[2025] UKUT 288 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2025] UKUT 288 (AAC)

Fecha: 24-Jun-2024

Why I have allowed the appeal

Why I have allowed the appeal

24.

While it is apparent from the Tribunal’s statement of reasons that the Tribunal directed itself to the relevant statutory provisions concerning entitlement to a personal independence payment, it is equally apparent that when considering whether the claimant was entitled to a personal independence payment, it fixated on the claimant’s circumstances as at the deemed date of his claim, ignoring the important principle that a claimant’s circumstances must be considered down to the date of the decision, just as the decision maker for the Secretary of State had done.

25.

In GE v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2017] UKUT 145 (AAC); [2017] AACR 34, Judge Poynter held:

'54. I accept it will sometimes be possible to say that if a claimant does not have a particular right of residence at the date of claim she probably will not have it at the date of decision either. For example, it is extremely unlikely that a claimant who does not retain worker status when she claims ESA will somehow retain it ten days later when the claim is decided.

55.

However, that does not change the general principle that decision-makers can and must take into account changes in a claimant's circumstances between the date of claim and the date of the decision.

56.

That principle is axiomatic and it is therefore difficult to cite direct legislative authority for it. However it is implicit in section 12(8)(b) of the Social Security Act 1998, which prevents the F-tT from considering circumstances that did not obtain at the date of the decision under appeal. It is also inherent in regulation 3(9)(a) of the Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/991) - and the equivalent provisions of the other sets of Decisions and Appeals Regulations - which prevents the Secretary of State from revising a decision under the "any grounds" power conferred by regulation 3(1) on the basis of a "relevant change of circumstances which occurred since the decision had effect". It follows that a relevant change of circumstances which occurred before the decision had effect can be taken into account on an "any grounds" revision. That, in turn, only makes sense if the original decision maker could also have taken that change into account.

57.

The ability to take into account a change in circumstances that occurs between the date of a claim and the date that claim is decided cuts both ways. The claimant who has not retained worker status in the example in [54] above may have married another EU national who does retain that status during the period between claim and decision. If so, he may have acquired a right of residence as a family member from the date of the wedding. Equally, an ESA claimant with a right of residence may get better during that period and return to work, thereby losing entitlement to benefit.

58.

There is no reason in law why the first of those changes of circumstances should be treated differently from the second. In all claims for benefit, whether the claimant satisfies the conditions of entitlement falls to be assessed on a daily, or sometimes weekly, basis from the earliest date covered by the claim until the date on which the claim is decided. If a claimant does not satisfy those conditions when she first claims but does satisfy them from some later date (before the date of decision) then the correct decision is to award benefit from the date on which the conditions were first satisfied. If she did satisfy the conditions at the start of the claim but ceased to do so before the claim is decided, the correct decision is to award benefit up to, but not after, the date of the change. All this is elementary and it applies in right to reside cases as it does in others.'

26.

Additionally, it was held in paragraph 81 of Judge Jacobs' judgement in AM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UC) [2022] UKUT 242 (AAC):

"It is possible for the decision-maker to decide that entitlement begins only after the date of claim but before the date of decision. This does not affect the analysis. The relevant period does not change, but the decision-maker is able to award from a later date in the period. This is a result of the claim subsisting until it is decided. That was decided in R(S) 1/83 at [10] and is assumed by section 8(2)(a) of the 1998 Act.

27.

The second basis on which a personal independence payment can be awarded from a date after the date of claim is the advance award provision in regulation 33 of the Claims and Payments Regulations, which provides:

"(1)

Where, although a person does not satisfy the requirements for entitlement to personal independence payment on the date on which the claim is made, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that unless there is a change of circumstances the person will satisfy those requirements for a period beginning on a day ("the relevant day") not more than 3 months after the date on which the decision on the claim is made, the Secretary of State may award personal independence payment from the relevant day subject to the condition that the person satisfies the requirements for entitlement on the relevant day."

28.

In effect, then, the ‘down-to-the-date-of-decision’ principle allows an adjudicating authority to consider the claimant's entitlement during the period down to when the claim is decided, and then regulation 33 allows it to consider the three months after that.

29.

In the case at hand, the claim was decided on 29 July 2022, when the decision maker in effect disallowed the claim on the ground that the claimant did not satisfy the condition of entitlement in section 77(3) of the 2012 Act (see the First-tier Tribunal bundle at pages 653-4). By virtue of the ‘down-to-the-date-of-decision' principle, the First-tier Tribunal could consider the claimant's entitlement down to 29 July 2022. In doing so, it did not have to consider any issue that was not "clearly apparent from the evidence" (Hooper v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 495 (reported as R(IB) 4/07) at paragraph [28]), but was obliged to consider any issue that was clearly apparent from the evidence (R(IS) 2/08 at paragraph [47]). The First-tier Tribunal accepted the claimant’s evidence that he had returned to Great Britain on 9 April 2022 (see the Upper Tribunal bundle at page 25, paragraph 18).

30.

Clearly, a personal independence payment could not be disallowed in respect of the period from 9 April 2022 onwards merely because the claimant was not "present in Great Britain" (regulation 16(a) of the PIP Regulations). The Secretary of State’s decision to dismiss the claimant’s claim on that basis was clearly in error of law, and the Tribunal’s decision to confirm the SoS Decision was likewise in e. rror of law. The error of law was plainly material because as a result of that decision no assessment was made as to whether the claimant satisfied the other conditions of entitlement to an award of a personal independence payment. That warrants the setting aside of the FtT Decision.