QB-2022-001098 - [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB)

The purpose of a review hearing for an injunction, particularly one against Persons Unknown, was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. At [225], the Court observed that a review:

“…will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

As Mr Morshead KC observed, this is an area of evolving jurisprudence so that it is also open to the Court to review the operation of continuing injunctive relief in the light of legal developments. That has already taken place in this case following the decision in Wolverhampton. I am satisfied that the Claimants have drawn to my attention all of the recent relevant case law in relation to the granting of similar injunctive relief.

In cases where the review is uncontested, the primary focus is not to revisit the merits afresh but rather to determine whether the injunction has outlasted the compelling need which led to its initial imposition, in view of any changed circumstances. This approach is consistent with the views expressed by Hill J in Valero v Persons Unknown (2025 review) [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) at [20-30], and by Garnham J in Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (hereafter “Rochdale”) at [42-52].

I agree that this is the practical and proportionate way to approach a review ordered as part of the original grant of relief. Such a review is also an opportunity to make necessary adjustments in the light of experience of the practical operation of the injunction and changing circumstances. The Court should nevertheless be wary of embarking upon fundamental changes to the scope or nature of injunctive relief at a review hearing rather than requiring a further and full application to be made. I also bear in mind that there is no legal presumption of continuance.