KA-2024-000208 - [2025] EWHC 1964 (KB)

HHJ Simpkiss set out the relevant legal principles, and it is not contended that he misdirected himself as to any of them.

The Judge noted that at the end of the evidence, the defendant submitted that there were no issues of fact to be left to the jury whilst the claimants submitted that there were two:

The Judge ruled that those questions should not go to the jury, whom he accordingly discharged. In respect of the question whether PC Havers actually believed that it was necessary to arrest the second claimant, his reasoning was:

“46.

Nevertheless, the jury should only be asked to decide actual issues of fact in relation to facts which are relevant to the decision in the case. There was no real dispute in this case about PC Havers’ actual belief and to the extent that there was it was as to whether it was appropriate to infer from evidence other than direct evidence of PC Havers that he had that belief. That is a question of law and unless it was to be contended that PC Havers was lying when he used his words of arrest and when he wrote out and signed his MG11 there was only one possible verdict. It was not suggested that he was lying nor was there any basis for putting that to him.”

The evidential basis for that conclusion was that although there was no evidence from PC Havers, who had left the police force, there were records of the arrest.

First, the Court heard PC Robinson’s BWV footage in which PC Havers was heard to say:

“You are under arrest for suspicion of child neglect … The necessity is just to prevent harm … You know how it goes, prompt and effective …”.

The Court also saw a form MG11 (i.e. a witness statement) completed by PC Havers the day after the arrest in which he stated:

“The necessity for your arrest is to prevent physical injury to your child and to enable a prompt and effective investigation”

The Judge also recorded that the second claimant, in evidence, conceded that there was no reason to suppose that PC Havers did not believe what he was saying at the moment of arrest.

In respect of PC Bell, the Judge noted that it was conceded in submissions that she did believe that the first claimant’s arrest was necessary.

At the time of the arrest she said that it was “to protect vulnerable persons and for a prompt and effective investigation”. In court she explained that it was important to get the accused person under control so that the vulnerable persons (her children) would be protected to prevent further harm and injury while the investigation was carried out.

In closing submissions, the claimants’ counsel accepted that the arrest was made (i) so as to safeguard the children; and (ii) to avoid contaminating the evidence by the Claimants talking to each other or talking to their children and that these reasons were important. The issue was whether arrest was the only way of achieving those aims.

The Judge noted that PC Bell accepted in cross-examination that a voluntary interview at the police station might have been possible. She had in mind a need “to gather the evidence very quickly and to get the Claimant under police control and to protect the children and prevent further harm and injuries”, and she “was aware that if the parents had not been arrested there was a risk that the police would not obtain the evidence they needed because the parents could speak to the children and each other”.

The Judge observed that this was a case where there was no evidence that the arresting officer applied her mind to the alternative of voluntary attendance at a police station and therefore ran the risk of a challenge to the reasonableness of her decision. However, at the time of the first claimant’s arrest, it was apparent to PC Bell that there was a significant risk to all three children and that they required urgent protection from the claimants, about whom she knew little or nothing. If she had thought about alternatives to arrest, she would have had to think about the risk of collusion between the parents and interference with the children’s evidence. The Judge concluded:

“63.

… If the alternatives, which were not at all straightforward, were considered then no reasonable officer could have come to a different conclusion than to arrest.

64.

I am therefore satisfied that the Defendant has proved that PC Bell reasonably believed that it was necessary to arrest the First Claimant for 2 of the reasons set out in section 24(5) of PACE. These were to protect a child or children from the person in question and to enable a prompt and effective investigation. For the same reasons I am satisfied that the burden of proof has been discharged in relation to PC Havers’ arrest of the Second Claimant.”

The Judge went on to record that it became clear within a few hours that the children were not at risk and further police involvement was not necessary. However, the police did not know that at the time of the arrests. Accordingly the first claimant’s claim was dismissed.

In the case of the second claimant, the Judge said that he “gave serious thought to reaching a different decision” and that “the practicalities were not as stark as with the First Claimant because he was not at home. If he had come to the police station with the officers then he would not have been in contact with his children or ABD.”

However, the Judge held that the same risks existed in his case because of what he had been told about ABD’s allegations. Therefore the second claimant’s claim failed.

The Judge went on to resolve an issue about whether the first claimant should have been released at or soon after 3.12am. Nothing now turns on that.

By their grounds of appeal on liability the claimants contend that the Judge erred by: