HT-2022-000254 - [2025] EWHC 105 (TCC)

I deal first with some of the respondents’ more general arguments about the timing and strength of the application.

Mr Levenstein argues on behalf of the respondents that if the applicants had the courage of their convictions that the properties were not caught by the freezing injunction, they would have proceeded to sell the properties. He submits that the fact that they have not is a strong indicator that they appreciate a real risk that the properties are caught. This is in the same vein as the contention that the applicants’ tenuous position is evidenced by the application to vary the injunction.

I do not consider the making of the application a strong indicator of a real risk or possibility that the properties are within the terms of the freezing order. The respondents’ solicitors have asserted in correspondence that they may be and that their sale may be a contempt of court. Faced with such assertions, the applicants cannot be criticised for seeking the sanction of the court for their actions and doing so displays no weakness in their convictions.

Further the inference sought to be drawn from the application to vary the injunction – namely that it displays the tenuous nature of the applicants’ case - seems to me to misunderstand the applicants’ position. Their primary case is that the properties are not within the freezing injunction. Their alternative case is that the Charge takes priority so that, even if the properties are or may be within the terms of the freezing injunction, it makes no difference to the respondents whether the properties are sold or not. It is in those circumstances that a variation to the injunction would be appropriate. It could be varied to make it clear that the properties are not to be treated as subject to the injunction. That alternative case does not weaken the primary case.

The submission that the application is premature also does not offer a good reason not to deal with the application on its merits. In essence, the respondents’ argument is that the applicants’ ought to have made further inquiries to seek to ascertain the true position in terms of Click St Andrews’ interests before making the application. It is the case that in these proceedings for injunctive relief, Click St Andrews has failed to comply with the court’s orders for disclosure and it is improbable that the applicants would have fared better. The respondents ought not to be prejudiced by that and it is right that I should take account, in assessing the evidence, of the fact that the respondents may be hampered in establishing any proprietary interests of Click St Andrews by that company’s own failures. However, as I shall come to, the only evidence is of a small payment from Click St Andrews’ funds to Mews Ltd. and, even if that could lead to the establishment of some beneficial interest, it would have no relevance to the argument as to priority of the Charge.

The other side of the coin is that Mr Creasey, on behalf of the respondents, has made clear that they do not stand in the way of the sale of the properties but cannot consent to what may be a breach of the freezing injunction.