The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
I gave the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, commenting that the FTT may have erred in law as it appears not to have had regard to regulation 33(1) of the Universal Credit etc (Claims and Payments) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/380). This makes provision for advance claims to PIP:
Advance claim for and award of personal independence payment
—(1) Where, although a person does not satisfy the requirements for entitlement to personal independence payment on the date on which the claim is made, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that unless there is a change of circumstances the person will satisfy those requirements for a period beginning on a day (“the relevant day”) not more than 3 months after the date on which the decision on the claim is made, the Secretary of State may award personal independence payment from the relevant day subject to the condition that the person satisfies the requirements for entitlement on the relevant day.
Thus, as Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs explained in AH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2016] UKUT 541 (AAC), regulation 33(1) “allows for the possibility that the claimant may have satisfied only part of the retrospective period when the decision is made” (at paragraph 15). Accordingly, as Judge Farbey QC (as she then was) observed in EB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2017] UKUT 311 (AAC), “under regulation 33, a person may qualify for an advance award by scoring points for the three month period after the date on which the Secretary of State’s decision was made” (paragraph 28).
Ms Uroosa Ali, the Secretary of State’s representative in these proceedings, therefore supports the appeal to the Upper Tribunal and consents to the FTT’s decision being set aside. She sums up her analysis in the following terms:
Throughout the statements of reasons (SoR) there is no evidence to indicate or suggest the FtT have considered or applied regulation 33. The FtT have focused only on the appellant’s work incident date and the date of claim. These dates appear to be the determining factors in their decision. The FtT stated in the SoR, ‘However, it ultimately found the appellant did not meet the qualifying period for PIP, having claimed less than 3 months after his work incident’ (para 34). This clearly indicates the FtT have decided the appellant does not meet the qualifying period however, regulation 33 allows for them to consider an award up to three months in advance. The FtT have failed to provide any reasons that would indicate regulation 33 was considered.
Therefore, I respectfully submit the FtT have erred in law by failing to consider regulation 33. This resulted in the FtT’s decision to disallow the appellant’s entitlement to PIP.
Furthermore, I submit that the FtT have not only erred in law by failing to consider regulation 33, but they have also failed by not sufficiently warning the appellant of their intention to disallow the award of benefit.
The FtT stated in the SoR ‘the appellant had been warned his existing PIP award could potentially be increased, decreased, or removed entirely by the Tribunal’ (paragraph 25). While the FtT did inform the appellant of the potential adverse decision, they failed to correctly warn the appellant of their intention to disallow his award and at ‘...no point was the appellant made aware of the specific concerns of the tribunal…so as to enable him to prepare his case…’ (CPIP/3480/2016, paragraph 12). The FtT ultimately decided to disallow the appellants’ award without providing the appellant an explanation of their specific concerns therefore, failing to allow him the opportunity to prepare his case by adjourning the hearing.
I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law for both the reasons summarised above by Ms Ali. I therefore allow the Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal, set aside (cancel) the FTT’s decision and remit (send back) the original appeal for re-hearing to a new tribunal, which must make a fresh decision.
- Heading
- The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 4 April 2023 under number SC285/22/01290 was made in error of law. Under section 12(2)(a) and
- This appeal to the Upper Tribunal: the result in a sentence
- The Upper Tribunal’s decision in summary and what happens next
- The chronology of the appeal
- The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
- What happens next: the new First-tier Tribunal
- Conclusions
![[2024] UKUT 198 (AAC)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_3a2BKne.png)