Legal Principles
Legal Principles
CPR 25.26 provides:
“(1) A defendant to any claim may apply for security for their costs of the proceedings.
(2) An application for security for costs must be supported by written evidence.
(3) Where the court makes an order for security for costs, it must determine the amount of security, and direct the manner and time within which the security must be given.”
CPR 25.27 then sets out the conditions that are to be satisfied if an order for security for costs is to be made. The Court may make an order for security for costs if:
“(a) it is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is just to make such an order; and
(b) either an enactment permits the court to require security for costs, or one or more of the following conditions apply—
…
(ii) the claimant is a company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside England and Wales) and there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so;”
I was referred by the parties to various principles which are applicable to the court’s determination of whether “there is reason to believe that [a company] will be unable to
pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so”. The following did not appear to be controversial:
The CPR 25.27(b)(ii) gateway, like all of the gateways in CPR 25.27, is not a question for the court’s discretion but raises an issue of fact on which the court needs to be satisfied. It is only once a case has passed through one of the gateways that the court’s discretion comes into play: Infinity Distribution Ltd (In Administration) v The Khan Partnership LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 565, [2021] 1 WLR 4630 per Nugee LJ at [30];
The burden falls on the defendant to show that the condition at CPR 25.27(b)(ii) is made out. It is not incumbent upon a claimant to prove that it has the means to pay: Phaestos Limited and others v Peter Ho and others [2012] EWHC 622 (TCC) per Akenhead J at [71(a)(iii)];
However, the defendant does not have to show on the balance of probabilities that the claimant will be unable to pay costs ordered against it: Jirehouse Capital v Beller [2008] EWCA Civ 908, [2009] 1 WLR 751 per Arden LJ at [26]-[29]. It need only show that “there is reason to believe” that the claimant will be unable to pay. The test is “will not be able to pay” and not “might not be able to pay” – that test is not watered down by the earlier words “reason to believe”: Eagle Ltd v Falcon Ltd [2012] EWHC 2261 (TCC) per Coulson J at [22(b)];
If legitimate concerns about the claimants’ financial position are raised, and if the claimants “choose to provide no or incomplete information in response, that in itself can lead to a court reaching the belief that the Claimants are unable to pay”: Phaestos Limited and others v Peter Ho and others [2012] EWHC 622 (TCC) at [71(a)(iv)];
The focus should be on the claimant’s net rather than gross assets:Pisante v Logothetis [2020] EWHC 3332 (Comm), [2020] Costs LR 1815, per Henshaw J at [53]-[56]. A claimant must therefore identify not only its liquid assets but also its current and long-term liabilities: Kompaktwerk GMBH v Liveperson Netherland [2019] EWHC 1762 (Comm), per David Edwards QC at [35];
Illiquid assets are not a good answer to an application: Wright v Coinbase Global Inc [2023] Costs LR 1403, per Mellor J at [54(ii)];
Whilst questions as to the claimant’s ability to pay must be decided at the time of the application, the court must consider whether there is reason to believe that a future event will occur, i.e. that the claimant will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs following trial. This calls for an assessment of what the claimant may be expected to have available for payment at that time: Thistle Hotels Ltd v Gamma Four Ltd [2004] EWHC 322 (Ch), [2004] 2 BCLC 174 per Sonia Proudman QC at [11] and Longstaff International Ltd v Baker & McKenzie [2004] EWHC 1852 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 2917, at [17]-[18], both citing the decision of Sir Donald Nicholls V-C in In re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 2) [1993] BCLC 532 at 534;
Even if the impecuniosity condition is satisfied, the court’s power to award security for costs is discretionary; the overall question is whether the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is just to make such an order: CPR 25.27(a).
More controversial, as I have already alluded to, is whether the threshold impecuniosity condition is satisfied by evidence of substantial assets held by a wholly owned subsidiary over which the parent company can exercise control so as to procure the speedy realisation of cash in the event of an adverse costs order. I shall return to this question when I deal with the GC Application.
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