King's / Queen's Bench Division of the High Court

J90PE914 and K00LU633 - [2025] EWHC 2076 (KB)

Fecha: 01-Jul-2025

Conduct leading to wasted costs

Conduct leading to wasted costs

17.

With respect to the schedule of incidents, the matters where there was court time wasted as a consequence of the conduct of the second claimant and/or the need to take further instructions to avoid professional embarrassment were as follows. Where I am in any doubt as to whether the fault lies directly with the second claimant, I have not included these matters. Having been presiding over this trial, I can be absolutely certain where I have referred to time being wasted – this is time that was wasted because of the second claimant’s conduct.

(1)

On 1 May 2025, the second claimant walked out of court after one of the individual defendants alerted the court to the fact that the second claimant had been mimicking counsel for the first defendant from behind the screens in court. This was in keeping with previous immature behaviour from the second claimant when interacting with counsel for the second defendant. 1 hour wasted.

(2)

On 2 May 2025, proceedings were interrupted when the second claimant started sobbing very loudly after her witness told the court that he signed his second statement “blind” and he did not know what it said. 40 minutes wasted.

(3)

On 15 May 2025, leading counsel for the second claimant had to ask for the embargo to be lifted from the second claimant discussing the case while giving evidence as counsel needed instructions to avoid professional embarrassment. 22 minutes wasted.

(4)

On 15 May 2025, the second claimant had to be warned against self-incrimination and counsel sought permission to give advice and for the embargo to be lifted for a second time. 1 hour and 10 minutes wasted

(5)

On 16 May 2025, the embargo had to be lifted for a third time as evidence of a without prejudice meeting by the second claimant with some of the individual defendants was raised but claimant’s counsel had not been instructed about such a meeting. 36 minutes wasted.

(6)

On 16 May 2025, the embargo had to be lifted again in order for instructions on documents to be taken from the second claimant. A total of 19 minutes wasted.

(7)

On 20 May 2025, the proceedings were paused to enable counsel to take further instructions. A total of 28 minutes wasted.

(8)

On 21 May 2025, there was a delay to the evidence as a consequence of the second claimant taking photographs of one of the defendants while he was waiting in the coffee queue in a local coffee shop and wrongly accusing him of standing in a threatening posture and moving towards her aggressively, when he was standing normally and had not moved – the second claimant had zoomed in on him. 20 minutes wasted.

(9)

On 22 May 2025, further instructions were taken with respect to whether the second claimant was willing for the court to see the dashcam footage of the second claimant driving her car and touching Ms Beresford Ambridge. The second claimant contended she did not want the court to do so as she has an extant application to the Criminal Case Review Commission (albeit she has no new evidence), but the magistrates and the Crown Court had seen the footage and convicted the second claimant of assault by battery. 33 minutes and 28 minutes wasted dealing with this issue.

(10)

On 23 May 2025, the dashcam footage from the second claimant was disclosed showing her using her car to push at another defendant, days before the incident involving Ms Beresford Ambridge. Instructions had to be taken with regard to the showing of the dashcam footage and why it had not been disclosed earlier. Total wasted time 38 minutes.

(11)

On 27 May 2025, the video evidence showing what had actually happened after the assault on Ms Beresford Ambridge undermining the second claimant’s allegation against Darren Honeywill that he had thrown tea over her. Total wasted time 1 hr and 4 minutes.

18.

By listing out these incidents it can be seen just how “out of the norm” the behaviour of the second claimant has been within the litigation. The total wasted time on these various points amounts to 7 ½ hours or 1 ½ days of court time. At a rate of £3,500 – which is entirely reasonable and proportionate - that is an identifiable and wasted cost of £5250 awarded on the indemnity basis.

19.

Those costs should have VAT at 20% added to them in the sum of £1050 (a total figure of £6300). The first and second claimant, who are jointly represented, agree that the costs should be borne by Ms Saunders – the second claimant. It has been submitted by counsel that Ms Saunders is not registered for VAT and therefore VAT should not be added. That submission is not correct. The paying party is obliged to pay VAT regardless of the status of the paying party. The only time that VAT is not recoverable is if the receiving party is able to recover the VAT themselves. The total sum of £6300 should be paid to the first defendant within 14 days of today. While there has been a submission to pay in 21 days, the second claimant has given no justification for why she needs that additional time and there is no reason for the court to extend time.

20.

The second claimant further seeks additional time to appeal, beyond the time given in the civil procedure rules of 21 days from the decision being made. It appears that the second claimant wishes to extend time until after the full judgment. There is no justification for such an extension of time. This is a discrete issue and if counsel for the second claimant considers there is a proper basis for bringing an application for permission to appeal on this determination on costs then that properly should be dealt with within the period allowed for in the rules.

21.

If the counsel for the second claimant considers that there is a good basis for bringing an application for permission to appeal this costs order then that application should be made now. There is no reason for delay and, to my recollection, this is the third or fourth time the claimants have sought to hold over seeking permission to appeal until final judgment is given. It gives the appearance that the second claimant wants to have the opportunity to keep litigation on these points alive, when there should be finality.