KB-2021-000741 - [2025] EWHC 2096 (KB)

There will now be considered the evidence of the Represented Claimants, that is the twenty Claimants save for the Fourth Claimant, the Fourteenth Claimant and the Seventeenth Claimant, who did not provide witness statements and who did not appear at trial.

Mr Ellis became a trainer in 2017 or thereafter. He said how scared most instructors were of Mr Benson. He related how Mr Benson was aggressive and intimidating, citing his claims about taking people’s houses after they left JBL and his conviction for possessing a firearm and ammunition. He said (para. 19 of his witness statement) that “it was his way or the highway”.

He made four specific allegations in the Particulars of Claim. First, he was removed from the Just Benson Facebook group. That would be damaging for most franchisees, but evidently not for him: he did not mind because he found Just Benson offensive. The fact that he felt that it was offensive such that he was content not to have access to it supports the case about the toxic environment.

Second, Mr Benson withheld work from instructors with whom he fell out. He said that when he declined work well out of his area because of the time and cost to him, he did not receive much work after that (paras. 10 and 18 of his witness statement). This was consistent with statements of both Ms Summers and Ms Sharpe in a recorded conversation, referred to in the section about what was put to Wendy Smith below, namely if in his bad books, you went to the back of the pile and Ms Sharpe saying that she was told not to book pupils “if people pissed him off”. Mr Stubbings related that Ms Summers had mentioned this to him. Mr Hayward related how he had a discussion with Mr Benson in about 2019 regarding increases in fees which he challenged. Mr Benson did not agree, and around this time, he said that his pupil referrals from the office “dropped off” (para. 11 of his witness statement).

Third, he witnessed threatening behaviour of Mr Benson towards Mr Elliott, but in evidence, it did not go very far. Although he said that he had seen Mr Benson holding a staff member, he did not see any context. At the time he dismissed it as not being the usual behaviour of Mr Benson.

Fourth, he witnessed Mr Benson giving driving instruction after his licence to do so was revoked (following the firearm conviction). The response was that Mr Benson would help to supervise staff trainers during mini-bus days without any remuneration. No breach has been proved, albeit that it incited suspicion for Mr Benson being involved in giving driving instruction whether because any payment was made to a third party or there was no payment made at all.

Mr Ellis’s evidence dovetailed with other evidence in the case. Simply by way of example, he said that Mr Benson did not explain how long the agreement would last. This corresponds with how the provision as to duration was so unclear. He was upset that he was not able to have his telephone number on his vehicle which was an aspect of his lack of freedom and affected his ability to grow his business. This is a common pleaded breach.

The specific allegations in respect of Mr Hayward were first an allegation about the taxman and second the refusal to allow him to publicise his name or his telephone number on the car, both allegations being considered elsewhere in this judgment.

Mr Hayward has given evidence about what he regarded as the intimidation of Mr Benson. Some of this has been referred to above in that context. He signed a 60 month contract on his first meeting with Mr Beck, being told that it was a really good deal. In fact, he did not realise that the 60 months was after the initial training phase, and he did not appreciate that the franchise fee would rise appreciably each year. He signed a second contract in 2018 because he could not afford the payments under the first contract.

On 23 March 2020, the day of the start of the national lockdown, he said that he wanted to exit, saying that it was making him very stressed and affecting his heart condition and his sleep. He asked for a suitable outcome, even although he recognised a big cost to him. The response was that it would cost him over £122,000, and that this would be “likely to be financially disastrous to you and your family”. Whatever the exact sum, and there are arguments about that, the very large size reflected the fact that, by that time, he was signed up to a ten -year agreement. This account in one sense confirms how Covid was a trigger to the terminations, but it also provides the context in which the breaches relating to Covid have to be judged. They comprised the refusal until 24 March 2020 to make any accommodation for Covid, and thereafter to use the problems of Covid as an opportunity to seek unilaterally to extend the agreements.

I found Mr Hayward to be a man of few words. He was not very comfortable with matters of detail, not because he was dissembling, but because dealing with documents and specific events was well outside his comfort zone. A witness like Mr Hayward is a good example of why there is concern about the practice of concluding long-term franchise agreements without independent advice. Mr Hayward, as were other franchisees relative to JBL and Mr Benson, disadvantaged and vulnerable.

The additional allegations are as follows:

I found Mr Monk to be a weak witness. He avoided confrontation and easily and meekly agreed to matters put to him. An unsatisfactory feature of his evidence was that he was unable to substantiate several areas of criticism of JBL in his evidence.

I accept that the first of those allegations is proved. It is denied by JBL. There was a technical breach of the rules, but it did not merit the reaction which it got. I accept Mr Monk’s evidence that Mr Benson berated Mr Monk in front of others shouting that he should be ashamed of himself.

As regards the second of the allegations, Mr Benson says that when his licence was revoked, he would help to supervise staff trainers during mini-bus days without any remuneration. No breach has been proved, albeit that, as in the case of Mr Ellis, it incited suspicion for Mr Benson to be involved in giving driving instruction whether because any payment was made to a third party or there was no payment made at all.

As regards the third allegation, I find that this did not amount to a breach of contract. There was no nominated supplier: JBL contracted with the signwriter. There was nothing wrong with doing it that way: it promoted uniformity.

Mr Monk gave evidence which resonated with a lot of the evidence in this case. He said how he felt pressurised to sign the first agreement: he was not allowed to take it away. He believed that it was a three-year agreement, but the agreement was for longer and it was difficult to work out how long it lasted. He complained about how the weekly fees increased but the price for lessons did not. He stated how inappropriate a lot of Mr Benson’s Facebook posts were e.g. an offensive remark about a Chinese franchisee. He heard Mr Benson being unable to control his temper, being angry and rude and acting as a bully and intimidating people. He felt shouted at and belittled and made to feel inferior.

The additional allegations in respect of Mr Robins were as follows:

These allegations were answered in the Defence in that:

None of the specific allegations were proved. That is not to say that Mr Robins was seeking to mislead. His evidence resonated with much of the evidence in the case, adding to the picture of disadvantage and vulnerability of franchisees. In his evidence, Mr Robins stated that the agreement had been presented to him in an envelope. He was not allowed to take the contract away until he had signed it. He felt under pressure to sign because Mr Beck said that he could not train until he had done so.

He said that when he failed Part 3 for the second time, Mr Benson said that he was probably one of the worst instructors he had ever had.

He said in the context of not passing that he was offered “a deal” by Mr Benson which was a new longer agreement with another start-up period. He said that he had no choice other than to sign the agreement because he was trapped by the payment.

He said that he did not have a full diary despite what he believed he would get. He was not permitted to promote his own business. He was not allowed to put his number on his car or advertise himself. He was upset about an incident when he said “Good morning” to Mr Benson outside his office door, there was a very short conversation and he then received a letter dated 1 August 2019 saying that he should not come into the office of Mr Benson without an appointment. I accept this evidence. It was sought to be justified because Mr Benson was so busy and needed to be protected in this way. In fact, it was unnecessary, insensitive and controlling.

I formed the view that Ms Rusted gave her evidence in a measured and thoughtful way. She was patently an honest witness, albeit that she recognised that her precise recollection of the order of events was not good. She got confused on points of detail such as her assertion that the franchise fee had gone up to £300 per week at the start of her 10 year franchise agreement when it was more likely that this was a projection forwards perhaps to the end of her existing 5 year agreement. I did not find that such points of detail affected her overall reliability, particularly about witnessing bullying or herself being driven to tears.

There were seven allegations specific to Ms Rusted as follows:

As regards, the first allegation, Mr Benson denies using such language or upsetting Ms Rodgers. There was jovial shouting at the office, but she gave back as good as she got. She had rented a property from Mr Benson in Portugal and went on a work holiday with colleagues organised by Mr Benson. I do not accept this denial. I prefer the evidence of Ms Rusted who gave evidence at para. 30 of her witness statement that she was waiting by the door in the office in the reception area and could hear Mr Benson screaming at someone down the corridor saying “F*** off out of my office, you stupid cow.” She saw Ciera walk out and she shrugged her shoulders and put her head down and carried on. This evidence was corroborated by Ms George at para 21 who said that a few months after her first training day, Mr Benson was shouting and swearing at two office girls Ciera and Wendy whom he told to “F*** off and go away”, picked up their bags and coats and walked out. They looked grey and weary. Ms Rusted found the experience was upsetting. In cross-examination, she said that she thought that she would be the next one.

There was evidence from Wendy Smith, a former partner of Mr Benson, saying that Mr Benson got on very well with Kiera and in oral evidence, she did not accept that this occurred.

I have considered the analysis of JBL. First, it is said that no date was given and it is likely that it may have been at a time of stress before the criminal trial in 2015, but this is not an answer because it was before Ms Rusted and Ms George became franchisees. Second, the words reported in Ms Rusted’s witness statement are not the same as the pleaded words: that does not undermine the account. In both accounts, the “F” word was used in the same sentence as the word “stupid”. In Ms George’s account the “F” word was used without the word “stupid.” I find either that such words were used. It is possible that this was the same incident or a separate incident, but it matters not for the purpose of this action. It is evidence of aggressive and abusive behaviour. Third, it is said that such an incident not directed to the franchisee cannot be a breach of the franchisee’s contract. I disagree. It was a part of the intimidatory atmosphere and bullying conduct of Mr Benson which is the subject of so much evidence and is to be seen as a part of an overall picture which was in breach of the implied terms of good faith.

As regards the second allegation of abusive and aggressive behaviour during driving tuition: this is denied by Mr Benson, and he prayed in aid the fact that subsequently she entered to a franchise agreement and would recommend the training of Mr Benson. She says that thereafter she had excellent tuition from Ms Summers and that it was to her and Mr Williams that her praise was directed, mentioning Mr Benson as “sound” and “giving up his time”. There is evidence from Ms Thornton that there was an occasion when Mr Benson reduced her and Ms Rusted to tears. Ms Thornton’s evidence was that Mr Benson would raise his voice and shout at her. She told Mr Benson that she learned from being told where she had gone wrong and not from being shouted at. She told him that he was a bully, and he said that he did not care. Whilst Ms Thornton was not mentioned by Ms Rusted, I accept her evidence. Ms Rusted has an account of being made very upset by similar behaviour. I accept the submission that such breaches are evidence of aggressive and abusive conduct which persisted thereafter in the various ways described in this judgment.

The third allegation was that she was required to pay for a training session which she was unable to attend due to back pain. The forensic point was that she said orally that she was reduced to tears, whereas in her statement she referred to being in agony due to her laser surgery and being “very upset”, and it being “really upsetting” due to the lack of empathy about her predicament. I am satisfied that her account was honest and accurate and that the account does not stand or fall by whether there were actually tears. This is not a trivial allegation. It was deeply uncaring: it comes over that the money to the trainer was treated as more important than the physical and mental well-being of Ms Rusted. It is a better point that it was a stale allegation, but here too, it was a part of a culture of lack of compassion in which the financial interests of JBL and those associated with it were elevated over basic sensitivity to franchisees. It was therefore a part of a continuing culture in which this was manifested in different ways.

The fourth allegation is a pleaded allegation of how for numerous franchisees, the business model of JBL may not have worked in that so many of them were unable to pay. The consequence is that even if the lower payments were generous, Ms Rusted became involved in a 10 -year arrangement instead of a 5 -year arrangement, thereby affecting her freedom of labour. Having said that, Mr Benson has demonstrated in para. 162 of his witness statement that he decreased her fees including that she did not have to pay any franchise fees in her last three years.

The fifth allegation about advice to evade tax is considered generically elsewhere. The sixth allegation that Ms Rusted heard Mr Benson use a homophobic word is not supported by evidence.

The seventh allegation about being blocked on Facebook actually occurred in June 2020 rather than earlier during Covid. As will be noted below, in June 2020, Ms Rusted took exception to a remark about an instruction with a brain cell. This in turn led to Mr Benson removing her from Facebook because of her “unreasonable behaviour and potentially trouble causing comments and remarks.” She would be returned if she gave an assurance that she would not make similar remarks again. On 11 June 2020, Ms Rusted said to Mr Benson that she could not believe that she was blocked and they should be able to have a decent discussion instead of his getting angry all the time. She said that she was not attacking him, but questioning the rules of the government and “it did pee me off about the brain cell comment.”

It is not an answer to say that being on Facebook was not a contractual right. Whether it was or it was not, to allow someone access to Facebook and then to remove them because she took exception to the brain cell remark was part of an unreasonably domineering environment. Contrary to the evidence of Mr Benson that there was no business benefit to being part of Just Benson, franchisees were entitled to take the view that access to the Just Benson Facebook was of importance in order for their better performance of their obligations as franchisee. Ms Rusted was unreasonably blocked. It is not an answer that not all franchisees looked at the Facebook group. Nor is it an answer if the allegation was misdated by saying that it occurred in March 2020 when in fact it occurred in June 2020. That it occurred was uncontroversial.

Mr Stubbings gave evidence about how he was persuaded to become a franchisee. He did not realise when he signed a 60 month agreement that that period would not start to run until he became a qualified instructor. He gave evidence of intimidatory conduct. This included on a bus day bringing Mr Stubbings to the front imagining that he was a pupil and shouting at him in front of all the people on the bus. The fees became disproportionate to what he was earning. By 2020, he was struggling with weekly payments and he was offered an extended agreement of 10 years. He knew that other people had been asked to sign up to 10 year agreements and this seemed like a trap to him. When Mr Benson said that he would be extending the term of his contract he did not agree to this and he did not want to be tied to JBL any longer.

The additional allegations as regards Mr Stubbings are as follows:

As regards the first of the allegations, this was a strategy on the part of Mr Benson to neutralise the threat of a competitor driving school getting into the market in Haverhill. Four of the Claimants in this action operated in the Haverhill area. Mr Stubbings already felt that he did not have enough work and at the attempt to recruit more from Haverhill was unreasonable, and that the suggestion the market could be flooded by JBL was ridiculous. Any consultation with franchisees through a meeting which was convened was simply to convey a message rather than to take soundings. The allegation is that this was being done in order to put pressure on a competitor about coming into the area rather than having any regard for the franchisees who were already under financial pressure. Whilst the complaint is understood, there is not before the Court sufficient information regarding the market in Haverhill and the work available for the franchisees in that area. In order for a possible breach of an implied term to be established, it would have required much more detailed facts to show how JBL had deprived the Claimants from obtaining benefits granted and/or undermine the terms of the bargain and or in some other way acted in breach of a duty of good faith. The agreement did not contain any right to exclusivity in Haverhill or any express right to decide whether or not to recruit in Haverhill. Although this first of the allegations may be seen as a part of a course of conduct of failing to be attentive to the concerns of the franchisees, it has not been proved.

As regards the second of the allegations, I find that this is not a breach of contract in that it was intended to refer to Facebook friends, and JBL wishing the internal plans of the Benson School not to be shared with other schools.

As regards the third of the allegations, the franchise agreement did contain a dress code, but that did not mean that it could be enforced abusively. Mr Stubbings had attended a photographic shoot with a polo shirt which had been allowed previously without criticism. If it was a problem, he could have gone home and changed it without delaying the shoot. Instead, he received a letter from Mr Benson, stating “your dress code on this day was appalling and it doesn't matter how cool you think you look.” Mr Stubbings believed that this was bullying conduct. It was abusive and disrespectful. It was a part of the intimidatory and aggressive conduct of Mr Benson and not justified by clause 5(q) of his franchise agreement. Mr Ellis commented on this behaviour (para.17 of his witness statement): it made him nervous when Mr Benson wanted him to wear formal trousers which was unrealistic in his work as a trailer trainer.

As regards the fourth of the allegations, I am satisfied that Mr Stubbings witnessed Mr Laughlin being insulted by Mr Benson on the bus over a long period with swear words being used. He later found out that this occurred on the day before Mr Laughlin’s Part 3 test. I do not accept the denial. It was memorable to Mr Stubbings and it was consistent with Mr Benson’s other conduct.

Ms Summers made additional allegations about requiring cash which will be considered generically in connection with taxation matters. She also complained about “JBL's chaotic communications policy under which the instructors were applied to the telephone the office but not allowed to let the phone ring more than three times at risk of sanction”. This was a rule that caused real difficulties because she had to put down the phone instead of making contact between her lessons, and occasionally by the time that she was able to telephone again it was after office hours.

It may be that this system was inadequate, but in the context of an allegation of a breach of an implied term of good faith, an inadequate system by itself was not necessarily a breach of contract. The point was the risk of sanction and the way in which that was expressed. Mr Benson posted to the Just Benson page:

“If the instructor phone in line rings more than three times HANG UP!

Any more of this selfish behaviour and I will block offending instructor’s numbers and you'll have to call in to the office to update your diaries.”

In the Defence (para. 10 H(iii)), JBL says that this was not a threat of sanction but a warning and that it was effective. It was a threat of sanction because then the instructor would be unable to contact head office without having to go there which might be a very long distance from their area. It was also written in intimidatory and unpleasant language and is part of a course of conduct of other intimidatory and abusive behaviour. The fact that it may have been effective in the limited ambit of its objective misses the point about the objectionable manner in which Mr Benson made his point.

Ms Summers gave evidence that she was too afraid of Mr Benson not to do what he wanted. She regretted helping Mr Benson sign on new franchisees, knowing that it would be a disaster for them personally, but being too scared not to do as he said. When she did stand up to him in the lead up to the lockdown, as appears elsewhere, she was removed from Facebook.

The additional allegations of Mr Szatkowski comprised:

As regards the first allegation, the Court does not doubt the information about the cancellations and no doubt the firearms conviction did cause some ongoing damage to the brand. However, it was not comparable to the stigma of the widespread corruption of BCCI referred to in BCCI v Malik. I am not satisfied that as of 2020, the stigma was so great that it amounted to a continuing breach of any implied term of trust and confidence. If and to the extent that it had previously amounted to a breach at least vis-à-vis instructors at the time of the conviction and in the period thereafter, it was so long ago that it has not been shown to be a basis for terminating in late 2020.

As regards the second allegation, it would have been disappointing for Mr Szatkowski not to be able to drive a vehicle which may have been superior to the recommended vehicles. It would also have been inconvenient to him, given that he was able to get a good deal on it. That said, I am not satisfied that it was so unreasonable of JBL to refuse the request as to give rise to a breach of an implied term. JBL was given a right under the contract to approve or decline a choice of car, and the insistence on having a brand confined to a number of cars does not appear to be an arbitrary or capricious act or something so unreasonable as amounting to a breach of the implied term of good faith.

As regards the third allegation, there was no evidence of overt racism to Mr Szatkowski, but the incidents of which he had knowledge (e.g. about the Chinese instructor) did cause him to believe that Mr Benson was prejudiced against non-UK instructors. That is simply a tangible reason why racism within the workplace had a knock-on effect not limited to the person who was the subject of the racist comments.

In addition to this, Mr Szatkowski gave evidence that when he signed his second contract in February 2019, he could not understand it all because he was not fluent in English. He and his guarantor, Joanna Bernat, asked if they could take the agreement home, but were told that they could not, and if they did not sign there and then, Mr Beck could not guarantee that the offer would still be available. At the time of signing, he was desperate for work.

He also described how he struggled for new pupils and how he was given leads sometimes 20 miles away from his home. When he refused leads in areas far away from Peterborough, he was given less or no leads in Peterborough which he felt was a punishment. He wanted to be able to advertise his mobile number on the car, but this was refused.

He said how alongside many other instructions, he found Mr Benson rude, disrespectful and threatening. He heard of the troubles that instructors had when they sought to stand up to Mr Benson.

I accept that he was a truthful witness who gave consistent testimony. The fact that the Court did not accept the stigma claim as a basis for termination or the claim for not being able to use the Mercedes Class A as founding a breach of contract does not affect the fact that the Court was able to accept the truth of his evidence.

The additional pleaded allegation is that Mr Chapman was put under pressure to publicise other instructors when he was unable to pass his training. He felt so trapped by the agreement that he became suicidal and was prescribed antidepressants. The defence of JBL was that Mr Chapman was encouraged to engage in publicity for the benefit of the brand. He was not put under pressure to publicise other instructors.

His evidence was a very sorry account about the business model not working for him. He was put under pressure to sign the agreement. His repeated failures of the tests led to him being on anti-depressants. He did not have enough work and did not have the opportunities which would come if he was able to market for himself e.g. having his number on the car and setting his own rate. He felt unable to raise his concerns because he had heard stories of how Mr Benson reacted to those who tried to make the franchise their own business. He felt trapped and on one occasion broke down in tears in front of the other trainees on a training day.

Mr Chapman called Mr Benson to tell him that he was suicidal, on antidepressants and he wanted to get out of his contract. In the course of a few conversations, Mr Benson said that this would cost £81,000, but he offered a sum of £40,000 to be “generous”. Mr Chapman did come back to him saying that he could not afford this with a young family and a mortgage. He said that he would just carry on: he felt that he did not have a choice. Mr Chapman felt that Mr Benson did not care.

Mr Chapman said that he came to a state of feeling trapped and being in despair. He felt so stressed by everything at JBL. One on occasion, he broke down in front of all the other trainees. He described graphically how he had “jumped out of the fire” at his previous employer into “a pit of hell at Bensons.” (witness statement at para. 22)

The additional allegations on the part of Ms Newell are as follows:

The context of the first additional allegation is the evidence of Ms Newell, namely that she was rushed into signing the agreement by Mr Beck, thinking that she could read it at home. By that time, it was too late. She then realised that it would be a long and difficult process to qualify which would be added to the term of her franchise agreement. In the event it was a period of 21 months from signing the franchise agreement to getting her ADI licence. The consequence was that she signed 3 franchise agreements because of being unable to afford the franchise fees in the first and second agreements.

She says that she signed the third agreement because she was told to do so by Mr Benson and that she knew that she would be taken to court if she did not. He often spoke about taking houses and bankrupting people. On one occasion, he told her and her father, her guarantor, that he would see us in court.

The consequence is that on 26 November 2019. Ms Newell signed a 13 year agreement. She felt scared. What has now happened is that the counterclaim in her case is more or less than a sum of £300,000. Whilst quantum is for a later stage, this extraordinary consequence of a vulnerable person entering into these contracts and ending up with a contract for a period that is inexplicable results from the first of the above allegations.

The Defence is that Ms Newell entered into an agreement for a minimum term of 13 years on 15 May 2017 in circumstances which were “entirely her choice”. It is also said that there was a minimum term previously of 10 years and so the extension in the third agreement was relatively small. The closing submissions of JBL are that there cannot be a breach of contract in that the pre-contractual conduct cannot constitute a breach or a repudiatory breach of an agreement justifying its discharge. If the submission is correct, then the consequence might be that the breach of contract was of the prior agreements which were being terminated. In fact, this has no practical consequence.

The circumstances in which Ms Newell had got herself into this situation by the second agreement and adopted again by the third agreement speak about a level of power enjoyed by JBL over Ms Newell. It speaks volumes about the nature of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. It was not “entirely her choice.” There was an inequality of bargaining power. She became subjected to a regime in a contract which was never going to work and in which her interests were relegated to those of JBL. She felt trapped by the extended contracts. She was still on anti-depressants because of her experience at JBL.

Even assuming that this was not a breach of contract, but a part of the business model, and even if long contracts were something contemplated by the terms of the agreements, they provide a context. It is a context in which the many alleged breaches in this case between Ms Newell and JBL and between the Claimants generally and JBL are to be judged.

Ms Newell referred to numerous incidents of intimidatory conduct. She said (para. 21 of her witness statement) that when she failed her standards check, Mr Benson posted this on Facebook. She felt mocked in front of the other instructors. She said that she could no longer be a driving instructor because it affected her mental health.

The second allegation about Mr Court was not proved because it did not form a part of the evidence of Ms Newell. That said, I accept the evidence of Mr Dean about a homophobic remark of Mr Court and homophobia more generally, as set out in the section where I consider the evidence of Mr Court.

There is an application on behalf of the Claimants to amend the Particulars of Claim as regards Ms Newell. I accept that it is a late amendment, but I do not accept that it is a case of a party “mucking around” the other side. In part, it is to correct the error in her evidence about the extension to 10 years occurring in May 2017 in the second agreement and in the third agreement. There is a further particular about the place where homophobic remarks were said to have taken place. The only new matter was an allegation about the failure to have a trainer to assist in requalification.

I am not prepared to allow the last allegation about the failure to have a trainer because there has been insufficient evidence to prove that Ms Newell asked for a new trainer, her trainer up to that point having been Ms Summers. If, in fact, the amendment should have been allowed, I should have found that the allegation was not proved for the same reason. Save for that amendment, the other amendments are allowed.

The only additional allegation was having no choice as to the model or colour of the car in which he gave lessons. His evidence was that he wished to have a bigger vehicle because of his back and scoliosis around the shoulders. He had no cooperation and no help. When he sought assistance from JBL staff, he received a letter from Mr Benson saying that he was abusing staff. The complaint was that his circumstances were not being taken into account, and that the requirement to have uniformity of colour and model was treating the franchisees as employees.

JBL denies that a complaint was made about the model and colour of car. There is a letter in the papers from Mr Benson dated 22 January 2020 which does not evidence the complaint, and there is no other document evidencing the same. That letter censured him for “foul language” of the kind which franchisees had complained of coming from Mr Benson.

I found that Mr Dzierzanowski’s evidence lacked clarity and may have been affected by how palpable his feelings of mistreatment were. He gave very few dates, and did not come over as having a clear recollection. Having regard to the absence of documentary record and my assessment of Mr Dzierzanowski’s evidence, I have not found the specific allegation proved.

That said, much of his evidence resonated with other evidence in this case. He gave evidence of signing the first agreement and of not understanding the duration of the agreement that the minimum period was additional to the training period. His second contract was because he could not afford to make the payments under his first contract. He gave evidence about how controlling Mr Benson was with students, in particular how the roof cone broke and he received a call telling him off about driving without a roof cone. He was not allowed to have his phone number on his car. He was upset about the remarks about the Chinese instructor who was a friend. He felt that he was being deliberately delayed from taking the test for the next stage of his qualification. After being told that he was not ready, he passed with the highest score bracket.

He was also upset about conversations about Poland and its culture, and particularly being told a Polish swear word by Mr Benson, which he did not appreciate. Mr Benson denied that he knew the word. There was a remark about Polish people coming and taking jobs which he found particularly disrespectful. Although he found this insulting to Poland and Polish people, he did recognise that a part of the publicity of JBL was that they taught in Polish and he was encouraged to speak in Polish. Whilst everything depends on context, It is possible that there was a reference to the word, but I am not satisfied that its mention was a breach of contract. This incident says more about the general concerns about racist, sexist and homophobic conduct amounting to breaches of contract (as found below), rather than about the particular discussion, if there was one, about a Polish word.

Mr Dzierzanowski was upset about the initial failure to reduce fees due to the onset of COVID. Thereafter, he said that the decision to extend the contract by the number of COVID lockdown weeks was made by Mr Benson and without his consent. In the end, he terminated because of the way in which he had been treated. He said that the majority of people had not had a good relationship with Mr Benson.

The particular allegations made by Ms George are as follows:

Ms George knew the case well. She gave her evidence well. She was not intimidated by any of the questions. In respect of the first allegation, Ms George’s evidence in respect of the first allegation is that she wanted to advertise in a local magazine but went to 15,000 homes in South Woodham, but Wendy Smith said that she could not do that because all advertising was to be controlled by the office. JBL says that this is not proved by documentary evidence, and Wendy Smith had no recollection. It was also said that it was not prevented by the agreement. I am satisfied that there was a request and it was prohibited by Wendy Smith. It was said that the experience was that it did not work, but the system of JBL would have been that any such advertising would not have been personalised to Ms George, and so she would not necessarily have had any referrals. I am satisfied that it was a breach of contract in that she was prevented from doing something which, even on JBL’s case, she was able to do. This was all part of controlling behaviour.

In her evidence, Ms George said that she felt pressurised to sign the first contract. Mr Beck refused to allow her to take away the agreement from the premises and did not explain the contract to her, which felt like a hard sell. She then signed a second agreement at a time when she was having issues with her back and other health issues. She then received a letter from Mr Benson saying that she should have got sickness and accident insurance. He repeated that at a meeting and told her that she would still be liable for the franchise fees under the first agreement. She signed the second contract feeling that she had no alternative other than to sign the second contract because she could not afford the weekly payments. This is her evidence in respect of the second allegation.

There is no issue that there was a reference to health insurance. It is an answer that there was a contractual requirement about insurance. Whilst no breach is proven, she was in a predicament from the nature of the system of JBL which involved ending up in an unsuitable contract which she did not understand when she entered into the agreement and where she was left with no alternative other than to enter into another and longer second agreement. There is no indication of sympathy to her predicament, although the second allegation does not give rise to a specific breach of contract.

In respect of the third allegation, Ms George signed a third contract because Mr Beck told her that if she got her own vehicle, she would save a considerable amount on franchise fees each week. In fact, it turned out that it cost her far more under the third contract. She said that they had lied to her, but no separate claim is made for misrepresentation respect to the third contract. The answer which is provided is that this would have been a complaint about pre-contract behaviour. Further, it is said that the additional fees were because of the costs of hiring a car. Here too, an additional breach of contract is not proven, but Ms George was locked into a contractual relationship within which the other allegations of breach of contract have to be assessed.

She said that Mr Benson controlled the franchisees: she could not have the car she wanted; she could not wear the clothes she wanted she could not advertise where she wanted to do; and she always operated outside her area which was costly. They had to deliver leaflets that had office numbers and which were miles outside her area. The bus days involved travelling for about an hour. She referred to Mr Benson's behaviour as being aggressive and swearing, intimidating and unapproachable (para. 19 of her witness statement). She tried to avoid meeting Mr Benson face-to-face because she was scared of him.

The sole additional allegation in respect of Mr Maples is that he was required to sign a new franchise agreement with extended terms having not qualified as a driving instructor after Mr Benson was informed about his divorce and his bankruptcy.

The evidence of Mr Maples is that he entered into his first agreement in a very informal way and without legal representation. When he had still not qualified, he was in difficulty about paying his franchise fees whereupon it was suggested that he signed a new contract which was for a much longer term than his first contract. He signed that contract because he believed he had no option in order to keep his weekly fees under control.

JBL's answer to this is that, if anything, this was a pre-contractual representation and therefore not giving rise to a breach of contract. In any event Mr Maples entered into the agreement because he needed to qualify and he was given the breathing space required. It was also said in the defence that JBL did not know about his divorce and bankruptcy until a later stage in early 2020. Whilst no allegation of specific breach is proven, this is another instance of a person having entered into an agreement without adequate opportunity to consider it and then being locked into a situation where there was no alternative other than to sign an agreement for a longer period of time. Whilst no breach of contract specific to Mr Maples has been proved, these are the circumstances against which the other allegations of breach of contract have to be assessed.

The additional allegations are as follows:

As regards the first allegation, on the basis of the witness statement of Ms Newman, this does not appear to have been by reference to the extension of a franchise agreement but in the context of a meeting about an inability to pay. The witness statement does refer to correspondence in January 2018 when Ms Newman wanted a way out and “to save my very good friend and guarantor from losing her house because I cannot pay the current amount of weekly fee payable”, Mr Benson responded on 22 January 2018. He offered to extend the agreement by an additional 3 years (so that it would continue until April 2026). She was given 7 days to agree, failing which proceedings would be likely to follow against her as first defendant and her guarantor as second defendant. A judgment would follow and if not paid, a charging order would be applied for against the guarantor’s home and then there would be an order for sale. The new agreement followed. This was not the same incident as pleaded in the Particulars of Claim, but it was no difference in substance from the alleged breach of contract This was the business method of JBL and this was how the extension was procured. Mr Benson said that the letter was not a threat of the consequences of not having a longer agreement, but it was an offer which Ms Newman could accept or refuse.

As regards the second allegation, in a recorded interview, there is a reference to life insurance but not having the intimidatory context contained in the pleaded allegation. I do accept that Ms Newman did tell Mr Benson about her physical and mental health difficulties and about being upset about everybody being put at risk, and how she could not provide for her family or pay the rent because of the franchise fees. It is possible that, in that context, there was a reference to life insurance. She said at para. 21 of her witness statement how she felt suicidal and that Mr Benson turned off his recording machine and said that “you’ve got life insurance, haven’t you?” I accept that there may have been an inappropriate reference to life insurance and that Mr Benson was probably insensitive to Ms Newman’s mental health difficulties. However, I am not so satisfied by the evidence that I am able to find the second allegation proven on the balance of probabilities or that the machine was turned off. It should be added that there was an allegation that there had been many more recorded interviews which had not been produced on disclosure. The answer given was that no interviews had been withheld, and sometimes interviews must have been recorded over. Whilst this shows a chaotic approach to preservation of documents, I do not find proved that this was a deliberate attempt at concealment. I bear in mind the instances of preserved recordings which evidence the Claimants’ case about aggressive and intimidatory conduct.

In the course of the interview close to the time when Ms Newman says that Mr Benson switched off the recording, the interview contains the following passages:

“JN: because they've had a bad experience with Benson-

JB[Interrupting] They haven't had a bad experience, they've fallen into arrears, they've put two fingers up at me, they've ended up in court, some of them have lost their houses, that's how it works, they enter the agreement with me, they don't honour the agreement.

“JB:…this is getting ridiculous. So can we just calm down a little bit? If we are going to move forward, let's do it nicely. Because the nasty way is just to say, let's finish the meeting now and I'll give the matter to the solicitor. Now do you honestly think I want to do that? I'm looking you straight in the eyes now.

JN: No, I don't want to do that either.

JB: Well, it's not up to you, it's up to me.”

Mr Benson's evidence is that Ms Newman was forthright in that conversation. That short extract contains intimidatory language of the kind attributed to Mr Benson, that is to say threatening the use of a solicitor which in context meant legal action and saying that it was up to him and not her when she said that she did not want legal proceedings.

Ms Newman in her oral evidence referred to a continued barrage of nastiness that Mr Benson would sue her if she did not pay. She felt trapped. There was no way out once the agreement had been signed. It was a dictatorship. There was control. She had to work to pay the fees. There was full control over work strategy, over not being able to advertise for herself on the car, everything having to go through the office.

As regards the third allegation, I am satisfied that this comment was made at least in respect of one pupil who may have been of Indian heritage. It is a lame answer of JBL to distinguish between whether the comment was made of all pupils of Indian heritage or only one. Either way, it was an unpleasant and denigrating remark which could fairly be construed as showing a dislike to people of Indian heritage. That was consistent with Mr Benson's other racist and sexist remarks.

As regards the fourth allegation, JBL says that the vehicle was supplied was capable of use and is apparently still being used. There is not sufficient evidence before the Court to prove this allegation.

Ms Newman said as regards her first agreement that she asked if she could have the document seen by a legal person but was told that that was not possible and that she had to sign it if she wants to continue training and her guarantor need to needed to sign it as well. The information about how long the agreement was to be was not made clear to her.

She gave evidence about signing a second and a third agreement eventually extending her period to around ten years in circumstances where she fell behind with payments needed to lower her fees. At the same time there was no offer of extra advertising or help. She felt that everything in the business was dictated to her by Mr Benson, not using her own phone number for advertising, not having her contact number on her car and being dictated to as to how much she could charge. There were numerous rules with sanctions if there was not compliance.

Ms Newman said that she did not have a problem with the terms of the agreement but with everything which went with it and being dictated to. She said that it all sounds great on paper but the net tightens on you. She felt under the cosh all the time. Sitting in a chair in Mr Benson’s office at a lower level to him felt like being in a dungeon. She said that she could see a cheque behind him on the wall and he told her that this was from a court case and this is what happens to people who do not pay. He told her a few times that other instructors were sued. He was saying to herself and her partner and guarantor that that was how he made his money suing and taking people's houses. She said in re- examination that Mr Benson can portray himself as a funny man, but when asking for help, he does not give help. It is difficult to explain unless one has seen his looks. She terminated because of him and his behaviour.

Ms Newman said that she left because of Mr Benson's behaviour. She could not take any more threats she referred to his behaviour just before lockdown. After COVID, she could not take anymore.

Although I do not accept every detail of her evidence and find that she may have been mistaken in details, I do accept the general thrust of her evidence and of her account of her own feelings caused by Mr Benson’s conduct.

Since Mr Tanfield did not have a home of his own, he had to provide a guarantor. A guarantee was provided by his father. His father died on 18 March 2020. He described how difficult it was for him in the period before his father’s death. When the death occurred, he needed to take the next week off in order to grieve and to help his mother. On 20 March 2020, he informed Mr Benson by email of the situation. He asked to be able to take a second week of holiday (meaning a franchise fee free week) for this: he had just taken a week of holiday for an operation which he had just had. Mr Benson replied within just over an hour, saying that he could not see that that would be a problem. He then wrote: “I’m sorry to hear about your dad however, your dad was/is your guarantor is he not?” Mr Tanfield did not respond, saying that following that response, he could no longer bear to have anything to do with him. He said that he found this to be heartbreaking that someone would put their business before the wellbeing of a franchisee or any human being. He said, “to me it was just beyond words really, appalling.” This was heartfelt and genuine evidence, and I have no hesitation in accepting how devastated he was about the way in which he felt that he had been treated.

This was then followed by a letter from the solicitors for JBL on 27 March 2020 at a time when there had not been any breach of contract expressing condolences and saying that until a replacement guarantee was provided, there could not be a distribution of the estate. At that time, the funeral had not yet taken place. Evidently stricken by grief as well as angry and disgusted by the correspondence, Mr Tanfield did not respond to these letters and to follow up correspondence to his mother on 8 and 16 May 2020 and on 8 June 2020. In oral evidence, the degree of upset caused to Mr Tanfield by the correspondence was palpable.

It is not an answer to say simply that there is room for disagreement about the sensitivity of the letters. Ultimately this is about Mr Benson and JBL. The sympathy was contradicted by Mr Benson’s communication when Mr Tanfield was bereft and vulnerable, and it was entirely foreseeable that these communications at that time would have caused such distress. It is said that Mr Benson had fiduciary and statutory duties to the Company. These did not require conduct of the kind which caused Mr Tanfield so much distress. It may be noted that the duties under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 include a duty to have regard among other things to the interests of the company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others and maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct. The duties to a company did not override the need for decency and space at least for a short period of time following the death and in circumstances where there was no reason to believe that there would be an immediate distribution of the estate.

Ms Thornton made the following further allegations, namely:

As regards the first of the above allegations, Ms Thornton also gave evidence of her failing her Part 2 exam and of Mr Benson’s intimidating behaviour thereafter, returning to Harlow together without his saying a word and slamming the door which left her upset. It is possible that this might have been to do with the failure of the exam and so I make no finding arising out of this incident. However, the related evidence about Mr Benson driving her and Ms Rusted to tears in one-to-one tuition is proved.

As regards the second of the allegations, the ankle injury started in August and may have gone on until the end of September or into October. The solicitor’s letters were on 27 November 2017 and in December 2017. This part of the case is not made out. It may be that she has been affected by the tenor of the correspondence addressed to her and her mother Mrs Clarke, the guarantor, in December 2017 in which she was threatened with termination of the contracts and incurring a charge of £60,000 for losses of franchise fees going forward under the franchise agreement and for costs of £20,000.

She felt that getting her into the contract had been so that she would fail and he could take her mother’s home through his solicitors. That is a very serious allegation, and I do not accept that Mr Benson wished her to fail from the start. Having heard the entirety of the evidence, the picture is different. The business model did involve signing up people in circumstances where it was foreseeable that they would fail as franchisees. So long as there was a property against which to enforce whether of the franchisee or the guarantor, it was a win-win. It might be that the franchisee would succeed in which case there was a regular income stream. If the franchisee did not succeed, there would be the possibility of increasing the term for reduced fees in which case JBL would have the franchisee for longer, but then the franchise fees payable on default by way of damages would be greater. If the franchisee still did not succeed, then enforcement would be brought against the franchisee and the guarantor with the possibility of taking a property about which Mr Benson bragged to other franchisees as above.

The context of how Ms Thornton became a franchisee was as follows. She gave evidence of the hard sell which led to her signing a franchise agreement together with a guarantor. Mr Benson had said that other people were interviewing for two positions. Ms Thornton did not wish to lose the opportunity. The length of the contract was not made clear, namely that the fixed period did not start until she became an Approved Driving Instructor.

As for the end, she said that the contract just seemed to go on for ever. She was never given an end date. She could not believe it when she was told that the contracts were being extended still further. She could not afford the ever increasing franchise fees which went up every year by £18 per week plus VAT, whilst the rates paid by pupils remained the same. She said that she felt that she had no choice but to quit. She said that Mr Benson completely broke her.

As regards the third of her allegations, this is referred to in more detail elsewhere in this judgment. Contrary to JBL’s submissions, the posting of 14 December 2020 went beyond vigorous enforcement, but was abusive and aggressive “deservingly and horrible and life changing”. It was not simply a reaction to a need to show that the terminations were treated as a breach of contract, but it was consistent with the intimidatory conduct of Mr Benson referred to on so many occasions in this case, and is a matter of which Ms Thornton was able to complain as a continuing franchisee at that stage.

The three additional allegations in respect of Ms Freeman comprise the following:

Ms Freeman, and also her father Mr Freeman, her guarantor, gave evidence about how she was not allowed to take her first contract home and thereafter regretted having signed it. She and her father stated that she was assured at the time of signing the agreement that there was a fourteen day cooling off period, but when she returned to the office thereafter to exercise that right, she was told that there was no cooling off period. She referred to how she had to pay franchise payments during 8 weeks of being off after breaking an ankle and for 2.5 weeks after some signage on her car had rubbed off. She received no referral fee when she had to hand over her pupils to others. As noted above, she gave evidence about not being given information about her end date until after three requests in writing and a telephone call.

I found most of Ms Freeman’s evidence to be plausible. I accept the general thrust of her evidence, and I accept her specific evidence in respect of the first and second allegations. As regards the alleged misrepresentation at the time of her signing the first agreement, I accept that there was pressure to sign the agreement at the office, but I make no findings on the alleged misrepresentation that there was a cooling off period, There is no reason why this was not specifically pleaded, particularly where it is a cause of action in itself and potentially of fraud.