HT-2024-000328 - [2025] EWHC 2926 (TCC)

Secondly, I consider the reasonableness of the Claimant’s delay. The challenge under section 68 of the Act was sought to be brought on the very last day of the statutory period, namely on 24 September 2024. I do not consider that the Claimants have anything to answer for in terms of the initial delay during which the fees were not paid until the Award was handed down, simply because they do not rely upon that as giving rise to a ground for extending time. However, by 13 September 2024, having received the Award some ten days earlier, the Claimant had consulted solicitors and received legal advice on the potential grounds of challenge, sufficient to notify both the Arbitrator and the Defendants of the Claimant’s complaints which now form the basis of the challenge sought to be made.

There was no obligation on the Arbitrator to respond with speed to the Claimant in circumstances where the Claimant had chosen to delay collecting the Award. In those circumstances, the Claimant did not act reasonably in delaying until the very last moment to try and start the Arbitration Claim. Although I accept that the delay was not intentional, it was a risk that the Claimant chose to take. The failed attempts to file the Claim Form during the week prior to 8 October stemmed from the Claimants’ failure to file it under the correct category and pay the correct fee.

Therefore, although I am satisfied that there was no deliberate decision to delay making the claim, the Claimant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay of 14 days following expiry of the statutory period for issuing a challenge to the Award.