[2025] UKUT 075 (AAC)

In this case, as a result of DBS’s mistakes of fact in its decision, we do not as yet have the benefit of DBS’s view as to whether it is necessary and proportionate to bar the appellant in the light of the facts as we have found them to be.

In those circumstances, it seemed to us that there were two options open to us: either:

We consider that the very significant advantage of adopting the latter course is that it avoids delay and multiplicity of proceedings. In this case, the appellant was dismissed by her employer on 14 November 2022 and referred to DBS immediately. It took DBS until 26 September 2023 to issue a Minded to Bar letter and until 16 January 2024 to issue a Final Decision letter. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on 4 April 2024 and 16 October 2024 was the earliest date possible for a hearing. If we remit to DBS, there is a likely to be a delay again until a decision is taken by DBS. If the decision is adverse, the appellant may appeal again. It may take another year before her appeal is heard. In the meantime, the likelihood is that the appellant will continue as she is now, i.e. out of work, in debt and on benefits. While that may be how things have to be if the barring decision is finally confirmed, if it ultimately turns out that the decision to bar was wrong, then the reality is that every week, month and year during which the appellant has been prevented from exercising her civil right to practice her chosen profession will have been highly prejudicial to her.

For these reasons we have issued this decision as a decision on a preliminary issue and made directions for the further conduct of this appeal. To ensure there is no prejudice to either party’s appeal rights from our adopting this course, we extend time for appealing this decision so that time will run from the date on which our final decision in this matter is issued.

We acknowledge that we have taken these case management decisions without inviting the parties’ submissions. That is because we consider that the parties could only fairly be expected to make submissions on the issues of case management having had the opportunity to consider this decision. If, having so considered, either party disagrees with the course that we have adopted in terms of case management, they may apply under rule 5(2) for us to set aside or vary our case management decisions.

Our directions are set out at the start of this decision.

The Upper Tribunal’s Decision on Preliminary Issue in this case was issued on 5 December 2024.

By letter dated 16 December 2024, DBS informed the Upper Tribunal that, by decision dated 12 December 2024, it had decided on review under paragraph 18A of Schedule 3 to the SVGA 2006 to remove the appellant’s name from the children’s and adults barred lists.

In the light of DBS’s decision, I directed that the parties confirm whether they were content for the appeal to be disposed of by consent under rule 39(1).

Both parties have now confirmed that they are so content and I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances for the appeal to be so disposed of.