The First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the decision in JM v SSD
The First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the decision in JM v SSD
The FTT cited paragraphs 134-136 of JM at paragraph 9 of its own decision as well as setting out paragraph 145 (which is in the form of a direction to the remitted tribunal, effectively in identical terms to paragraph 118 of the three-judge panel’s judgment). It therefore cannot seriously be suggested that it misdirected itself as to the law, and Mr Rawlinson did not suggest as much – rather, his submission was that the FTT had erred in the application of the relevant legal tests to the facts. The FTT then sought to apply that template to the circumstances of the present case in the final paragraph 19 of its own decision, which I replicate here for convenience:
Applying the Law
We have largely followed the guidelines helpfully set out in JM vs SoS and quoted at Para 9 above but with the fundamental distinction that this is not only a question of whether service was the predominant cause, but whether service after 6th April 2005 was the predominant cause.
We have first considered whether, without a ‘service cause’ the injury would have occurred at all. We conclude that sun exposure post April 2005 might have led to some form of melanoma, but not for many more years. The first mole was noticed by Mr C in 2013, only 8 years post the start of AFCS service, and there is no evidence at all that such a short latency period (even up to malignancy in 2018) would be causative. This is presumably why the IMEG report concludes at Para 14 that in general, none of these circumstances is likely to be met due to service after 6 April 2005 and so most cases of NMSC and CMM claimed under AFCS will be liable to rejection. However, each case will be considered on its facts. (NMSC stands for non-melanoma skin cancers). Clearly as time goes on, this conclusion will carry less weight as the period between exposure and onset becomes more stretched.
The second question is (applying the test in JM above) whether without the ‘service cause’ the injury would have been less than half as serious. In our view, the basic injurious process started pre 2005. It would be wholly speculative, unsupported by the medical evidence and certainly not meet the standard of proof or the predominancy test for us to conclude that the onset of Mr C’s CMM would have been less than half as serious if he had not had post 2005 sun exposure. In the specific case of CMM it is difficult to envisage what ‘half as serious’ might look like, and the Medical Opinions to which we have referred above do not even discuss such a concept. JM was a case about mental health conditions where it is somewhat easier to tease out the effects of service and non-service factors.
We have also noted the IMEG conclusion that each case should be considered on its facts. Had there been no pre 2005 sun exposure at all (not only in service), and Mr C were very much younger then there might be an argument for a service cause but bearing in mind the medical evidence that UVR is not the only factor. On the evidence in this appeal, this is not such a special case.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal issued on 4 January 2021, following the hearing on 21 December 2020 under file number A
- Introduction
- A very brief outline of the factual background to the appeal
- The Appellant’s AFCS claim
- The Secretary of State’s decision on the Appellant’s AFCS claim
- The Appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
- The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
- The Upper Tribunal appeal
- The AFCS legislative framework
- The role of appellate review in appeals from a specialist first instance jurisdiction
- Ground 1
- The First-tier Tribunal’s approach to making findings on the basis of its own knowledge
- The Appellant’s other main written submissions in the context of Ground 1
- The Appellant’s other main oral submissions in the context of Ground 1
- Ground 3
- The non-fault based nature of the AFCS
- The causation test and JM v Secretary of State for Defence
- Key points from the three-judge panel’s decision in JM v Secretary of State for Defence
- The First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the decision in JM v SSD
- The Appellant’s challenge to the FTT’s approach to the decision in JM v SSD
- Pulling the threads together
- Conclusions
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