and the risk of such harm to others (including C1 and C2 as identifiable and identified potential victims of his abuse and violence); and thereby
by the provision of all relevant information about C3’s mental health history fulfilled [the AMHP’s] own and D1 ’s role in assessing C3’s mental state in order to reach a reasonable decision on whether or not he should be detained under section 2 MHA.
The duty/duties pleaded at sub-para 3 above were owed because of one or a combination of the following:
D1, either directly or through those for whom D1 is vicariously liable assumed responsibility for Cs 1-3 since:
As regards C3 through the MHAA, he was being provided with professional medical/ psychiatric care and services, which D1 assumed responsibility for providing to C3 individually and which it was reasonably foreseeable that C3 would rely upon, and which C3 further did rely upon in understanding that it was safe for him to remain in the community
As regards C1 and C2, by virtue of D1's aforesaid assumption of responsibility towards C3, D1 assumed responsibility to C1 and C2 as identifiable and identified potential victims of C3 in the event that his mental health conditions were not properly assessed and treated.
D1 , either directly or through those for whom D1 is vicariously liable, had a special control over the said risk posed by C3 to C1, C2 and himself since during the course of the MHAA process on 14th August 2018, D1 had sufficient control over C3 such that D1 owed a duty to both C3 and any identifiable or identified individual, such as C1 and C2, who were at significant risk of serious harm from C3 in the event that his mental health conditions were not properly treated; and/or
the status of D1 as the public authority responsible for the provision of AMHP services.
Thus the Claimants allege vicarious liability through an assumption of responsibility because of
An assumed responsibility for Cs 1 to 3 either directly or indirectly because
as to C3, he was being provided with psychiatric care and services and D1 had assumed responsibility for providing them to C3 and it was reasonably foreseeable that C3 would rely upon them,
by reason of the assumption of responsibility at i. above, D1 also assumed responsibility to potential victims of C3, namely C1 and C2.
It is also said that D1 had a “special control” over the risk that C3 posed such that D1 owed a duty to C1 and C2 and to C3 himself, otherwise by reason of the status of D1 as the provider of the AMHP’s services.
Causation is said to arise because but for the breaches of duty the attack would not have happened such that
if C3 had received competent psychiatric assessment and treatment he would have either been detained and provided with care or received care in the community, and if he had not been discharged back to primary care the chances of him causing the other Claimants physical, psychiatric and psychological harm would have been markedly reduced and/or the attack on 23 December 2018 (or any other violent assault) would not have happened at all because:
During the course of the detention C3’s mental health would have received detailed assessment and treatment, which would have reduced or removed the possibility of his causing C2 and C3 physical, psychiatric and psychological harm, either through the 23 December 2018 attack or otherwise. In particular if C3 had remained in detention, he would not have been able to have undertaken the 23 December 2018 attack.
Further and/or in the alternative the provision of care within the community, following release from detention, or in a place of detention, would have led to C3 receiving treatment to address his condition and/or being in receipt of close monitoring that would have led to his detention under the 1983 Act at a later stage. Either possibility reducing or removing the possibility of his causing C1 and C2 physical, psychiatric and psychological harm, either through the 23 December 2018 attack or otherwise so that C1 would not have been injured, and C2 would not have suffered physical and psychiatric injuries through witnessing the immediate aftermath of the attack on 23 December 2018.
Further, C3 would not have been found not guilty by reason of insanity of the attempted murder of C1 and been made the subject of a section 37 MHA Hospital Order with a section 41 restriction.
- Heading
- THE CLAIM
- As against all Claimants
- As against C2
- As against C3
- As against C2 and C3
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
- Events of 14 August 2018
- The index incident
- The Common Law Claim
- The Human Rights Case
- As against C2
- As against C3
- D1’s position on the Common law duty in its defence
- D1’s position on the Human Rights Case
- Framework for the Application
- The Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 139 Discussion
- Duty of Care Discussion
- Consistency with statutory framework
- The omissions principle and its exceptions – an assumption of responsibility – services or control?
- He continued
- Conclusions