![HT-2023-000306 - [2025] EWHC 660 (TCC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_yJUntHA.png){kind=logo}
Introduction
Introduction
This my second Judgment in this case. It is consequential upon the first Judgement (“the First Judgment”), handed down on 24th February 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing on 6th March 2025 I refused the application the subject of the hearing and awarded the costs of the application on the indemnity basis against Mr Goldkorn and Kazu 1 with reasons to follow. This Judgment contains my reasons.
In this Judgment, I adopt the same nomenclature as in the First Judgment.
The draft First Judgement was made available to Counsel for Mr Goldkorn and MPA under cover of an email from the Court dated 18 February 2025, timed at 13:03.
On 20 February 2025, Junior Counsel for the Claimant emailed Junior Counsel for MPA saying:
“At present, my Instructing Solicitors are in the process of being instructed by the Second Defendant, with a view to the Second Defendant issuing an application to be substituted as Claimant in these proceedings pursuant to CPR 19.6(3)(b). That application cannot be issued before the Judgment is formally handed down and made public, because (i) until that point there is no Order determining that the assignment is ineffective and that the Vandepitte procedure cannot be used by the Claimant; and (ii) the application will need to refer to the outcome of the Judgment, which remains embargoed pending formal hand down.”
By a document signed by the Liquidator of Kazu 1, Ian Yerrill on 20 February 2025, he consented on behalf of Kazu 1 to it being substituted as Claimant in this case.
The First Judgment was handed down on 24 February 2025. On the same date, Mr Goldkorn’s solicitors (the Stokoe Partnership) served a notice of change of legal representative to the effect that they had been instructed to act on behalf of Kazu 1. On that date also, the Stokoe Partnership issued an application seeking an Order pursuant to CPR 19.6.3(b) that Kazu 1 be substituted as the Claimant in these Proceedings.
On 5 March 2025, Mr Yerrill served a witness statement in which he said at paragraph 1 that after agreeing to the terms of the Deed of Assignment and the subsequent Declaration of Trust ... “I thereafter played no part whatsoever in the proceedings and was not even aware that a trial of the preliminary issues had been ordered and was due to take place in February this year.”
At paragraph 4 of that witness statement, Mr Yerrill said “In those circumstances, following the hearing, I was contacted by Mr Goldkorn and decided that I was prepared to discuss with Mr Goldkorn the possibility of Kazu 1 continuing the MPA Claim in place of Mr Goldkorn ...”.
PD 40E provides at paragraph 2.4:
neither the draft judgment nor its substance is disclosed to any other person or used in the public domain; and
no action is taken (other than internally) in response to the draft judgment, before the judgment is handed down. ...”
Paragraph 2.8 of PD 40E provides:
“Any breach of the obligations or restrictions under paragraph 2.4 or failure to take all reasonable steps under paragraph 2.6 may be treated as contempt of court.”
Having considered that chronology, I was concerned that there may have been a breach of paragraphs 2.4(a) and/or paragraph 2.4(b) of PD 40E. At the outset of the hearing on 6 March 2025, I raised my concern with Mr Brisby KC. Having taken instructions on two occasions, he informed me that no breach had occurred. I accepted that assurance.