QB-2022-002971 - [2025] EWHC 2445 (KB)

The pleaded allegations are that the Defendant:

The Defendant accepts that the First Aid Policy required the Defendant to contact parents as soon as possible in the event of an accident or injury to a pupil. The wording of the policy is set out at [61] above.

The Defendant accepts that “a child’s parents ought to be made aware in the event of a child using powerful illicit substances over the course of an entire weekend if that was the case and the school had knowledge of the same”. The school does not accept that it was in possession of such information.

Mr Samson’s evidence was that the school had no firm evidence that the vape had contained mephedrone or any “illicit” or prohibited drug. He noted that the urine test taken by the school did not identify any drug use. However, the Defendant has not adduced any evidence as to whether the urine test was intended to be capable, or was in fact capable, of testing for drug use, nor, if so, which particular drugs it was capable of identifying and after what period of time following use. His evidence was that he did not appreciate, at the time, that “magic” was a name used for mephedrone, nor, therefore, that it was a ‘class B’ drug. He said that if it is correct that the Claimant had taken mephedrone and had he appreciated this at the time then he would have acted differently, including by engaging a more rapid response and notifying the Claimant’s parents.

The following facts are evident from the contemporaneous documentary evidence and, insofar as any part of the relevant factual background was in issue, I make the following findings:

At paragraph 39 of its Defence the Defendant accepted “on the balance of probabilities the Claimant probably did take an illicit substance”. In my judgment, on the balance of probabilities, the drug which the Claimant took over the weekend of 27-29 September 2019 and which she understood to be called “magic”, was likely to have been mephedrone, or a similar substance. In any event, whether or not the drug taken by the Claimant was mephedrone, I accept, on the evidence before me, that the Claimant was displaying “paranoid and manic symptoms” on Monday 30 September 2019, the day after she had last taken the drug, and that these symptoms were obvious to the school nurse and correctly identified by the nurse as likely to have been caused by the use of the drug the previous day.

The symptoms reported by the Claimant to the school nurse and recorded in the school medical records can properly be described as more than minor; they were reports of visual disturbance, paranoid and manic symptoms. In their joint report the expert psychiatrists describe the taking of the “magic” over the weekend as precipitating “an episode with psychotic and manic symptoms” and this is accepted by the Defendant. That summary fairly describes, in my judgment, the symptoms noted and reported by the school nurse.

At one stage, there was a suggestion on the part of the Defendant that because the Claimant was “Gillick competent”, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, the school was therefore unable to inform the Claimant’s parents that she was taken to hospital because she presented with “paranoid and manic symptoms” in connection with her admission of the use of a drug called “magic”. Mr Edwards, rightly, did not pursue that contention and conceded that the school was not prevented, by reason of any issue of Gillick competence, from informing the Claimant’s parents of the relevant facts.

In my judgment, it is clear that the symptoms noted by the school nurse, summarised at [92] above, amount to a personal injury of a type which should have been reported to the Claimant’s parents as soon as possible under the school’s First Aid Policy ([61] above).

The duty of care owed by the Defendant school to the Claimant encompassed a duty to protect the Claimant who, as a child, was inherently vulnerable and highly dependent on the observance of proper standards of care by the school. It is also relevant to the nature and scope of that duty, in my judgment, that the Claimant was boarding at the school and so the school had a particularly high degree of control over her life; see, for example, the description of the degree of control exercised by a typical day school over a student in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association, at [25(1)], set out at [77] above. There was little or no opportunity for the Claimant’s parents, or any other adult outside of the School, to identify the relevant facts so as to be able to take appropriate action, including identifying that the Claimant had admitted taking an illicit drug, to note that she was exhibiting “paranoid and manic symptoms”, to make any enquiry as to the cause of any such symptoms, to assess any on-going symptoms, and to ensure that appropriate steps were taken to provide medical assistance to address any on-going symptoms.

Furthermore, in relation to the nature and scope of the duty of care and to the standard of care, it is necessary to take into account the School’s knowledge of the matters set out in Rafael Oteo Seijas’s psychiatric report dated 16 July 2019, including the recommendations relating to the need for particular care and protection of the Claimant and the “great instability in [her] prognosis”. The particular vulnerabilities of the Claimant were well known to the school and the school was under a correspondingly high duty to take care of the Claimant given its knowledge of her vulnerabilities, which included reporting incidents of this nature to her parents accurately and without undue delay. Apart from anything else, the Claimant’s parents needed to be informed of the true facts in order to be able to make a properly informed decision, in the interests of the Claimant, as to what, if any, steps should be taken to mitigate the risks of any continued drug use. Possible steps may have included withdrawing the Claimant from the school without delay and bringing her back to live at home with her parents in Spain.

In my judgment, in all the circumstances, the duty of care owed by the Defendant school to the Claimant encompassed, on the facts of this case, a duty to inform the Claimant’s parents timeously of the relevant facts, including that: (a) the Claimant had presented to the school nurses with “paranoid and manic symptoms” on Monday 30 September; (b) this was in connection with her admission to the nurses that she had taken “some drugs” the previous day; and (c) she was taken to hospital because of her “paranoid and manic symptoms”. I would add that when, the following day (Tuesday 1 October), another student informed the school that the drug taken by the Claimant was called “magic” (see [46] above) and the Claimant reported ongoing symptoms (including déjà vue) to the school nurses (see [47] above), the school should reported these additional facts to her parents.

I am also satisfied, on the evidence, that the Defendant school acted in breach of the duty of care which it owed to the Claimant by failing to provide adequate and accurate information to the Claimant’s parents:

The fact that the school did not provide accurate information to the Claimant’s parents about the incident and about the adverse effects suffered by the Claimant meant that the Claimant’s parents were not in a position: (a) to make any enquiries concerning the potential harm which might have been caused to the Claimant by any use of drugs; (b) to take action to ensure that the Claimant’s health was closely monitored; and (c) to decide whether the Claimant should be removed from the school in order to mitigate the risk of further exposure to drugs and/or to ensure adequate monitoring of her health and/or to ensure the availability of appropriate treatment.

It may be the case that the school formed the view that the adverse effects of the admitted use of drugs would be short term and of no real consequence. However, that does not justify the failure to provide the Claimant’s parents with adequate and accurate information concerning the true position. It is also difficult to reconcile with the fact that on Tuesday 1 October, some 48 hours after taking the drugs, the Claimant was still experience adverse symptoms ([47] above).

In summary, I am satisfied that the school fell below the requisite standard of care, and was negligent, in failing to provide the information identified in paragraph [98] above to the Claimant’s parents without delay.

In circumstances in which the Defendant has reached an agreement with the Claimant in respect of all issues of causation and quantum, subject only to determination of the issue of breach of duty, it is not necessary or appropriate for me to make any findings on causation. Accordingly, the Claimant’s claim in negligence in respect of this first issue succeeds and the Defendant is liable to pay her the agreed damages.