KB-2024-002095 - [2025] EWHC 1925 (KB)
King's / Queen's Bench Division of the High Court

KB-2024-002095 - [2025] EWHC 1925 (KB)

Fecha: 25-Jul-2025

Conclusions

Misfeasance in Public Office

16.

This is raised at paragraphs 48-50, 61-63, and 105-106 of the APOC.

17.

In Young v Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police [2020] EWHC 308 (QB), Master Davison re-stated the ingredients of the tort of misfeasance in public office, which Martin Spencer J quoted in full and approved as correct at [10]

24.

Misfeasance in public office requires proof of the following ingredients:

(a)

The defendant must be a public officer;

(b)

The conduct complained of must be in the exercise of public functions;

(c)

Malice: the requisite state of mind is one or other of the following:

(i)

“Targeted malice”, i.e. the conduct “is specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves bad faith in the sense of the exercise of a public power for an improper or ulterior motive”. Or

(ii)

“Untargeted malice”, i.e. the public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of or with reckless indifference as to the lack of such power and that the act will probably injure the claimant.

(d)

Damage: the public officer must have foreseen the probability of damage of the type suffered.

See also Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) [2003] 2 AC 1

18.

It is unclear whether the claim is founded on targeted or untargeted malice, but in any event the Claimant fails to meet the ‘heavy burden’ in pleading malice, per Young. The Claimant merely asserts malice by reference to ‘unnecessary use of force, deliberate disregard of exculpatory evidence, and the prolonged detention without justification’. This is insufficiently particularised and cannot found a claim for misfeasance in public office. The Claimant has not pleaded and properly particularised the bad faith or reckless indifference relied upon, and that which is pleaded is consistent with mistake or negligence and accordingly liable to be struck out.

19.

In paragraph 105 the Claimant relies on ‘deliberate’ disregard of exculpatory evidence, and in paragraphs 61-63 he expands on this as follows:

61.

The officers deliberately and maliciously suppressed exculpatory evidence by:

a)

Dismissing the Claimant’s offer to provide clear evidence of innocence

b)

Attempting to justify an unlawful arrest

c)

Perverting the course of justice

20.

This passage and the following two paragraphs also fail to plead malice in the way required by Young v Chief Constable of Warwickshire. They do not particularise intention to injure the Claimant or ulterior motive, nor do they particularise knowledge of a lack of power to do the act(s) complained of.

21.

Accordingly this claim falls to be struck out under CPR3.4(2) (a).

The Remaining Parts of the Claim Form and Amended Particulars of Claim

22.

The Defendant submitted in addition that the APOC and Reply as a whole should be struck out, but that the Claimant, as a litigant in person, should be given an opportunity to amend his Particulars of Claim. The Defendant pointed out that the APOC are 24 pages long, and after service of a comparatively concise Defence, the Claimant filed a Reply extending to another 11 pages. It was submitted that the cumulative 35 pages of the Claimant’s statements of case do not amount to ‘a concise and clear statement of the facts’, contrary to CPR 16.4(1)(a).

23.

I agree with the Defendant that the APOC and Reply do not meet the requirements of Rule16.4(1)(a), even with the claims listed above being struck out. They are prolix and not organised logically. A number of paragraphs are simply repeated in different parts of the statement of case. These factors make them unnecessarily complicated and difficult to understand. I considered that the APOC and Reply fall to be struck out under CPR3.4(2) (a) and (b). I have made an order that permits the Claimant to provide substituted Particulars of Claim, within a generous time frame to permit him to take legal advice, if he wishes, and consequential directions.

24.

I addressed costs at the hearing. The Defendant sought its costs of the application. I considered that the usual rule should apply, namely that the unsuccessful party should pay the costs incurred by the successful party. There are no good reasons to make a different order. The Claimant received the Defendant’s Counsel’s skeleton argument before the hearing but made no offer to amend his statements of case and failed to attend the hearing without any notification or explanation to the court for that discourtesy.