KB-2025-000703 - [2025] EWHC 2957 (KB)
Fecha: 13-Nov-2025
and CPR 16.5(2) provides
and CPR 16.5(2) provides:
Where the defendant denies an allegation—
they must state their reasons for doing so; and
if they intend to put forward a different version of events from that given by the claimant, they must state their own version.
Specific requirements relating to a defence in a “media and communications claim” such as this one are found inCPR PD53B. CPR PD53B para. 2.1 provides: Statements of case should be confined to the information necessary to inform the other party of the nature of the case they have to meet. Such information should be set out concisely and in a manner proportionate to the subject matter of the claim.
Under CPR PD53B para. 10.4, a defendant to a claim for harassment by publication “must in any defence specifically admit or deny each act alleged in the particulars of claim to constitute part of a course of conduct amounting to harassment”.
A litigant in person must comply with a rule, practice direction or order that applies to them in the same way as a represented party: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP[2018] UKSC 12; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 1119, [18].
In relation to summary judgment, CPR 24.3 provides:
The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue if—
it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and
there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
The proper approach to applications for summary judgment has been set out in Easyair Ltd (trading as Openair) v Opal Telecom[2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) [15(i)-vii)] per Lewison J:
“i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 ;
ii) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]
iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain v Hillman
iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]
v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;
vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63;
vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.”