KA-2023-000225 - [2025] EWHC 2112 (KB)

I accept that I have a parallel jurisdiction with the Court of Appeal to grant a stay of my own order given that I am not functus and that I am considering consequential matters. The question, therefore, is whether the high threshold for granting a stay has been met in this instance. The core of the Respondent’s argument for a stay rests on the assertion that information, once provided, “cannot be erased” and that compelling the Respondent to respond to the request would stifle its appeal. While I appreciate the distinction the Respondent draws between the provision of information and the transfer of money, the nature of the request must be considered. It has been outstanding for a long period because the Respondent has declined to answer. The Appellant has pursued the information through the Application and then this appeal, and I have found in his favour. As the Appellant correctly points out, the questions posed are not on their face difficult to answer. The Respondent accepted in submissions that it had a duty to divulge a commission, as per Tankard v John Fredericks Plastics [2008] EWCA Civ 1375, but argued that it was not under a general duty to confirm that such a commission had not been paid. However the provision of further information which confirmed that this was indeed the case can hardly be regarded as the source of any harm. If the position is in fact more complex, then the client should be in a position to argue, on an informed basis if it is open to him to do so, that the cash account was deficient. That was the purpose of the request.

The fact that a step ordered in the proceedings cannot be undone is not the same as one which will cause irreparable harm if later reversed on appeal. This is not akin to a payment of money that might be difficult to recover, nor does it carry the same weight as, say, mandatory disclosure that could prejudice a party in subsequent proceedings. Furthermore, I find the reasoning in Edwards/Raubenheimer, to be highly persuasive. The purpose of such an order for further information is precisely to clarify matters. If, as Warby LJ noted, compliance with the order may reveal whether the appeal is itself academic on its facts (either way), then that is a relevant matter, and a stay would simply frustrate a necessary clarification at this stage. The Respondent’s argument that the provision of this information would cause “irremediable harm” or stifle the appeal is, in my view, unconvincing given that a point of principle is identified. Indeed the nature of the harm that would be caused is opaque. I am not persuaded that refusing a stay would place the Respondent in an unjust position or compel a breach of my order. Compliance with an order for information is an expected part of litigation, and the Respondent has not demonstrated that compliance would create irreversible prejudice so severe as to warrant delaying the effect of the Judgment. The balance of justice does not favour a stay in these circumstances. The immediate provision of this information could, in fact, facilitate the efficient resolution of the underlying dispute, particularly given the straightforward nature of the information sought, regardless of any further appellate process.

The Respondent has not, in my view, met the stringent test for a stay. I therefore refuse the Respondent’s application for a stay.