HT-2019-CDF-000012 - [2025] EWHC 1315 (TCC)

CPR rule 24.3 provides, so far as relevant to this application:

“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant … on the whole of a claim or on an issue if –

(a)

it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim … or issue; and

(b)

there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

Many cases have explained the correct approach to applications for summary judgment. The classic summary of the principles is that of Lewison J in EasyAir Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15], approved by the Court of Appeal in Global Asset Capital Inc v Aabar Block SARL [2017] EWCA Civ 37, [2017] 4 WLR 163. Other significant summaries or discussions of the relevant principles include: ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]–[10] (Potter LJ);; Elite Property Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2019] EWCA Civ 204 at [41]-[42] (Asplin LJ, dealing with the similar test for permitting amendment of a statement of case); Skatteforvaltningen v Solo Capital Partners LLP [2020] EWHC 1624 (Comm) at [3]-[4] (Andrew Baker J); Foglia v The Family Officer Ltd [2021] EWHC 650 (Comm) at [11]-[18] (Cockerill J); Lex Foundation v Citibank NA [2022] EWHC 1649 (Comm) at [33]-[39].

I have regard to what was said in these cases but do not need to set out the relevant dicta here. The following summary will suffice. Summary judgment will be given against a claimant on a claim or issue only if the court is satisfied that the claim or issue has no real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success; a claim or issue that is merely arguable but carries no degree of conviction will not have a real prospect of success. The court will not conduct a mini-trial and, where necessary, will bear in mind that full disclosure has not yet taken place and that there might be more evidence to come. Accordingly, where there are disputed questions of fact, it will not generally attempt to determine where the probabilities lie. However, the court ought to carry out a critical examination of the available material and is not bound to accept the mere say-so of anybody; where it is clear that a factual case is self-contradictory or inherently incredible or where it is contradicted by the contemporaneous documents, the court, after careful consideration of the evidence that is currently before it and having regard to the nature of such further evidence as might reasonably be expected to be available at trial, is entitled to reject that case even on a summary basis. The court will not be dissuaded from giving judgment by mere Micawberism—the unsubstantiated hope that “something might turn up”. Importantly, where the claim turns on a point of law that can properly be determined on the available evidence, the court is entitled to go ahead and determine it. The complexity of litigation is not itself a reason for refusing summary judgment: the circumstances may be such that determination of the case is impossible without a trial; on the other hand, it might be possible to analyse the case sufficiently at an early stage and thereby avoid the unnecessary time and expense of the continuation of litigation until trial. In all cases, r. 24.2(b) falls to be considered in principle.