[2024] UKUT 206 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2024] UKUT 206 (AAC)

Fecha: 12-Jul-2024

The Upper Tribunal proceedings

The Upper Tribunal proceedings

7.

Following a hearing on 13 February 2024, I gave permission to appeal.

8.

The permission decision noted that, in addition to how the FTT decision summarised Mrs Farnsworth’s FTT appeal form, box 5a of that form (“grounds of appeal”) said “Please see my notes attached” and these run from A15 to A46 in the FTT bundle; these were largely copies of documents, as the FTT decision noted, but they are interspersed with notes by Mrs Farnsworth. The permission decision noted that, in these, Mrs Farnsworth referred to the information requested as the DLP consultants report (for example on page A30).

9.

The permission decision found it arguable that the FTT erred in law by construing Mrs Farnsworth’s grounds of appeal overly literally, given that she is a litigant in person; arguably, the FTT, acting inquisitorially and in keeping with the overriding objective of the FTT’s procedure rules, should have recognised that

a.

asking the FTT to tell her the “differences” between the information she requested (in her terms, the DLP consultants report), and a report published by the council (and to which she had access), Mrs Farnsworth was in effect just asking (again) for disclosure of the information she had requested; and

b.

it was inherent in her information request (by her repeated reference to the “DLP consultants report”) that she regarded her request as relating to a self-standing document (being a (complete) document delivered by a separate company, DLP Planning Ltd, to the council) – and so, contrary to the position taken in the challenged IC decision, outwith regulation 12(4)(d) (although Mrs Farnsworth, not being a lawyer, did not articulate her position by reference to that regulation).

10.

The permission decision found the foregoing arguable error on the part of the FTT to be material: if the FTT had recognised Mrs Farnsworth’s grounds as being that the challenged IC decision erred by treating her information request as caught by regulation 12(4)(d), then it was realistically arguable that the FTT would not have struck out the appeal as having no reasonable prospect of success, as it was (again) realistically arguable that a report written by a consultant company and given to the council was neither “material still in the course of completion”, nor an “unfinished document”. (The permission decision noted in particular that “material” in the former phrase was held in Highways England Company Ltd v IC and Manisty [2019] AACR 17, a ‘reported’ decision of this chamber of the Upper Tribunal, at [23], to mean something with physical existence i.e. not something incorporeal, like a project, an exercise or a process).

11.

IC produced a response to the appeal, drafted by counsel; and Mrs Farnsworth put in a reply. IC said the appeal should be determined on the papers; Mrs Farnsworth asked for an oral hearing. In all the circumstances, I have decided it is fair and just to determine this appeal without a hearing.

12.

I am grateful to both parties for their submissions.

IC’s submissions

13.

IC’s submissions referred to the detail of the challenged IC decision, in particular paragraphs 13 and 14 (under the heading, “The Council’s arguments”), which stated that

a.

the requested information was “the draft version” of the decision made by the council on Mrs Farnsworth’s planning application;

b.

the council had explained to IC that “a third party was contracted to assist with a number of planning applications, due to an increased workload. The contract involved the third party investigating and processing planning applications, which were then sent for consideration by the Council’s Head of Planning and the Development Control Manager; much the same way that the Council’s own officers would work”.

14.

IC’s submissions also referred to several of the paragraphs of the challenged IC decision under the heading, “Balance of the public interest”, which contained reasoning about the public interest in releasing “draft reports in relation to planning applications”, and included noting that the council published “the final versions of these reports online”. IC had seen the requested information (the “draft decision document”, as the challenged IC decision called it) and noted that “whilst there are some changes, these do not impact on the outcome of the final draft report that has been disclosed. Amendments have been made from the draft to the final version, however, these are to make the final version clearer and more concise, as well as removing information which could be considered personal data”.

15.

IC submitted that:

a.

the FTT decision was right to conclude that Mrs Farnsworth’s FTT appeal notice did not raise any ground of appeal falling within the FTT’s jurisdiction

b.

there was nothing on the face of Mrs Farnsworth’s FTT appeal form capable of being construed as an argument that the requested information was a self-standing complete document, such that regulation 12(4)(d) was not engaged; it was contended that Mrs Farnsworth “appears to accept” that the requested information was a “draft”: her email to IC of 9 August 2022 was cited, which referred to the “DLP consultants draft report”

c.

in the alternative – even if the FTT decision did err in law by not construing Mrs Farnsworth’s true ground of appeal as being that regulation 12(4)(d) did not apply to the requested information – it was submitted that any such error was immaterial, because

i.

the law is clear that “drafts” of documents are “unfinished documents” (and remain so even after the document is finalised) and so fall within regulation 12(4)(d)

ii.

on the facts of this case, the requested information related to a draft of the council’s report on the relevant planning application; the “unfinished” nature of the document to which the requested information related, was not “negated” by the fact that the council “outsourced its production” to DLP, rather than being produced in-house by the council’s own staff

iii.

an appeal on the basis that the requested information did not relate to an “unfinished document”, therefore, had no reasonable prospect of success.